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The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S.
Government's Campaign Against
International Bribery
By H. LOWELL BROWN:::
The recent prosecution of an Italian corporation, Montedison,
S.p.A.,' by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for
violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)' based on
conduct that occurred entirely in Italy, once again brings into sharp
focus Congress' assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign
commercial activity. Recent international initiatives by the
Organization of American States' and the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development4 further underscore efforts, primarily
by the U.S. government, to "level the playing field" of international
commerce through the prohibition of government bribery.
For U.S. companies, these developments are generally positive
since the FCPA's prohibition of foreign bribery has been viewed as
putting U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage with non-U.S.
companies that are not subject to the same injunction.' However,
* Assistant General Counsel, Northrop Grumman Corporation. The viev, s
expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the ievs of
Northrop Grumman Corporation.
1. SEC v. Montedison, S.p.A., No. 1:96CV02631 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 21, 19V).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. 1997).
3. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. TEATY-
Doc. No. 105-39,35 I.L.M. 724.
4. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997,37 I.L.M. 1.
5. The FCPA has been perceived and criticized as disadvantaging U.S.
companies doing business overseas. In a 1981 report, the Comptroller General
reported to Congress that sixty percent of the companies responding to a
questionnaire concerning compliance with the FCPA were of the %iew that they
could not compete successfully against foreign competitors vwho paid bribes. In
particular, aircraft and construction companies reported that they had lost busines as
a result of FCPA restrictions. The Comptroller General noted, however, that this
belief could neither be supported nor rejected on the basis of verifiable data. Sue
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foreign entities in which U.S. companies have an interest, such as
foreign subsidiaries and overseas joint ventures, may now find
themselves subject to criminal and civil liability for commercial
practices which were formerly beyond the reach of the FCPA and
approved, or at least condoned, in their own countries. " Accordingly,
Impact of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on U.S. Business, [1981 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 82,841 (1981). Another survey of four hundred
stockholders of publicly held corporations and four hundred certified public
accountants also revealed the belief that the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA
caused U.S. companies to lose business. See Manuel A. Tipgos, Compliance with the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Aug. 1981, at 44; see also HOWARD
L. WEISBERG & ERIC REICHENBERG, THE PRICE OF AMBIGUITY: MORE THAN THREE
YEARS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (1981); Johr Kimelman, The
Lonely Boy Scout, FINANCIAL WORLD, Aug. 16, 1994, at 50. In cortrast however, a
survey of Fortune 500 companies conducted between 1977 and 1978 found that sixty-
six percent of the respondents did not feel disadvantaged by the FCPA. Instead, the
study found that much of the business lost by U.S. companies due to bribery was lost
to other U.S. companies. The study also noted that often the corrupt payments were
never delivered by intermediaries who instead kept them. Id. The government noted
a reluctance on the part of U.S. companies to report incidents in which business was
lost due to a competitor's bribery. See, e.g., Annual Report of the Office of the United
States Trade Representative on Discrimination in Foreign Governmnt Procurement
(last modified Apr. 30, 1996) <http:llwww.ustr.gov/reports/ special/title7.html> ("It
appears that many U.S. firms are hesitant to come forward publicly with cases in
which they have seen bribery and corruption influence contract awards for fear that
they may experience a commercial backlash with respect to future contracts"). The
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative nevertheless reported that "[ijnformation
from U.S. embassies and other sources indicate that bribery and corruption play a
significant role in procurement decisions in many countries." Id. A 1996 study by the
U.S. Department of Commerce reported that between April 1994 and May 1995
there were approximately one hundred cases in which foreign bribes "undercut"
efforts to win procurements valued at $45 billion. See Kirk Victor, Dirty Dealing,
NAT'L J., Apr. 20, 1996, at 870; Administration Highlights Bribery A': Trade Problem
for U.S. Exporters, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1711 (Oct. 18, 1995). But see Daniel
Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of
Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185,207-10 (1994).
6. For example, the OECD Anti-Corruption Unit noted that bribes to foreign
officials were tax deductible as a business expense under the laws of Australia,
Belgium, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, and Switzerland. See Tax Treatment of
Bribes in OECD Member Countries (as of 23 of October 1998) (last modified 29
March 1999), OECD Anti-Corruption Unit,
<http:llvwv.oecd.org/daflnocorruption/annex3.htm>. On October 23, 1998, this
Unit reported that Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands and
Switzerland adopted or were in the process of adopting legislation that would deny
tax-deductibility to foreign bribes. In addition, Australia, Luxembourg, New
Zealand, and Sweden were considering similar legislation. See Update on the
Implementation of the OECD Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to
Foreign Public Officials: Report by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD Doc.
C/Min (97)17/Add.3 (May 26, 1997) [hereinafter Implementing the OECD
Recommendation]. See also id.
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for U.S. companies doing business internationally and their overseas
partners, as well as for foreign corporations subject to U.S.
jurisdiction, there is cause for concern.7 Part I of this article provides
an overview of the FCPA's regulatory scheme. Part II discusses the
issues of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction arising from the
assertion of extra-territoriality under the FCPA. Part III reviews
various initiatives through which the United States has attempted to
curb international bribery. Finally, Part IV considers the possible
effects on both U.S. and foreign entities and individuals.
I. Overview of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The FCPA, originally enacted in 1977, had its genesis in the
disclosure by the Watergate Special Prosecutor and SEC of overseas
"slush funds" used by U.S. companies to make illegal political
contributions to the Nixon re-election campaign and others, and to
pay bribes to foreign government officials.' Thus, Congress intended
7. Indeed, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission announced its
intention of increasing enforcement of the FCPA in regard to the activities of
overseas offices of U.S. firms and foreign issuers whose securities are listed in the
United States. See SEC to Boost Bribery Surveillance of Overseas Firms, Global
Compliance Rep. (Oct. 6, 1997). Paul V. Gerlach, Associate Director of the SEC
Division of Enforcement, signaled the likelihood of more enforcement actions like
Montedison, "While we have not brought a lot of cases in the recent past, there w~ill
be more in the future." Dominic Benciuenga, Antibribery Campaign: SEC Cracks
Down on Illegal Payments Abroad, N.Y.LJ., Apr. 10, 1997, at 5. The SEC Director
of Enforcement expressed similar sentiments, See David B. Fein & Timothy A.
Diemand, Companies Face Scrutiny and Penalties Under FCPA, Co... L. TRIB, Jan.
19, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, CLT File: see also David M. Zornow &
Keith D. Krakaur, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Anti-Bribery Provisions Examined,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 18, 1997, at 1.
S. The FCPA was signed into law by President Carter on December 19, 1977.
PUB. PAPERS 2157 (Dec. 20, 1977). Since then, the FCPA was amended once. by the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, §§ 5]014)3, 1t02
Stat. 1107 (19S8), although amendments were offered in 1980. 1931, 1983 and 1935.
See Adam Fremantle & Sherman Katz. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Amendments of 1988, 23 INT'L LAWv. 755,759 n.27 (1989).
9. As Philip A. Loomis, Jr., a Commissioner of the SEC, explained:
Our current involvement may be said to have grovn out of the investigations
made by the Watergate Special Prosecutors Office of illegal, and therefore
undisclosed, corporate campaign contributions in the 1972 elections. Our
staff, observing these proceedings, recognized that the activities disclosed for
the first time involved questions of possible significance to the public
investors and that this might have a bearing upon our responsibilities.
Accordingly, the Special Prosecutor's Office referred to us information
obtained in various of its investigations.
The Activities of Am. Multinational Corps. Abroad, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
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the FCPA to address the problem of overseas bribery. The Act
approaches this issue in two distinct, though related, ways.
First, the FCPA prohibits the payment or offer of payment"'
either directly, indirectly or through a third party," of money or
on Int'l Economic Policy of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong. 36 (1975)
[hereinafter June 17th Statement]; see also Foreign Payments Dis losure: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 94 Cong. 1 (1976) (remarks of Chairman John M. Murphy)
("While investigating certain contributions to the former presidential campaign, the
Watergate Special Prosecutor uncovered a number of corporate political slush funds.
These funds had been concealed from normal corporate accounting controls. Since
such activities involved matters of possible significance to public investors, the
Securities and Exchange Commission initiated its own investigation. Their
investigation revealed that a number of U.S. corporations, in connection with their
overseas operations, had used such secret slush funds for questionable or illegal
foreign payments.") [hereinafter Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearings].
10. The FCPA prohibits not only payments actually made to foreign officials but
also the "offer... promise to pay, or authorization of the giving of anything of value"
to foreign officials. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §s 78dd-1, 78dd-2
(Supp. 1997).
11. The FCPA also prohibits payments made to third parties "while knowing that
all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given or promised,
directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political party, or official
thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office." 15 U.S.C.§§ 78dd-l(a)(3).
dd-2(a)(3). As enacted in 1977, the FCPA prohibited third party payments if there
was "reason to know" that all or a portion of such payment would be given or
promised to a foreign official. 15 U.S.C.§§ 78 dd-l(a)(3), dd-2(a)(3) (1978) (amended
1988). However, this "reason to know" standard was criticized for being so
ambiguous that negligent payments could fall within its scope. See Bus. Accounting
and Foreign Trade Simplification Act Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
and Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking. Hous. and
Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 45-46 (Malcom Baldridge, Secretary of Commerce), 85-86
(Caiman J. Cohen, Emergency Committee for American Trade), 96-98 (Allen B.
Green, American Bar Association Public Contract Law Section) (1986) [hereinafter
Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act Hearings]; Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act- Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms.,
Consumer Protection, and Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong.
243 (William E. Brock, U.S. Trade Representative), 278 (She,-man E. Ungar,
Department of Commerce), 356 (John T. Subak, Rohm and Haas Company) (1982)
[hereinafter FCPA-Oversight Hearings]; GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE
WINDSOR, TiE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACr: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 96-97
(1982); Mark A. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 15 INT'L L. & POL'Y 627, 631 (1983); John M. Fedders, The "Reason to Know"
Standard-A Troublesome Ambiguity in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, MIDDLE
E. ExFCuTIVE REP., July 1981, at 2; Allen B. Green & David A. Churchill,
Antibribery Problems Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices tct, MIDDLE E.
ExEcurIvE REP., Feb. 1982, at 19; Robert S. Levy, The Antibribery Provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Are They Really as Valuable as We Think
They Are?, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 71, 79-80 (1985); Ruth Aurora Witherspoon,
Multinational Corporations-Governmental Regulation of Business Ethics Under the
[Vol. 22:407
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"anything of value," to an official of a foreign government or
political party,' with corrupt intent,'14 to obtain or retain business.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: An Analysis, 87 DICK. L REv. 531,562 (1983).
12. The payment, offer, gift or authorization of the giving of "anything of value"
is prohibited by the FCPA. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), dd-2(a). Although the
prohibited corrupt payment often involves cash or cash equivalent, the term
"anything of value" is not so limited. As used in the domestic bribery statute, the
term "anything of value" is construed broadly to include tangible and intangible
objects. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1999); see United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1192
(5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Nilsen, 967 F.2d 539, 542 (11th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Picquet, 963 F.2d 54, 55 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69,
71 (2d Cir. 1979). Thus, "anything of value" has been construed as including, for
example, charitable donations (Lamb v. Philip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir.
1990)), travel expenses (United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991)) and
transportation of voters who supported the ruling party (United States v. Kenny Int'!
Corp. (D.D.C. 1979), 2 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACS. Acr REP. (BNA) 649 (Dec. 31,
1982).
13. A "foreign official" is defined in the FCPA as "any officer or employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78
dd-l(f)(1), dd-2(h)(2). As originally enacted in 1977, the FCPA definition of "foreign
official" did not include "employees whose duties were primarily ministerial or
clerical." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-831, at 12 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4121,4125. The 1988 amendments removed this limitation, and the U.S. Department
of Justice suggested that the elimination of this exclusion was consistent with the
focus of the act on the nature of the official action, rather than on the position or
duties of the recipient. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTiCES ACT
ANTI-BRIBERY PENSIONS 5 (1992). Also, like the term "public official" in the
domestic bribery statute, "foreign official" is construed broadly. See H. Lowell
Brown, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Redux: The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 INT'L TAX & BUS. L. 260, 275-79 (1994); see, e.g.,
United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 334 (D. Conn. 199)
(consultant to the Jamaica Tourist Board with close personal ties to the Prime
Minister of Jamaica was a "foreign official" under the FCPA).
14. The legislative history in 1977 and 1988 reflects Congress' intent to use the
term "corruptly" analogously to the use of the term in the domestic bribery statute.
See S. REPt. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 409S, 4108; H.R.
REP. No. 95-640, at 7-8 (1977); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-576, at 913 (19S8), reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547. Accordingly, proof of the requisite corrupt intent
requires evidence that the payment was made or offered with the intent of
influencing an official act. See United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th
Cir. 1980) ("[T]he government must show that the money was knowingly offered to
an official with the intent and expectation that, in exchange for the money, some act
of a public official would be influenced. The money must be given with more than
some generalized hope or expectation of ultimate benefit on the part of the
donor.... The money must be offered, in other words, with the intent and design to
influence official action in exchange for the donation."); cf. United States v. Dorri, 15
F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Corruptly, like 'due process', 'malice aforethought' or
'proximate cause,' is a concept that can't be easily captured in a single formula, as it
varies too much from situation to situation. There's certainly a core meaning to it:
conduct is corrupt if it's an improper way for a public official to benefit from his
job.").
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Not all payments are prohibited, however. Instead, payments,
sometimes referred to as "facilitating payments" or "grease
payments," which are intended only "to expedite or secure the
performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official,
political party, or party officer," are exempt."5 Similarly, payments
that are legal under the written laws of the foreign country " and
payments related to the promotion of products or related to the
performance of contracts 7 are likewise exempt from the overseas
15. What are sometimes referred to as "facilitating payments" -- payments made
in order "to expedite or secure the performance of a routine governmental action by
a foreign official, political party or party officer"-are excepted from the prohibition
against payments to foreign officials. 15 U.S.C.§8 78dd-l(b), dd-2(b). Although not
specifically referred to in the 1977 act, the original legislative history strongly suggests
that the FCPA's prohibition did not apply to so-called "grease payments." See H.R.
REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108. The 1988 amendments made the exception for such
payments explicit, which the House-Senate Conference made clear were for routine
governmental actions, i.e., "ordinarily and commonly performed actions with respect
to permits or licenses," and not for "those governmental approvals involving an
exercise of discretion by a government official where the actions are the functional
equivalent of obtaining or retaining business." H. R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 921
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547. Accordingly, the FCPA defines
"routine governmental action" as being:
ordinarily and commonly performed ... in connection with: (i) obtaining
permits, licenses or other official documents to qualify a person to do
business in a foreign country; (ii) processing governmental papers; (iii)
providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling
inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to
transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone service, power and
water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products
or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(A); dd-2(h)(4)(A) (Supp.
1997). Such "routine governmental actions" do not include:
any decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award new
business to or to continue business with a particular party, or any action
taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making process to
encourage a decision to award new business to or continue business with a
particular party.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78 dd-l(f)(3)(B); dd-2(h)(4)(B).
16. The Conference on the 1988 amendments noted that the absence of a
prohibition against such payments under the country's laws, however, would not
thereby establish the legality of payments otherwise subject to the FCPA. H. R.
CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 922 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547. Instead,
in order to fall within the statutory defense, the FCPA requires that the payment be
"lawful under the written laws and regulations" of the country in wbich the payment
was made. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (c)(1), dd-2(c)(1) (Supp. 1997)(emphasis added); see
H. R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 921-22 (1988), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547.
17. It is also a statutory defense under the FCPA that the payment to a foreign
official was directly related to the promotion, demonstration or explanation of
[Vol, 22:407
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payment prohibitions of the Act.
In addition to these anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA
established accounting and controls requirements for companies
registered with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of
193 4 .S Establishment of these requirements represented a significant
expansion of the SEC's regulatory authority and marked the first time
the federal government established standards for the internal
management of public companies. "
products and services, or to the execution or performance of a contract. 15 U.S.C. §§
78 dd-l(c)(2), dd-2(c)(2). The U.S. Department of Justice issued several releases
concerning such payments under the review and opinion procedure mandated by the
FCPA, 15 U.S.C. sections 78dd-l(e) and dd-2(f), under its regulations, 2- C.F.R.
sections 80.1 to 80.16 (1997). In those releases, the Department of Justice stated that
it would not take enforcement action against Io\va Beef Packers. Inc., vhich
proposed providing samples of beef to the Soviet Ministry of Trade for inspection
and tasting (Release No. 81-02); the State of Missouri Agriculture De.partment,
which proposed to pay for the meals, lodging, entertainment and in-state trael of a
ten member delegation from Mexico to sample agricultural products lRelease No.
82-01): a U.S. company, which proposed to pay for meals, lodging, entertainment and
domestic airfare expenses of the general manager of a foreign entity and his vife in
connection with a ten day promotional tour of the company's U.S. facilities I Releas:e
No. 83-02); a U.S. company, which proposed to pay for the round-trip airfare, meals.
lodging and entertainment of a Singapore official to attend demonstrations and
meetings during a ten day period (Release No. 83-3). and ARCO, wlhich proposed to
pay for the travel, meals, lodging and entertainment of French officials responsible
for licenses necessary for ARCO's construction of a chemical plant so that the
officials could visit an ARCO plant in Texas (Release No. 85-1). The Conference on
the 1988 amendments, emphasized, however, that if the payment were made with a
corrupt intent, the defense that the payment was intended for product promotion or
contract performance would not be available. Thus, the conference stated that -[I1f a
payment or gift is corruptly made, in return for an official act or omission. then it
cannot be a bona fide, good faith payment, and this defense would not be available-).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78o.
19. Thus, it was observed in SEC r. World-Wide Coin Irs.. Ltil., 567 F. Supp.
724,747 (N.D. Ga. 1983):
The accounting provisions of the FCPA will undoubtedly affect the
governance and accountability mechanisms of most major and minor
corporations, the work of their independent auditors, and the role of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The maintenance of financial records
and internal accounting controls are major every-day activities of every
registered and/or reporting company. The FCPA also has important
implications for the SEC, since the incorporation of the accounting
provisions into the federal securities laws confers on the SEC new
rulemaking and enforcement authority over the control and recordkeeping
mechanisms of its registrants. The consequence of adding these substantive
requirements governing accounting control to the federal securities la%% S ill
significantly augment the degree of federal involvement in the internal
management of public corporations.
See also Barbara Crutchfield George & Mary Jane Dundas, Responsibilitics of
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Heralded as "a new era" in federal regulation," thie accounting
and controls provisions represented a significant departure from the
previous law, which established disclosure standards and prohibited
the making of false entries in a company's books and records.2
Although these provisions remained unchanged, the FCPA added
Domestic Corporate Management Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31
SYRACUSE L. REV. 865, 880 n.79 (1980) ("The accounting standards provisions of the
FCPA regulate the everyday operations of a publicly-hld corporation.
Notwithstanding its other powers, the SEC has never had authority to regulate the
internal operations of American corporations. This power has now been given to the
SEC through section 13 (b)(2)(A) and 13 (b)(2)(B) of the 1934 Act.").
20. George & Dundas, supra note 19, at 866-67 ("The internal accounting
provisions of the FCPA have changed the mandate of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) by giving that agency the means for regulating the internal
management of domestic corporations. Thus, the FCPA heralds a new era."); see
George J. Siedel, Corporate Governance Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 21
Q. REv. ECON. & Bus. 43, 44 (1981) ("the accounting provisions were referred to as
the most significant intrusion into corporate affairs since the 1930's when federal
securities legislation was originally enacted").
21. Prior to the enactment of the accounting and control requirements, the SEC
based its enforcement actions arising from overseas corrupt payments on the
prohibition in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against making material false
statements in a company's books and records. See 15 U.S.C. § 76m(b)(2)(A). As
then-SEC Commissioner Loomis observed:
Inquiry into illegal campaign contributions disclosed the falsification of
corporate financial statements to disguise or conceal the source and
application of corporate funds misused for this purpose. Mort specifically,
they disclosed, in some instances, the existence of secret 'slush funds,'
derived from the creation of expenses for fictitious purposes and disbursed
without accountability by corporate executives. In our view, this type of
activity necessarily rendered inaccurate the financial statements filed with
the commission.
June 17th Statement, supra note 9, at 36. A former Deputy Director of the SEC
Division of Enforcement also noted:
In the early days when we were drafting some of the complaints in the first
cases, the seeds were planted for the FCPA as we know it. For example, the
first thing we did when we drafted our complaints in these cases was to seek
an injunction against the falsification of books and records. At that time,
there was no requirement that companies maintain accurate books and
records, but we sought injunctions against false entries. That was the seed
for Section 13 (b)(2)(a) of the Exchange Act.
Wallace Timmeny, An Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 235,
236 (1982). See Steven M. Morgan, In Search of an International Solution to Bribery:
The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 on Corporate Behavior, 12
VAND. J. TRANS. L. 359, 361 n.11 (1979) ("[t]he SEC proceeded on the theory that
misleading or suppressed disclosure of improper or questionable e.4penditures could
violate § 13 (a) of the Exchange Act ... and the rules and regulations thereunder, all
of which relate to the filing of periodic and other reports with the SEC by registered
companies. The SEC then brought the injunctive actions under § 21(d) of the
Exchange Act").
[Vol. 22-407
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requirements directed at the accuracy and completeness of
information entered into accounting systems.- Thus, it was said, the
FCPA sought to assure the accuracy of the "inputs" as well as the
"outputs."
The accounting and control provisions require issuers:' to "make
and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer."2 Issuers are also required to have internal
controls in place,: which provide "reasonable assurances"' that:
22. As one commentator noted, "[i]t is the obligation of the SEC to ensure that
investors are fully informed of material financial dealings of subject corporations. It
is therefore not surprising that the Commission viewed increasing evidence of foreign
bribery as a frustration of the system of corporate accountability." Jean D. Reed.
Corporate Self-Investigations Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 U. CHI. L.
REv. 803, 806 (1980).
23. A former chief counsel to the SEC's Division of Enforcement observed:
The [FCPA] has nothing to do with the output of the accounting system,
which is reflected in the financial statements and other disclosure
documents. It is a statutory requirement that regulates the input that goes
into the accounting system. It regulates how individual transactions must be
recorded, as distinguished from how financial information based upon the
aggregate results of all transactions must be discussed.
Frederick B. Wade, An Examination of the Provisions and Standards of the FCPA, 9
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 255,263 (1982).
24. The accounting and controls provisions of the FCPA apply to -every issuer
which has a class of securities registered pursuant to [15 U.S.C. § 78e] and every
issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to [15 U.S.C. § 78o]." 15 U.S.C. §
78m(b)(2) (Supp. 1997).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). Use of the term -accurately" %as intended to
mean that transactions would be recorded in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles. Thus, in construing the accounting requirements, "standards
of reasonableness must apply. In this regard, the term 'accurately' does not mean
exact precision as measured by some abstract principle. Rather, it means that an
issuer's records should reflect transactions in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles or other applicable criteria." S. REP. No. 95-114, at 8 (1977).
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4106.
26. Although intended to work in concert with the accounting provisions, [tihe
internal controls requirement is primarily designed to give statutory content to an
aspect of management stewardship responsibility, that of providing shareholders vith
reasonable assurances that the business is adequately controlled." SEC v. Worldvide
Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. at 750. As the court explained:
Internal accounting control is, generally speaking, only one aspect of a
company's total control system: in order to maintain accountability for the
disposition of its assets, a business accounting controls element of a
company's control system is that which is specifically designed to provide
reasonable, cost-effective safeguards against the unauthorized use or
disposition of company assets and reasonable assurances that financial
records and accounts are sufficiently reliable for purposes of external
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(i) Transactions are executed in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as
necessary (a) to permit preparation of financial statement in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any
other criteria applicable to such statements, and (b) to maintain
accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in
accordance with management's general or specific authorization,
and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is
taken with respect to any differencesY
Enforcement of the FCPA is shared by the SEC and the U.S.
Department of Justice. The SEC retained jurisdiction under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 over issuers;v the FCPA gave the
Department of Justice jurisdiction to bring civil actions to enjoin
violations of the FCPA by "domestic concerns" other than issuers.
reporting. 'Internal accounting controls' must be distinguished from the
accounting system typically found in a company. Accoun,.-ing systems
process transactions and recognize, calculate, classify, post, summarize and
report transactions. Internal controls safeguard assets and assure the
reliability of financial records, one of their main jobs being to prevent and
detect errors and irregularities that arise in the accounting sy:;tems of the
company. Internal accounting controls are basic indicators of the reliability
of the financial statement and the accounting system and record:; from which
financial statements are prepared.
Id. at 750.
27. As used in the FCPA accounting and controls provisions, "reasonable
assurances" and "reasonable detail" are defined as "such level and degree of
assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs." 15
U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7). This provision was added by the 1988 amendments "in order to
clarify that the current standard does not connote an unrealistic degree of exactitude
or precision. The concept of reasonableness of necessity contemplates the weighing
of a number of relevant factors including costs of compliance." H. R. CONF. REP.
No. 100-576, at 917 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547; see also Statement of
SEC Chairman John S.R. Shad Before Joint Hearings of the Subcomm. on Sec. and
the Subcomm. on Int'l Fin. and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Concerning S. 708, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH), 82, 882 (1981) [hereinafter Statement of SEC Chairman Shad] ("The
Commission believes the 'prudent man' test eliminates issuers' concerns over de
minimus inaccuracies and sets an appropriate minimum standard for publicly owned
corporations").
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). These requirements were summarized by a former
Chairman of the SEC, Harold M. Williams, as follows: "In essence, these objectives
are that assets be safeguarded from unauthorized use, that corporate transactions
conform to managerial authorizations, and that records are accurate." Remarks of
Harold M. Williams Before the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
SEC Release No. 34-17500,46 Fed. Reg. 11,544 (1981).
29. 15 U.S.C. §78u.
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The Department of Justice also retained jurisdiction to prosecute
violations of the Act criminally. ."
The penalties for violating the FCPA are substantial. Indihiduals
convicted of violating the anti-bribery provisions may be sentenced
for a period of up to five years imprisonment and fined $100,000." A
civil penalty of a maximum $10,000 also may be imposed.'
Additionally, the act prohibits the payment by a corporation of any
fine assessed against an individual.3 A corporation may be fined up
to $2,000,000.l
Knowing violation of the accounting and controls provisions may
also constitute a crime. An individual who committed a knowing
violation may be imprisoned for up to ten years and fined up to
$1,000,000.' Under the same circumstances, a corporation may be
fined up to $2,500,000.2'
H. Extra-Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction under the FCPA
A. Congressional Intent
The federal government's authority to punish the extraterritorial
crimes of its own citizens is among the oldest principles in U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence.' Indeed, several scholars have noted
30. 15 U.S.C. § 7Sdd-2(d) (Supp. 1997). The term "domestic concern" is defined
as:
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national or resident, of the United States;
and (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company.
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has
its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized
under the laws of a state of the United States or a territory, possession, or
commonwealth of the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1). Joint responsibility for enforcement has been criticized as
being cumbersome and inefficient. Pines, supra note 5, at 193-94.
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2 (g)(2),78ff (c)(2) (Supp. 1997).
32- Id.
33. Id. §§ 7Sdd-2 (g)(3), 78ff (c)(1).
34. 1& §§ 78dd-2 (g)(1), 78ff (c)(1).
35. Id §78ff(a).
36. Id.
37. As early as 1808, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated, albeit in dicta, that:
It is conceded that the legislation of every country is territorial; that beyond
its own territory, it can only affect its own subjects or citizens.... The rights
of war may be exercised on the high seas, because war is carried on upon the
high seas; but the pacific rights of sovereignty must be exercised within the
territory of the sovereign.
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that the Constitution does not limit Congress' legislative reach."
Nevertheless, as broad as Congress' inchoate authority may be to
govern and punish extraterritorial conduct, Congress exercises this
authority only sparingly.39 Others also suggested that Congress'
Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241,279 (1808).
38. In this regard, Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld observed:
The Constitution does not express any territorial limitation on the
powers of Congress. For example, the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and to enact criminal laws necessary and proper to carry out
the regulations of commerce, might well include laws that apply outside as
well as within the territory of the United States, to aliens a!; well as to
nationals....
The Constitution also grants to Congress the power to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the
law of nations. In addition, Congress must have at lease some of the powers
inherent in the international sovereignty of the United States, which being
unenumerated, have no express territorial limitation.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
International Law, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 880, 881 (1989); see United States v. Felix-
Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Generally, there is no constitutional
bar to the extraterritorial application of United States penal laws"). The absence of
constitutional limitation on Congress' extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction was
noted by Professor Lea Brilmayer, as well:
In the international context ... the Constitution plays virtually nD role at all.
The Supreme Court has never invalidated the extraterritorial application of
federal law on constitutional grounds. In fact, none of the Court's decisions
on extraterritorial application even seriously discuss the constitutional
issues. The most attention these decisions ever give to the issue is a back
handed reference to the Constitution at the outset of the discussion about
congressional intent.
Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological
and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 11, 24 (1987). Professor
Brilmayer also suggested that the extraterritorial effect of legislation is nevertheless
subject to the requirements of due process. Id. at 27-28; see also Christopher J. Lord,
Stapled Stock and LR.C. Section 269B: Ill-Conceived Change in the Rules of
International Tax Jurisdiction, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1066, 1067 (19q6) ("Except for
the due process clause, which proscribes arbitrary taxation, no constitutional
provision or international law restricts the scope of United State tax jurisdiction");
Bret A. Sumner, Due Process and True Conflicts: The Constitutonal Limits on
Extraterritorial Federal Legislation and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act of 1996,46 CATH. U.L. REv. 907, 908-09 (1997).
39. See Lowenfeld, supra note 38, at 882 ("Whatever the answers that an
uncertain constitutional jurisprudence might give [as to the limics of Congress'
extraterritorial authority], Congress has in fact respected the territorial limitations
imposed by international law, at least until recently. In that policy, I think Congress
has followed the lead of the framers"); Stephen B. Swigert, Extra-Territorial
Jurisdiction in Criminal Law, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 346, 348 (1972) ("Although the
Supreme Court recognized the federal government's power to punish extraterritorial
offenses as early as 1808, Congress has only rarely indicated an express intent either
to restrict the application of its criminal statues to acts committed within United
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extraterritorial jurisdiction, at least with respect to crimes, should be
exercised in accordance with the norms of international law."
There are five generally recognized theories of extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction under international law. These are the
territorial, protective, nationality, universal, and passive personality
theories." Of these theories, territoriality and nationality
States territory or to authorize their application to acts committed abroad").
40. See Lowenfeld, supra note 38, at S81,2 ("It is arguable that the Constitution
permits Congress to make acts committed abroad crimes under United States law
only to the extent permitted by international law. It is arguable that, especially when
Congress acts under its power to define offenses against the law of nations, it cannot
violate territorial limitations imposed by that law"). Mr. Chief Justice Marshall made
this point as well in Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. at 276-77 ("if [the court of a foreign
nation] exercised a jurisdiction which, according to the law of nations, its sovereign
could not confer, however available its sentences may be within the dominions of the
prince from whom the authority is derived, they are not regarded by foreign courts").
For a discussion and critical analysis of the integration of "customary international
law" into U.S. federal common law, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Conmmon Law:. A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. Rnv. 815 (1997).
41. These five theories of jurisdiction were identified in the seminal study:
Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AlM. J.
INT'L L. 435 (1935) [hereinafter Harvard Researdz]. As the introductory comment
explained:
An analysis of modem national codes of penal law and penal procedure,
checked against the conclusions of reliable writers and the resolutions of
international conferences or learned societies, and supplemented by some
exploration of the jurisprudence of national courts, discloses five general
principles on which a more or less extensive penal jurisdiction is claimed by
States at the present time. These five principles are: first, the territorial
principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the place where the
offense is committed; second, the nationality principle, determining
jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the
person committing the offense; third, the protective principle, determining
jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the offence;
fourth, the universality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the
custody of the person committing the offense and fifth, the passive
personality principle determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality
or national character of the person injured by the offence.
Id. at 445 (emphasis added). These five theories of jurisdiction are incorporated in
the Restatement, as well. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELTIO',S § 402
cnts. c-g (1986). In his paper prepared for the Eighth Congress of the International
Academy of Comparative Law, Professor Rollin M. Perkins suggested four theories
of criminal jurisdiction: territorial, Roman, injured forum and cosmopolitan. Rollin
M. Perkins, The Territorial Principle in Criminal Law, 27 HASTINGS LJ. 155 (1971).
Under Professor Perkin's construct, the "Roman" theory is, in essence, the same as
the "nationality" theory (i.e., "[t]he perpetrator, rather than the place of
perpetration, is the determinant under the Roman theory. A nation, in this view, has
jurisdiction over its national wherever he may be and hence can hold him
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predominate in their acceptance as bases for extraterritorial assertion
of a State's prescriptive jurisdiction."2
Congress has exercised its prescriptive jurisdiction consistently
with each of these theories." However, absent clear guidance from
accountable for his criminal misdeed wherever committed. It is the logical outgrowth
of the conception of law enforcement as a means of disciplining members of the tribe
or clan"). Id. Similarly, Perkins' "injured forum" theory places emphasis upon the
effect of the crime (i.e., "[t]he injured forum theory places emphasis upon the effect
of crime. A nation may take jurisdiction of any crime which has the effect of causing
harm to it"). Id. The "cosmopolitan" theory appears to be a synthesis of the
"universality" and "passive personality" theories (i.e., "this theory i; drawn upon the
extent necessary to authorize any nation having actual control of a pirate, and
evidence of his piracy, to convict him no matter who he may be, wherever his acts of
piracy were committed, and without reference to the harm resulting therefrom"). Id.
at 1156.
42. As the Harvard study noted:
Of these five principles, the first is everywhere regarded as of primary
importance and of fundamental character. The second i., universally
accepted, though there are striking differences in the context to which it is
used in the different national systems. The third is claimed by most States,
regarded with misgivings in a few, and generally ranked as the basis of an
auxiliary competence. The fourth is widely though by no means universally
accepted as the basis of an auxiliary competence, except for t&e offence of
piracy, with respect to which it is the generally recognized principle of
jurisdiction. The fifth, asserted in some form by a considerable number of
States and contested by others, is admittedly auxiliary in character and is
probably not essential for any State if the ends served are adequately
provided for on other principles.
Harvard Research, supra note 41, at 445.
43. For a general discussion of laws affecting U.S. business ov rseas, see Bruce
Zagaris, Avoiding Criminal Liability in the Conduct of International Business, 21 WM.
MITCHELL L. Rv. 749 (1996). The "territorial principle" has been described as "the
primary principle applied by U.S. courts." See Christopher L. Blakesley, United
States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. 1109. 1114-23 (1982);
Lowenfeld, supra note 38, at 883; Perkins, supra note 41; Ellen S. Podgor,
Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar Crime, .34 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 325, 342 (1997). See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276
(1927); United States v. Pacific and Arctic Ry. and Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106
(1913). Prosecution of extraterritorial crime has been upheld on the basis of the
other theories of jurisdiction as well.
With regard to the protective theory, see, for example, Ford v. United States, 273
U.S. 593, 619-20 (1927); Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911); United States
v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Caicedo, 47
F.3d 370, 371 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1327 (3d Cir. 1993): United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d
1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 462 (3rd Cir. 1987); United States v. Wright-
Palmer, 784 F.2d 161, 168 (3rd Cir. 1986); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d
1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Marc Rich & Co., A.G.), 707
[Vol. 22:407
1999] Extraterritorial Reach of Campaign Against International Bribery 421
Congress, either in the statute or its legislative history, courts will
indulge in a presumption of territoriality. That is, courts will presume
that U.S. law does not have extraterritorial effect." Where
F.2d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Gilboe. 684 F.2d 235, 238 12d Cir. 19,2):
United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1973); Steginan r. United States,
425 F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Pizzanisso, 38S F.2d 8. 9-10 (2d Cir.
1968); United States v. Braverman, 376 F.2d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 1967); Marin 1'. United
States. 352 F.2d 174, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1965); Rocha v. United States, 28S F.2d 545.54S.
49 (9th Cir. 1961). See also Blakesley, supra note 43, at 112--39, Podgor, supra note
43, at 342-43.
With regard to the "nationality theory," see, for example, Kawaita n United
States. 343 U.S. 717, 732-36 (1952); Skiriotes v. Florida. 313 U.S. 69. 76-77 (1941);
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,436-38 (1932); United States v. Bol,man, 2,69
U.S. 94, 102 (1922); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); United States . Juda,
46 F.3d at 966; United States v. Harvey, 2 F-3d at 1328-29; United States v. Thomas.
893 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Goldberg, 830 F2d at 463-0.4:
United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1986); United States r. Reh, 79
F.2d 1541, 1543 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986); United States %- King, 552 F2d 833, 851 19th Cir.
1976); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d at 750; Rocia v. United States, 2$8 F.2d 545,
548 (9th Cir. 1961); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921,929-31 (1st Cir. 19481.
With regard to the "universal theory," see, for example, United States v. Yunis,
924 F.2d 1086,1090 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See also Abraham Abramovsky. Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The United States' Unwarranted Attempt to Alter International Law in
United States v. Yunis, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 121, 136 (1990); Jordan J. Paust, Federal
Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Forcign
Violations of International Law Under FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine. 23 V.*. J.
INT'L L. 191 (1983); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 TEX. L. REv. 785 (198S).
With regard to the "passive personality theory," see, for example. United States
v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 841; United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1690. See also
Blakesley, supra note 43, at 1139-41; Mason H. Drake, United States r. Yunis: The
D.C. Circuit's Dubious Approval of U.S. Long-Arn Jurisdiction over Eriraterritorial
Crimes, 87 Nw. U.L. Rev. 697,704-13 (1993); Lowenfeld, supra note 38, at N%-91.
44. Notwithstanding this evolution of extraterritorial jurisdiction, in the absence
of clear congressional guidance, courts continue to indulge a presumption against
extraterritoriality. As the Supreme Court explained in Equal Emploi mcnt
Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244.248 (1991):
Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial
boundaries of the United States. Whether Congress has in fact exercised
that authority ... is a matter of statutory construction.
It is a long-standing principle of American law that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only ithin the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This canon of construction ... is
a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be
ascertained. It serves to protect against unintended clashes bet%%een our
laws and those of other nations, which could result in international discord.
In applying this rule of construction, we look to see whether language in
the relevant act gives any indication of a congressional purpose to extend its
coverage beyond places over which the United States has sovereignty or has
some measure of control. We assume that Congress legislates against the
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extraterritorial effect is asserted, courts often weigh principles of
international law in an attempt to ascertain, post hoc, Congressional
will.45 In contrast, when Congress enacts legislation specifically
directed at governing conduct abroad, it may be assumed that
Congress weighed the implications and likely effect of ihe legislation
on international law and foreign relations. The FCPA plainly
qualifies as such legislation.46
backdrop of the presumption against extraterritorality. Therefore, unless
there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed, we must
presume it is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.
(Citations omitted). See also Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336, U.S. 281,285-88 (1949).
The task of discerning Congressional intent and applying these pre;umptions is not
so simple, however. As Professor Brilimayer pointed out:
The most important consideration governing the extraterritorial application
of American law is hybrid legislative/judicial construct. By and large, the
issue is governed by presumptions which are judicially created and which
often show the influence of international law. At the same time, these
presumptions are presumptions about congressional intent and thus acquire
the status of legislation. It is this hybrid nature of the dominant element in
the methodology that accounts for a substantial part of the problem with our
current situation. Presumptions of legislative intent are something of a
Frankenstein's monster: easy to create, but hard to control.
Brilmayer, supra note 38, at 16.
45. See Podgor, supra note 43, at 340 ("When a statute is silent as to its external
application, courts bear the ultimate responsibility of determining the congressional
intent. Since Congress has often failed to focus on extraterritoriality in drafting
statutes, courts are frequently left to consider the international ramifications of an
extraterritorial application"). See generally Kelly Christie, Commentary, To Applv or
Not to Apply: Extraterritorial Application of Federal RICO Laws, 8 FLA. J. INT"L L.
131 (1993). In this regard, it has been suggested that political o')jectives guided
courts in determining issues of extraterritoriality. See Lea Brilmayer & Charles
Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Proces, 105 HARV. L,
REv. 1217, 1223 (1992) ("[E]xtraterritorial application of American law has become a
potent tool for effectuating American foreign policy"); Jonathan Turley, 'When in
Rome': Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84
Nw. U. L. REv. 598, 608-38 (1990) (arguing that courts favored extraterritoriality in
"market cases", i.e., statutes geared toward preserving free markets such as the
antitrust and securities laws, while creating an irrebutable presumption against
extraterritoriality in "nonmarket cases," i.e., those involving employment and
environmental law, or that U.S. law was applied extraterritorially wh 'n to do so "has
served the national interest of the United States or its corporate actors"); Mark P.
Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of Democratic
Governance, The Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of Establishing
Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT'L & ComP. L. REV. 297, 304-05 (1996); see also
Brilmayer & Norchi, supra, at 1223.
46. In this connection, it was observed:
When Congress drafts a statute specifically focused on international
activities, it is likely that there has been congressional reflection on the
international ramifications of the criminal application. The enactment of the
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Congress, in enacting the FCPA, intended not only to outlaw
foreign bribery, but also to eliminate the establishment of overseas
"slush funds" used to finance these bribes.' Indeed, prior to the final
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act demonstrates a clear intent on the part of
Congress to transcend the borders of the United States with regard to
specific conduct. Congress has, however, tailored the statute to encompass
limited conduct and individuals.
Podgor, supra note 43, at 332.
47. As the House-Senate Conference Report on the 1977 Act noted, the FCPA's
amendment of the record keeping requirements of the Securities Exchange Act
"ma[de] clear the issuer's records should reflect transactions in conformity , ith
accepted methods of recording economic events and effectively prevent off-the-
books slush funds and payment of bribes." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-331, at 10
(1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4121, 4122. Former SEC Division of
Enforcement Deputy Director Wallace Timmeny also observed:
The internal control provisions... are designed to deal with the problems of
off-the-books slush funds or company employees going beyond company
policy and using corporate assets to make payments ... in a %%ay the
management would not want them used. They were also designed to ensure
that there are controls on the company assets-that a company knows what
assets it has and that management is aware of what is going on within a
company concerning its assets.
Timmeny, supra note 21, at 240. Nevertheless, violation of the accounting and
controls provisions do not necessarily involve either maintenance of off-the-books
"slush funds" or corrupt overseas payments. As former SEC Chairman Shad
explained, "[a]s the legislative history of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes
clear, the accounting provisions were enacted in part to facilitate the disclosure
provisions of the federal securities lawvs and in part to provide for greater
accountability of corporate assets. They were not intended exclusively to curb
foreign bribery." Statement of SEC Chairman Shad, supra note 27, at 382. Indeed,
the FCPA accounting and controls provisions are considered rules of general
applicability, adopted for the protection of all investors. See SEC v. World-Wide
Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724,746 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("The FCPA was enacted on
the principle that accurate recordkeeping is an essential ingredient in promoting
management responsibility and is an affirmative requirement for publicly held
American corporations to strengthen the accuracy of corporate books and records,
which are the bedrock elements of our system of corporate disclosure and
accountability. A motivating factor in the enactment of the FCPA w~as a desire to
protect the investor, as was the purpose behind the enactment of the securities acts.
It is apparent that investors are entitled to rely on the implicit representations that
corporations will account for their funds properly and will not channel funds out of
the corporation or omit to include such funds in the accounting system so that there
are no checks possible on how much of the corporation's funds are being exp.nded in
the manner management later claims"); see also S. REP. No. 95-114, at 8 (1977),
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101 ("It]he establishment and maintenance of
a system of internal controls is an important management obligation. A fundamental
aspect of management's stewardship responsibility is to provide shareholders with
reasonable assurances that the business is adequately controlled. Additionally,
management has a responsibility to furnish shareholders and potential investors with
reliable financial information on a timely basis. An adequate system of internal
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enactment of the FCPA, a substantial amount of testimony arose
concerning the overseas practices of many of America's largest
corporations."
For example, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation made disclosures
of overseas bribery to the SEC in June 1975. As a result, the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs held hearings
primarily directed toward whether Lockheed was forthright with
Congress and the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board vith regard to
the guaranty of $250 million in loans made to Lockheed in the early
1970s.49 In the course of those hearings, the Committee heard the
testimony of then-Lockheed Chairman D.J. Houghton who
acknowledged that 15 percent of the total commissions paid to
foreign agents between 1970 and 1975 were in turn been paid to
foreign officials." This was estimated to be $22 million. 1
Lockheed's overseas payment practices were also the subject of
accounting controls is necessary to management's discharge of these obligations").
This is the construction of the FCPA endorsed by the SEC. See In re Grant,
Exchange Act Release No. 31069 (1992); In re Martirossian, Exchange Act Release
No. 30870, 51 S.E.C. Docket 1315 (1992); In re Abbington BanCorp, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 30614 (1992); In re Amre, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30431, 50
S.E.C. Docket 1474 (1992); see also SEC Release No. 17500, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,544
(1981) ("The primary thrust of the act's accounting provisions, in short, was to
require those public companies which lacked effective internal controls or tolerated
unreliable record keeping to comply with the standards of their better managed
peers. That is the context in which these provisions should be construed.") (emphasis
in original); SEC Release No. 34-15570, 44 Fed. Reg. 10,964, 10,967 (1979) ("the
maintenance of accurate books and records by reporting companies is one of the
foundations of the system of corporate disclosure embodied in the Securities
Exchange Act"). Thus, a corporation that conducts no overseas business may
nonetheless be liable for violations of the FCPA accounting and cortrols provisions.
See KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 61 (2d ed. 1991);
Hubert Lenczowski, Questionable Payments by Foreign Sub.idiaries: The
Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Effect of the Foreign Corrupt Practicer Act of 1077, 3
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 151, 158-59 (1979); Morgan, supra note 21, at 369.
48. Congress was also aware of the disclosures made to the Watergate Special
Prosecutor of illegal campaign contributions that often were financed through off-
shore entities and accounts, as well as the criminal prosecutions of twenty-two
corporations and twenty-one individuals. See Abuses of Corp. Power, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Priorities in Gov't of the Joint Econ. Comm., 94th Cong. 91
(1976) [hereinafter Abuses of Corp. Power Hearings]; GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra
note 11, at 17-19; Charles R. McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad:
An Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 215 (1976).
49. See Lockheed Bribery Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous. and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. (1975).
50. Id. at 27.
51. Id. at 40.
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hearings held the following year before the Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations.' In the course of those hearings, the Subcommittee heard
the testimony of board chairmen and senior executives of five major
corporations, which acknowledged their involvement in improper
domestic and overseas payments.
Mr. Haughton reprised his earlier testimony concerning
Lockheed's overseas payments. In particular, Mr. Haughton and
other Lockheed officials described their dealings with Adnan
Khashoggi and his company, Triad Corporation, in regard to aircraft
sales in Saudi Arabia. The Lockheed officials acknowledged paying
$400,000 to a Saudi official using funds from Swiss and Liechtenstein
entities.' Their testimony indicated that over a five-year period,
Lockheed paid over $100 million in commissions to Triad in
connection with sales in Saudi Arabia alone="2
There was also testimony concerning other overseas payments by
Lockheed. For example, it was disclosed that after Lockheed's agent
in Indonesia was let go following the change in regimes, the company
paid subsequent sales commissions directly to the Indonesian Air
Force. These payments were made to the Swiss account of the
"Widows and Orphans Fund."'5
A second major aircraft manufacturer, Northrop Corporation,
also testified before the Subcommittee. Northrop also was
represented in Saudi Arabia by Khashoggi and Triad. Richard W.
Millar, Chairman of the Executive Committee of Northrop's Board,
testified that in 1971 and 1972, Northrop made payments totaling
$450,000 to two Saudi Air Force officers through Khashoggi's good
offices.5' Mr. Millar also testified that approximately $476,000 in
payments to a foreign consultant were used to make unlawful
contributions to the 1972 Nixon re-election campaign.'
52. See Multinational Corps. and U.S. Foreign Policy. Hcaring~s Beftre the
Subconwn, on Multinational Corps. of the Conun. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong.
(1975) [hereinafter Multinational Corps. and U.S. Foreign Policy]. These revelations
resulted in shareholder derivative litigation, as well. See Gaines v. Haughton, 645
F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981).
53. Multinational Corps. and U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 52, at 349-51.
54. Id. at 352-53.
55. Id. at 372-76.
56. Id. at 112-13. Northrop's Chairman, Thomas V. Jones, also referred to these
payments during his subsequent testimony before the Subcommittee. I& at 1.-3.
57. Id. at 110-11.
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Executives of several major oil companies also testified during
the hearings. B.R. Dorsey, Chairman of Gulf Oil Corporation, told
the Subcommittee that an internal corporate review conducted under
the direction of John J. McCloy revealed that between 1960 and 1973
approximately $10.3 million of corporate funds were used for political
contributions, of which approximately $5 million were foreign
political contributions." Mr. Dorsey detailed contributions in 1966
and 1970 totaling $4 million to a political party in tha Republic of
Korea, which were channeled through a Gulf Oil subsidiary in the
Bahamas. 9 However, there was no specific quid pro quo for these
contributions. 6° Mr. Dorsey stated that the Bahamian subsidiary was
used to make contributions totaling $460,000 (including payments for
a helicopter) to the election campaign of the President of Bolivia and
to a fund in Beirut, Lebanon to promote better U.S. understanding of
the Arab-Israeli conflict.61
Archie L. Monroe, Controller of Exxon Corporation, testified
concerning political contributions made in Italy by its subsidiary, Esso
Italiana.62 Mr. Monroe stated that between 1963 and 1972, Esso
Italiana made political contributions to campaigns in Italy totaling
between $46 and $49 million.63 The sources of the funds were off-
book bank accounts controlled by the country manager and the
identities of the recipients of the contributions were camouflaged. "
The contributions were made in exchange for specific political
favors.65
Everett S. Checket, Executive Vice President of Mobil Oil
Corporation, also testified concerning political contributions in Italy.
Mobil Oil Italiana, Mobile Oil's subsidiary, made contributions
between 1970 and 1973 that averaged $534,000 annually over the
four-year period.6 According to Mr. Checket, these contributions
were made to an Italian trade association, Unione Petrolifera, from
normal business accounts and did not involve off-book funds or out-
58. Id. at 5-8.
59. Id. at 8-10.
60. Id. at 10.
61. Id. at 11-12.
62. Id. at 24. The contributions also were subject of shareholder derivative
litigation. See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
63. Multinational Corps. and U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 52, at 241-49.
64. Id. at 248-49.
65. Id. at 259.
66. Id. at 316. These contributions totaled approximately $2,135,000. Id. at 323.
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of-country transactions.' However, Mobile listed these expenses on
their books as advertising expenses or research, which Mr. Checket
conceded were mischaracterizations." Although disputed by Mr.
Checket, it was suggested that these contributions were in exchange
for subsidies and favorable tax treatment. '
Congress also heard extensive testimony from the SEC
concerning the results of the Commission's various inquiries into
corrupt overseas payments. For example, then-SEC Chairman
Roderick M. Hills testified concerning actions brought by the SEC
against several companies.' Chairman Hills stated, before the Joint
Economic Committee, that the SEC believed that United Brands had
paid $1.25 million to officials of a Central American country in
exchange for reduction of an export tax.7' He also testified that the
SEC believed United Brands paid approximately $750,000 to officials
of two European countries "to secure favorable business
opportunities."' In addition, Chairman Hills testified that actions
were brought against the following companies: General Refactories,
alleging that approxdmately $400,000 was paid to European
government officials; Phillips Petroleum Company, alleging that $2.8
million was disbursed to two overseas corporations and then returned
to the United States to fund illegal campaign contributions; Gulf Oil
Corporation, alleging that $10 million in corporate funds were given
to a foreign subsidiary, of which $4.5 million was returned to the
United States for illegal campaign contributions; Northrop
Corporation, alleging that $450,000 in payments to a European
consultant were used to make political contributions in the United
States; and Ashland Oil Corporation, alleging that $780,000 was
diverted to a secret fund used to make illegal campaign
contributions'
The SEC also provided Congress with a report' based on
disclosures made by corporations under the SEC's voluntary
67. Id. at 316.
68. Id. at 317.
69. Id. at 317-18.
70. Abuses of Corporate Power, Hearings, supra note 48, at 4-6.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 5-6.
74. See Report of the Sea and E ch. C'omm'n on Questionable and lle gal
Corporate Payment and Practices Submitted to the Comn on Banking, Housinq and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. (1976) [hereinafter SEC Report].
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disclosure program,75 as well as information obtained in the
Commission's enforcement actions. 6 The SEC found:
The almost universal characteristic of the cases reviewed to date by
the Commission has been the apparent frustration of our system of
corporate accountability which has been designed to assure that
there is a proper accounting of the use of corporate funds and that
documents fied with the Commission and circulated to
shareholders do not omit or misrepresent material facts. Millions
of dollars of funds have been inaccurately recorded in corporate
books and records to facilitate the making of questionable
payments. Such falsification of records has been known to
corporate employees and often to top management, but often has
been concealed from outside auditors and counsel and outside
directors. 77
Ultimately, the SEC's voluntary disclosure program resulted in
discoveries of payments by over four hundred publicly-held
companies in excess of $300 million.'
Despite evidence of fairly widespread "questionable overseas
payments," opinions differed substantially as to how the problem of
overseas corruption should be addressed. Some advocated public
disclosure as the most appropriate means of inhibiting questionable
payments. Others advocated criminalization.
On March 31, 1976, President Ford instituted a Cabinet-level
task force, the Task Force on Questionable Foreign Payments
Abroad, to review the problem of questionable payments and
75. For a discussion of the SEC's voluntary disclosure program, see GREANIAS &
WINDSOR, supra note 11, at 75-78; NEIL H. JACOBY ET AL., BRIBERY %ND EXTORTION
IN WORLD BUSINESS 46-58 (1977); John Sweeny, The SEC Interpretive and
Enforcement Program Under the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & Co. 273, 275
(1982); Timmeny, supra note 21, at 235-37; Note, Disclosure of Payment to Foreign
Government Officials Under the Securities Acts, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1848, 1851-52
(1976).
76. SEC Report, supra note 74, at 1.
77. Id. at a.
78. See H. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977)("[m]ore than 400 corporations have
admitted making questionable or illegal payments. The companies. most of them
voluntarily, have reported paying out well in excess of $300 million in corporate
funds to foreign government officials, politicians, and political parties. These
corporations included some of the largest and most widely held public companies in
the United States; over 117 of them rank in the top Fortune 500 industries"); S. REP.
No. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101("Recent
investigations by the SEC have revealed corrupt foreign payments by over 300 U.S.
companies involving hundreds of millions of dollars").
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propose remedial legislation." The Task Force was chaired by
Secretary of Commerce Elliot L. Richardson. The Task Force issued
an interim report on June 14 and a final report, which accompanied
proposed legislation on August 3, 1976."'
In its final report, the Task Force concluded that a "disclosure
approach" was preferable to a "criminalization approach.""
According to the Task Force, legislation criminalizing overseas
bribery "would have represented the most forceful possible rhetorical
condemnation of such conduct."' However, it was the task force's
view that "the criminalization approach would represent little more
than a policy assertion, for the enforcement of such a law would be
very difficult, if not impossible."' Thus, the Task Force concluded
that "unless reasonably enforceable criminal sanctions were devised,
the criminal approach would represent poor public policy.""4
The Task Force also considered, and unanimously rejected, a
legislative scheme that required disclosure of foreign payments and
that made some of those payments a violation of U.S. criminal law."
The Task Force concluded, in this regard, that the "disclosure-plus-
criminalization scheme would, by its very ambition, be ineffective.
The existence of U.S. criminal penalty for certain questionable
payments would deter their disclosure and thus the positive value of
the disclosure provisions would be reduced. In the Task Force's
opinion, the two approaches cannot be compatibly joined.'"
The Task Force and the Ford administration proposed requiring
reports to the Secretary of Commerce "of all payments made in
connection with sales to or contracts with foreign governments or
official actions by foreign public officials, where such are for the
commercial benefit of the payor or his foreign affiliate."7
The view that criminalization of foreign bribery would represent
bad public policy was also adopted a year later by an ad hoe
committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in
79. See Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearings, supra note 9, at 31.
80. Id. at 40 (Richardson Task Force Report).
8L Id. at 49.
82. Id. at 50 (emphasis in original).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 51.
85. Id. at 49.
86. Id. at 49-50.
87. Id. at 51.
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its report on questionable foreign payments. ' Indeed, the ad hoc
committee observed that Secretary Richardson's comment, "reflects
the sound principle that laws which cannot be enforced 'represent
poor public policy' because, after the failure in enforcement becomes
evident, the credibility of the government enacting them is
diminished."'  The ad hoc committee went on to observe that,
"[w]hile a statute criminalizing foreign payments may continue to
deter some United States citizens even after the failure to enforce it
becomes evident, it is unlikely to be accepted by any foreign official
as a serious justification for the failure to make such a payment.
Under the chairmanship of Roderick M. Hills, the SEC strongly
supported the view of the Richardson Task Force that keep disclosure
was the most effective approach to addressing foreign bribery."' In
88. AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN PAYMENTS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS BY
CORPORATIONS: THE PROBLEM AND APPROACHES TO A SOLLOTION (1977)
[hereinafter NYC BAR REPORT].
89. Id. at 9.
90. Id. The disclosure rather than criminalization approach was supported by
other industry groups as well. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce argued that "[tjhe
criminalization of questionable overseas business payments would contribute little to
deterring such payments beyond that which is already accompli;hed by existing
securities, tax and criminal law." Unlawfld Payments Act of 1977, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 235 (1977) (statement of J. Jefferson Staats for the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce) [hereinafter Unlawfld Payments Act Hearings]. The
Chamber also suggested that because prosecution of violations would rely on
evidence located outside the United States, the prohibition of foreign payments
"would be very difficult to administer and enforce." Id. at 236. The National
Association of Manufacturers raised similar objections. See id. at 238 (statement of
the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs.). The Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the
American Bar Association Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law
characterized as "unrealistic" the prohibition of foreign payments, "which assumes
that a multinational corporation will be able to prevent all corrupt offers or promises
by every employee, including foreign nationals whose concepts of business morality
differ from our own... ." Instead, the Committee urged that criminal sanctions be
reserved for instances in which a corporation's directors or e.ecutive officers
approved or had actual knowledge of corrupt payments. Id. at 251-52 (letter from
the Fed. Reg. Sec. Comm'n to the Hon. Bob Eckhardt, dated Apr. 19, 1997).
91. The disclosure approach to overseas corruption was not without its critics,
however. One commentator observed that there were already a variety of federal
disclosure requirements including the regulations of the Agency for International
Development, the Export-Import Bank, the Department of Defense Foreign Military
Sales Program and the Internal Revenue Service. Although the federal securities
laws were the only requirement for general public disclosure, those requirements
became mired in issues of materiality and accuracy. Further, the SEC's jurisdiction
was limited to compelling disclosure of material information of interest to investors,
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part, this perspective was due to the general orientation of the federal
securities laws to disclosure and the SEC's experience in
administering those laws. As Chairman Hills observed, "as a matter
of long-standing tradition and practice, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has been a disclosure agency. Causing questionable
conduct to be revealed to the public has a deterrent effect."' "
Thus, in fashioning legislation in light of the voluntary
disclosures and enforcement actions, the SEC did not propose
prohibiting foreign corrupt payments. Instead, the SEC believed that
the legislation should (1) prohibit the falsification of corporate
accounting records; (2) prohibit the making of false and misleading
statements by corporate officials and agents to auditors of the books
and records; and (3) require the establishment and maintenance of a
system of accounting controls.' Indeed, in testimony two years later,
Chairman Hills reiterated the SEC's view that these proposals were
the most efficacious approach to the problem: "The Commission
continues to believe that they represent the most effective solution to
the problem of questionable or illegal payments, and that they go to
and not the general public, only as to corporations offering federally registered
securities. McManis, supra note 48, at 226-28. Thus, it was suggested that -Itlhe
focus of SEC law enforcement efforts is simply too narrow to comprehend the
problem of overseas corporate payments." Id. at 228. Theodore C. Sorenson was
also of this view. In his influential article on overseas improper payments published
in Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sorenson noted:
Disclosure ... cannot carry the whole burden of law enforcement. It would
be illogical to punish more severely than at present the nondisclosure of an
activity not now illegal under U.S. law. Moreover, when the general or
stockholding public proves to be indifferent to a company's disclosure of
wrong doing, as is often the case, no penalty and no reform may follow.
Theodore C. Sorenson, Improper Payments Abroad: Perspectives and Proposals, 54
FOREIGN An'. 719,731 (1976).
92. Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearings, supra note 9, at 25 (statement of Hon.
Roderick M. ills, SEC Chairman).
93. SEC Report, supra note 74, at 58-59. As Chairman Hills subsequently
explained:
In my view, an effective system of corporate accountability requires that the
facts pertaining to illegal payments not be concealed from a corporation's
independent accountants or its board of directors. This is the key point.
The system of government regulation of business disclosure by the Securities
and Exchange Commission wvill not work unless the books and records are
kept in good faith.
Abuses of Corp. Power Hearings, supra note 48, at 12. In this connection, Professor
McManis noted the difference between the Richardson Task Force approach and the
SEC approach to the problem of corrupt payments by U.S. firms. "For the Task
Force, the problem is one of diplomacy, for the SEC, it is one of accountability to
shareholders." McManis, supra note 48, at 222.
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the underlying conditions, which have permitted the abuses, which we
have seen."94
On several occasions, Chairman Hills made clear that the SEC
did not envision its role as an enforcer of criminal laws. So, while the
SEC did not actively oppose the prohibition of foreign corrupt
payments, the SEC eschewed enforcement responsibility. Chairman
Hills testified in this regard:
The Commission does not oppose direct prohibitions against these
payments, but we have previously stated that as a matter of
principle, we would prefer not to be involved even in the civil
enforcement of such prohibitions. As a matter of long experience,
it is our collective judgment that disclosure is a sufficien: deterrent
to the improper activities with which we are concemed.95
94. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Inv. Disclosure,
Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 95th
Cong. 122 (1977) [hereinafter Foreign Corrupt Practices Hearings]. Chairman Hills
went on to state that legislation following that proposed by the SEC would
underscore the need for accurate books and records and would clarify the SEC's role
in dealing with foreign corrupt payments. Chairman Hills also stated that the
legislation would provide the Commission and private parties with the ability to
reach the underlying causes of concealment of such payments:
Enactment of legislation of this nature would demonstrate a strong and
affirmative congressional endorsement of the need for accurate corporate
records, effective internal control measures, and management candor in
connection with the work of independent auditors. Such an endorsement
would end any debate concerning the commission's proper role in the
solution to the problem of questionable payments. Most impDrtantly, the
bill would furnish the Commission and perhaps private plaintiff. with potent
new tools to employ against the underlying conditions, which permit
corporate insiders to conceal from the investing public the manner in which
corporate funds have been utilized.
Id.; see also id. at 139; Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payment Practices,
Proposed Promotion of Reliability of Financial Information and Prevention of
Concealment, 42 Fed. Reg. 4854 (Jan. 26, 1977).
95. Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearings, supra note 9, at 20, 23. As
Commissioner Hills testified at another hearing:
While on balance the Commission does not oppose the enactment of
prohibitions of this nature, it would prefer not to be involved in civil
enforcement of such prohibitions since they embody separate and distinct
policies from those underlying the federal securities laws. The securities
laws are designed primarily to insure disclosure to investors of all of the
relevant facts concerning corporations, which seek to raise their capital from
the public at large. The prohibitions.. .on the other hand would impose
substantive regulation on a particular aspect of corporate behavior.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Hearings, supra note 94, at 125.
During an earlier colloquy with Senator William Proxmire concerning
whether criminalization of books and records violations would assist the Commission,
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Harold M. Williams, who succeeded Roderick Hills as SEC
Chairman, had a very different view of the prohibition of overseas
corrupt payments and the SEC's role in enforcing the prohibition.
During his testimony concerning House bill H.R. 3815, and Senate
bill S. 305, which made foreign corrupt payments criminal, Chairman
Williams signaled this change in viewpoint when he stated:
I have spent most of my life in industry. I might note that the
objectives of H.R. 3815 are objectives I strongly support. My
feeling is that they are a part of the basic morality of our society
and the conduct that H.R. 3815 is designed to prescribe is conduct
which is not supported in our society and tends to erode not only
ethical standards but the free, competitive and effective market
place and is conduct which is not needed or justifiable.'
With respect to the SEC's role in addressing violations,
Chairman Williams observed that:
Violations of this new prohibition [i.e., against foreign corrupt
payments]-like any other provision of the federal securities lawvs-
would be investigated by the Commission's staff and could be made
the subject of civil proceedings to enjoin further misconduct.
Similarly, where appropriate, the Commission would refer its files
to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution."7
Chairman Williams also observed that Senate bill S. 305 not only
imposed a prohibition against corrupt payments but took a broader
approach that included prohibiting falsification of records or
deceiving auditors. On behalf of the Commission, Chairman
Williams endorsed this expanded approach:
The Commission believes that, from the standpoint of investor
protection, this broader legislation represents a more effective and
meaningful approach to the problem of improper or illegal
corporate payments. We do not, of course, oppose the enactment
of the direct prohibition incorporate[d] [in] both H.R. 3815 and S.
305. The Commission stands ready to accept the expanded
Chairman Hills remarked, "Whether or not what they have done [i.e.. falsify
corporate records] should constitute a crime, be prosecuted by the Department of
Justice, is a matter that will not either aid or abet us." When Senator Proxmire
pressed the point, Chairman Hill replied, -[I]f you were a behavioral scientist you
might say that a man would be less likely to give evidence if it showed his actions
were a crime, but that is not a concern of ours." Abuses of Corp. Power Hcarinrs.
supra note 48, at 33-34.
96. Unlawful Payments Act Hearings, supra note 90, at 196.
97. Id. at 196-97.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
mandate which enforcement of those prohibition would entail. The
Commission does not believe, however, that prohibitions against
bribery are the full answer. In our view, the long-term solution
requires a fundamental strengthening of the record keeping,
auditing, and internal control systems, which are the foundation of
any modem multinational corporation. For these reasons, I urge
the subcommittee to broaden its approach beyond direct
prohibitions against foreign bribery.9 8
Chairman Williams' support of the criminal prohibition of
overseas payments concurred with the position taken by the Carter
Administration in support of the legislation. Speaking for the
administration, Treasury-Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal
unequivocally voiced the administration's support for the antibribery
provisions in the House' and Senate bills.'
A central concern with regard to criminalization, for proponents
and critics, was the extraterritorial effect of the antibribery
prohibitions.'0 ' Indeed, the issue of extraterritoriality was raised in
the earliest hearings on corrupt practices by U.S. corporations. For
example, during the 1975 hearings concerning the activities of U.S.
multinational corporations, the Deputy Legal Advisor of the U.S.
State Department testified that:
Although investors operating in foreign lands would be wise to
98. Id. at 197.
99. See id. at 175, 179.
100. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Hearings, supra note 94, at 67, 92. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation also supported criminalization. See id. at 89 (letter
from Robert E. Barnett, Chairman of the F.D.I.C., to Sen. William Proxmire, dated
Mar. 24, 1977).
101. See, e.g., Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearings, supra note 9, at 50-51
(statement of Commerce Secretary Richardson) ("[s]uccessful prosecution of
offenses-and fair defense in relation to such prosecutions-would typically depend
upon access to witnesses and information beyond the reach of U.S. judicial process.
Other nations, rather than assisting in such prosecutions, might resist cooperation
because of considerations of national preference or sovereignty. Other nations might
be especially offended if we sought to apply criminal sanctions to foreign
incorporated and/or foreign-managed subsidiaries of American corporations");
Foreign Corrupt Practices Hearings, supra note 94, at 70 (statement of Treasury-
Secretary Blumental) ("turning to the central aspect of S. 305, the criminalization of
corrupt payments made to foreign officials, as I said, we support it. At the same time,
the Administration recognizes that great care must be taken with an approach which
makes certain types of extraterritorial conduct subject to our country's laws");
Unlawful Payment Act Hearings, supra note 90, at 238 (statement oF the Nat'l Ass'n
of Mfrs.) ("a unilateral, criminalization approach such as proposed in H.R. 3815
would pose serious problems of extraterritorial enforcement, particularly regarding
constitutional due process guarantees").
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avoid even the appearance of impropriety in those countries, we
believe it would not be advisable for the United States to try to
legislate the limits of permissible conduct by our firms abroad.
It would be not only presumptuous but counter productive to seek
to impose our specific standards in countries with differing histories
and cultures. Moreover, enforcement of such legislation ... would
involve surveillance of the activities of foreign officials as well as
U.S. businessmen and would be widely resented abroad.
Extraterritorial application of U.S. law-which is what such
legislation would entail-has often been viewed by other
governments as a sign of U.S. arrogance or even as interference in
their territorial affairs. U.S. laws are normally based on territorial
jurisdiction and, with rare exceptions, we believe that is sound
policy.'
0 2
Congress had the benefit of a searching and thorough analysis of
the implications of extraterritoriality by the Ad Hoc Committee of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. In its report,""
the committee observed:
As a general proposition, States have been reluctant to extend the
reach of their criminal law to acts done abroad. In part this
reluctance stems from concepts of sovereignty and the territorial
supremacy of States.
Criminalization of the act of paying a bribe necessarily involves the
characterization of the act of receiving it as a criminal act under
United States law. Thus, inherent in criminalization is a reaching
out by the United States to characterize acts done in a foreign
country by foreign national as 'criminal.' The possible foreign
102. June 17th Statement, supra note 9, at 24. Gerald L. Parsky, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs also stated this view:
Any attempt to apply a U.S. criminal statute to acts consummated abroad
would involve an extraterritorial application of U.S. law. While there are no
absolute legal prohibitions on such extraterritorial application, attempts by
the United States to apply our anti-trust and export control laws in a similar
way have created substantial problems in the past. The application of our
laws abroad often conflicts with foreign laws or practices and is looked upon
as an unwarranted intrusion into the sovereignty of other states. The history
of the extraterritorial application of our laws shows all too clearly that
foreign nations may react strongly when we attempt to enforce our laws with
respect to acts consummated in their territories. It can be expected that
similar reactions would be forthcoming in the present instance.
Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearings, supra note 9, at 89.
103. NYC BAR REPORT, supra note 88.
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relations impact of this is such that the wisdom of criminalization
should be carefully considered.'Y
The committee recognized Congress' broad jurisdiction over
U.S. citizens abroad and noted that the proposed legislation would
punish those who paid bribes but not the foreign officials who
received them."' However, the committee also noted that the
legislation would represent an exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and foreign corporations owned or controlled by U.S. citizens. In the
view of the ad hoc committee, "The validity under international law
of these ... proposed exercises of jurisdiction would depend on the
occurrence of a substantial impact on the United States.""'
The committee noted as well that the criminalization of acts
committed outside the United States, involving forej!gn nationals,
raised significant issues of fairness and due process. The chief
concern in this connection was the unavailability of compulsory
process over foreign witnesses, which might preclude a defendant
from mounting a defense to a charge of foreign bribery:
The position of the defendant before a United States court indicted
for the crime of making a foreign payment would indeed be
difficult. The existence of a foreign recipient of a payment is an
essential element of the crime and the operative acts would almost
inevitably have occurred on foreign soil. Whether or not the
prosecution could obtain necessary evidence, the defendant would
in most cases be without the benefit of compulsory process with
respect to foreign witnesses.""
104. Id. at 5-6.
105. Id. at 6.
106. Id. The ad hoc committee further observed in this regard:
Consistent with an approach that considers foreign interests, Congress has
rarely used the expanded territorial jurisdiction in the area of criminal law.
Where Congress has exercised this jurisdiction, the acts proscribed are
usually acts committed within the United States and/or acts of United States
nationals related to conduct taking place in and adversely affecting a foreign
state.
Id. at 8.
107. Id. at 10. The ad hoc committee also suggested the risk of double jeopardy
resulting in prosecutions both in the country in which the bribe was paid and the
United States. Id. at 10-11. As examples of the difficulties encountered by U.S.
regulatory agencies in serving process on foreign nationals, see In re Sealed Case, 832
F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Nahas v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 738 F.2d
487 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th
Cir. 1981); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636
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Finally, the committee warned that the extraterritorial reach of
the proposed legislation would offend international comity.!
Criminalization for foreign bribery would represent an usurpation of
the authority and discretion of the foreign prosecutor as well as an
assertion of dominance of U.S. law over that of the foreign sovereign
in which the conduct occurred:
The assertion of jurisdiction by the United States over behavior
properly subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign country is
unprecedented in the absence of significant policy concerns which
outweigh the interests of any affected foreign State regarding such
behavior. Such an assertion of jurisdiction by the United States
over conduct in a foreign country ... demeans the enforcement
responsibility of the foreign State for such conduct, discredits the
applicable foreign law and deprives the foreign States of the often
critical determination as to whether, in the light of relevant legal
and political considerations, to initiate prosecution for a particular
offense.
To the extent that any United States criminal law permits
F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (First Nat'l City Bank), 396
F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 590 F. Supp. 1160
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Grand Jury 81-2, 550 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. Mich. 19,2); FCPA-
Oversight Hearings, supra note 11, at 195, 204 (statement of Jonathan C. Rose. Asst.
Att'y Gen. of the Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Pol'y). To address thesejurisdictional problems, U.S. regulators entered into cooperative agreements %%ith
their overseas counterparts to facilitate sharing of information. See United States v.
Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985); Ellen R. Levin, The Conflict Between United
States Securities Laws on Insider Trading and Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws, 7 J. IN 'L L.
& Bus. 318, 332-46 (1985); Paul G. Mahoney, Securities Regulation by Enforccment:
An International Perspective, 7 YALE J. REG. 305, 317-18 (1990); Harvey L. Pitt &
Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next
Decade, 7 YALE J. REG. 149, 216 (1990); Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial
Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry Into the Vitality of a
'Choice-of-Law'Approadz, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1799, 1826 (1992).
108. The ad hoc committee, citing Black's Law Dictionary, defined "comity" as
"the body of rules which States observe toward one another from courtesy or mutual
convenience, although they do not form part of international law." BLC's LxW
DIcnoNARY 12 (4th ed. 1968). The ad hoc committee commented further
Such rules reflect 'the recognition which one nation allo\ns within its
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of
its laws.' Enactment of criminalization legislation goes beyond the
traditional application of the principles of comity to and by the United
States.
NYC BAR REPORT, supra note 88, at 12 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113. 164
(1895)).
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
prosecution of foreign companies in the United States for bribery in
their own or a third country, special resentment can be expected of
countries considering themselves entitled to priority of regulation
as the locus of the conduct in question or as the jurisdiction of
incorporation of the foreign company, or both.C°
In the end, Congress concluded that criminalization was a more
effective deterrent than simply requiring disclosure. As the report on
the House bill explained:
The committee determined that disclosure can never be an
effective deterrent because the anticipated benefit of making a
bribe, such as winning a multimillion dollar contract, generally
exceeds the adverse effect, if any, of disclosing 1 year later a lump
sum figure without names, amounts or even countries.
Criminalization, on the other hand, has proven an effective
deterrent. Although a vast number of questionable corporate
payments have been disclosed, subsequent management changes
have been attendant only to disclosure of domestic bribery. The
reason is obvious: domestic bribes are clearly illegal whereas
foreign bribes are not.n °
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
reached a similar conclusion in reporting out its bill."' Nevertheless,
Congress was plainly aware that the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction remained subject to a requirement of reasonableness!1
109. NYC BAR REPORT, supra note 88, at 12-13.
110. H. REP. No. 95-640, at 6 (1977).
111. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4107
("[t]he committee considered the matter [of criminalization] extensively in the 94th
Congress and concluded that the criminalization approach was preferred over a
disclosure approach").
112. In addition to the issue of vel non, whether a basis of extraterritorial
prescriptive jurisdiction exists, there is the question of whether the exercise of
jurisdiction is reasonable in light of the interests of other States, the character of the
activity and its importance to the regulating State, and the links between the actors
whose conduct is regulated and the regulating State. See RESTATEMiENT (TiRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403(2) (1986) (listing factors for determining the
reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction). Thus, it was observed that "[t]he
realization that the effects approach could potentially lead to worldwide jurisdiction,
coupled with the fact that jurisdiction has often not been exerted over conduct within
the United States or involving United States nationals, suggests that states, in effect,
temper the power of territoriality and citizenship with other considerations." Note,
Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the National
Interest, and Transnational Norms, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1273, 1277 (1990). Courts
consider the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction in a particular setting when
determining whether Congress intended a law to have extraterritorial effect. See,
e.g., United States v. Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that
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Accordingly, in establishing the classes of persons and entities to
whom the various provisions of the FCPA would apply (i.e., issuers
and domestic concerns), Congress attempted to accommodate the
concerns expressed with regard to the international law implications
of the FCPA.
B. Prescriptive Jurisdiction over "Issuers"
The FCPA's accounting and control provisions and the anti-
bribery provisions apply to "issuers" with "a class of securities
registered pursuant to Section [78(1) of the Exchange Act]" or "which
[are] required to file reports pursuant to Section [78(d) of the
Exchange Act]. '' "U Under the Exchange Act, "any person who issues
or proposes to issue any security" is an issuer. ' Both individuals and
entities are included within the Exchange Act's definition of
,,issuer.,,1L5
The FCPA does not distinguish between domestic and foreign
persons who are issuers. Foreign firms may register stock under the
Exchange Act. Indeed, a foreign entity may be subject to the
the requirements of the National Firearms Act did not apply to manufacturers
outside the United States); United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 12010. 12(14-05
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the crime of "accessory after the fact" gives rise to
extraterritorial jurisdiction to the same extent as the underlying offense); United
States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that extraterritorial
jurisdiction over a conspiracy to import twenty-three tons of marijuana v.as
reasonable). In this connection, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREItGN REL, XTIoUS
section 403(1) provides that "[e]ven when one of the bases of jurisdiction ... is
present, a State may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person
or activity having connections .vith another State w hen the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable." See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS pt. IV, intro. note. As Learned Hand observed in his opinion in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945), "[wle should not
impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct
which has no consequences in the United States." Thus, comment a to
RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS section 403 explains:
There is a wide international consensus that the links of territoriality or
nationality, § 402, while generally necessar, are not in all instances
sufficient conditions for the exercise of such jurisdiction. Legislatures and
administrative agencies, in the United States and in other states, have
generally refrained from exercising jurisdiction where it %,ould be
unreasonable to do so, and courts have usually interpreted general language
in a statute as not intended to exercise or authorize the exercise of
jurisdiction in circumstances where application of the statute would be
unreasonable.
113. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2) and 78dd-l(a) (1998).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9).
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Exchange Act's registration requirements even though its securities
are not traded in the United States, so long as certain conditions are
met.
116
Commonly, issuers of foreign securities seek access to U.S.
capital markets through the sale of American Depository Receipts
("ADR") thereby avoiding the expense and delay attending
registration of their securities."7 Having its origins in the "substitute
116. A foreign entity that has $5 million in assets at the end of its most recent
fiscal year is required to register its securities if the class of securities is held by five
hundred or more persons throughout the world, including at least three hundred
shareholders in the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12g-1,
240.12g3-2(a) (1998). However, a foreign issuer can petition the SEC for exemption
from this requirement of registration. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(a). As one
commentator noted:
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of foreign companies that
have entered the U.S. capital markets in recent months. In the last year and
a half, more than 140 foreign issuers from twenty-seven countries have
entered the U.S. public market for the first time-companies like Daimler-
Benz, Shanghai Petrochemical, Enterprise Oil and Alcatel Alsthom are just
a few of the major companies that have recently entered the U.S. market.
Today, more than 550 foreign companies are reporting, for one reason or
another, to the Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington about
their on-going activities.
James R. Silkenat, Overview of U.S. Securities Markets and Foreign Issuers, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 54,55 (1994).
117. See Joseph Velli, American Depository Receipts: An Overview, 17 FORDIIAM
INT'L L.J. S38 (1994). Trading in ADRs and other foreign sccurities is very
significant in U.S. markets. For example, it was reported that "[flrom January to
August 1995, ADRs accounted for nine percent of volume on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), where all foreign stocks accounted for 10.7 peicent of volume.
Of the 220 companies now listed on the exchange, 161 are in ADR format." GLOBAL
INV. MAG., Dec. 1995, at 28. In May 1996, the Securities Industry Association
reported that U.S. investors purchased $51.2 billion in foreign equity securities in
1995. U.S. Bought $98 Billion in Foreign Securities in '95, REUTERs FIN. SERVICE,
May 8, 1996. According to a 1996 report commissioned by Citibank, approximately
one thousand depository receipt programs were established between 1991 and 1996,
and U.S. portfolio managers indicated their intent to increase their holdings of
ADRs. Growth Seen in U.S. Foreign Investment, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 5, 1996,
at 34. For a discussion of the globalization of the securities markets and the
attendant U.S. regulatory issues, see Brandon Becker, A Regulatory Perspective on
the Global Securities Market, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 309 (1987); James R. Doty,
The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an International Marketplace.
60 FORDHAM L. REV. 77 (1992); Jay D. Hansen, Other International Issues: London
Calling? A Comparison of London and U.S. Stock Exchange Listirg Requirements
for Foreign Equity Securities, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL. L. 197 (19)5): Michael V.
Hurley, International Debt and Equity Markets: U.S. Participation in the
Globalization Trend, 8 EMORY INT'L REV. 701 (1994); Bevis Longsti-eth, A Look at
the SEC's Adaptation to Global Market Pressures, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319
(1995).
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certificates" developed in the 1920s to facilitate trading in foreign
securities,11 ADR certificates are issued by a depository in the United
States (i.e., a bank or trust company) representing an ownership
interest in securities deposited with the financial institution and held
overseas. 9 ADRs offer the U.S. investor the advantage of buying a
foreign security denominated in dollars, that pays a dividend in
dollars and can be purchased from a U.S. broker through a U.S.
clearance and settlement system.1'
The foreign securities underlying an ADR may be either debt or
equity instruments."l Once established, an ADR trades like any
other security, either over-the-counter or on an established
exchange."' ADRs offered to the public in this fashion require SEC
registration.'m
Thus, foreign issuers whose securities are sold in the United
States in the form of ADRs listed on a U. S. exchange are subject to
the requirements of the FCPA. This was the jurisdictional basis of
the SEC's action against Montedison, S.p.A.
In Montedison the SEC brought an action under the FCPA's
accounting provisions against an Italian corporation headquartered in
118. Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OFSECURITIES REGULATION 246 (1983).
119. See Mark A. Saunders, American Depository Receipts: An Introtuction to
U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM IN'T'L L.J. 48, 52 (1994);
Vefi, supra note 117, at S39.
120. James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms
Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S58, S60 (1994); Hansen, supra note 117, at
208-09.
121. Saunders, supra note 119, at 50.
122. Velli, supra, note 117, at S39. An ADR is established when foreign securities
are purchased on their home market and deposited overseas with a U.S. depository.
which issues the ADR in the United States. When an investor wishes to sell an
ADR, the ADR can be sold to another purchaser or canceled. Cancellation of an
ADR involves re-selling the underlying securities in their home market. Id.
123. Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. section 78dd(b), and SEC Rule
12g3-2(a) exempt from registration persons who transact "a business in securities
without the jurisdiction of the United States .... Thus, ADRS are exempt from the
registration requirements of the Exchange Act. However, if an ADR is traded on a
national exchange, the registration requirements apply and the company whose
securities comprise the ADR is an "issuer" pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 781(a) and
subject to the accounting and controls requirements of the FCPA. See Doty, supra
note 117, at 87-88; Merrit B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, Who
Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2498, 2608-17 (1997); Hansen, supra note
117, at 205-06; Saunders, supra note 119, at 66; Velli, supra note 117, at S44; Roberta
S. Karmel, New Initiatives for Foreign Issuers, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1993, at 3; see also
Seizer v. Bank of Bermuda, 385 F. Supp. 415,418 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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Milan, Italy."' The SEC contended, inter alia, that Montedison
materially misstated its financial condition and results of operations
in reports filed with the SEC between 1988 and 1993.12
Specifically, the SEC alleged that Montedison's filings
misrepresented the true nature of two transactions. In the first, which
the SEC characterized as the "Exilar loan," payments were allegedly
made by Montedison or its agents and not documented in
Montedison's records. 6 These payments, which took the form of
deposits of bearer bonds by Montedison subsidiaries in Swiss
accounts for the benefit of unnamed third parties, were effected on
oral instructions without formal procedures and authorizations.27 In
order to account for these payments, a fictitious account receivable of
approximately $272 million (435 billion lire) was created and then
"loaned" to a wholly owned Curacao corporation, Financing and
Investments NV, which in turn "loaned" the same amount to a second
company, Elixar International S.A., a Virgin Islands cormpany. 2' This
"loan" was subsequently determined to be "uncollectible" and a
write-down in the amount of $272 million (435 billion lire) was
attributed to 1992.129
In the second transaction, which the SEC described as the
"Enimont Affair," Montedison entered into a joint venture with the
Italian State energy agency, ENI. 3" Under the joint venture
agreement, Montedison and ENI each held forty percent ownership
and the remaining twenty percent ownership was offered to the
public.13 Montedison unsuccessfully attempted to gain control of the
joint venture through the purchase of eleven percent ownership
through nominees, which resulted in a Milan Court ordering
Montedison's interest be put in the custody of a third pa'rty.' 2
At the same time, ENI and Montedison entered into a "cowboy
pact" arrangement that permitted ENI to set the price and conditions
under which it would buy Montedison's forty percent interest.
124. SEC v. Montedison, S.p.A., Civil Action No. 1:96CV02631 (H.H.G.) (D.D.C.
Nov. 21,1996).
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Montedison was then obliged to either purchase ENI's forty percent
interest on that basis or sell its interest to ENI."3 The terms set by
ENI virtually ensured that electing to purchase ENI's interest would
bankrupt Montedison."'
Nevertheless, according to the SEC, Montedison persisted in its
efforts to gain control of the ENIMONT joint venture by securing
political support to either change the terms of the "cowboy pact" or
overturn the decision concerning custody of Montedison's forty
percent interest." The complaint alleged that "Montedison
determined that to achieve these ends, the company would need to
pay extensive bribes."'" In order to fund this bribery scheme,
Montedison entered into real estate purchases and sales with a
developer in Rome at inflated prices.' In this way, hundreds of
millions of dollars were transferred to the developer who used the
money to make bribes on Montedison's behalf to Italian officials and
others." Montedison was again unsuccessful in gaining control of
ENTMONT and eventually sold its interest to ENI.
As a result of these transactions, Montedison overstated the
value of the properties purchased through the developer."
Montedison eventually wrote down the value of these properties by
approximately $126,250,000 (202 billion lire) in its Form 20-F filing
for the fiscal year ending December 31, 1993.1" Montedison
characterized the write down as a "prior period adjustment" without
specifying when the "prior period" was."4 "
In addition to constituting a scheme to defraud in violation of
section 10(b) of the Exchange Acte43 and Commission Rule lOb-5,'"
133. Id. 91 15.
134. Id.
135. Id. 9 16.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. As an example of such a transfer, the SEC alleged that in Novemb.r and
December 1990, a wholly owned subsidiary of Montedison overpaid the develop r
approximately $95 million (153 billion lire) and agreed to pay an additiunal $123
million (197 billion lire) for properties oned by or connected to various Italian
politicians. The developer paid a "fee" of approximately $106 million (170 billion
lire) to a third party who acted as an intermediary with the politicians. Id. at qj 17.
139. Id. T1 8.
140. Id. 91 19.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1998).
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the SEC charged that Montedison created and maintained false
books and records145 and failed to devise and maintain a system of
internal controls with respect to the disbursement of corporate
funds.146
Jurisdiction over Montedison was grounded on the trading of
Montedison ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)."'
The SEC's complaint noted that between January 1993 and the filing
of the complaint, one million ADRs, each representing ten shares of
Montedison common stock, were traded each month on the NYSE.'
The complaint also noted that as of May 31, 1995, U.S. residents
owned the equivalent of 6.1 percent of Montedison's common stock.'
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that all of the conduct constituting the
violations occurred in Italy, the United States asserted jurisdiction
over Montedison as an issuer that offered registered securities to U.S.
investors and that filed periodic reports with the SEC.
This extraterritorial assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction" °
144. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). The SEC also charged that as a result of the
EXILAR and ENIMONT transactions, Montedison filed false annual reports on
Form 20-F for the years 1989-1992 in violation of section 13(a) of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. section 78m(a), and Commission Rules 12b-20 and 13a-1, 17 C.F.R.
sections 240.12b-20 and 240.13a-1.
147. SEC v. Montedison, S.p.A., Civil Action No. 1:96CV02631 (H.H.G.) (D.D.C.
Nov. 21, 1996), Compl. 7. A similar commercial relationship with the United States
formed the basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the money laundering statute,
18 U.S.C. sections 1956-1957, in United States v. Banque Leu (Luxembourg), S.A., Cr.
No. 93-0607 (N.D. Cal. 1993), in which:
A Luxembourg bank with no offices in the United States was oharged and
convicted of money laundering in the United States on the basis of clearing
U.S. negotiable instruments drawn on a U.S. bank, but deposited by non-
U.S. citizens in Luxembourg. In other words, acceptance of U.S. dollar
negotiable instruments by a bank anywhere in the world outside of the
United States renders the bank susceptible to U.S. criminal jurisdiction in
the money laundering area because all such instruments most necessarily
clear through the United States.
Kirk W. Monroe, Surveying the Solution: The Extraterritorial Reach of the United
States, 14 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 505, 521 (1996).
148. SEC v. Montedison, S.p.A., at Compl. 7,8.
149. Id. at 8.
150. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS divides jurisdiction into
three categories:
(a) jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e., the authority of a state to make its law
applicable to persons or activities; (b) jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e., the
authority of a state to subject particular persons or things to its judicial
process; and (c) jurisdiction to enforce, i.e., the authority of a state to use the
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appears grounded on the theory that Montedison's conduct, although
wholly outside the territory of the United States, had a substantial
effect within the United States (i.e., the filing of inaccurate reports
with the SEC and the dissemination of false or misleading
information to U.S. investors)."' This "effects doctrine"'" has served
resources of government to induce or compel compliance w ith its law.
RESTATENMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS pt. IV, intro, note (19,6). Courts
view the Restatement as "an illuminating outline of central principles of international
law." United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 11 (ist Cir. lI97). cert.
denied, 118 S. CL 685 (1998). As Mr. Justice Scalia recently observed (albeit in
dissent) with regard to Congress' jurisdiction to prescribe:
There is... a type of 'jurisdiction' relevant to determining the
extraterritorial reach of a statute: it is known as 'legislative jurisdiction'...
or 'jurisdiction to prescribe'.... This refers to the authority of a State to
make its law applicable to persons or activities, and is quite a separate
matter from 'jurisdiction to adjudicate'... . Congress has broad power
under Article I, § 8, cl. 3, to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and this
Court has repeatedly upheld its power to make lav~s applicable to persons or
activities beyond our territorial boundaries where United States interests are
affected.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,813-14 (1993) (J. Scalia dissenting):
see Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244.
248 (1991) ("[b]oth parties concede, as they must, that Congress has the authority to
enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States").
151. Under the Restatement view, among the enumerated bases for the State's
jurisdiction to prescribe is "conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory...." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIG'4
RELATIONS § 402.
152. See, for example. Strassheim r. Daly, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) in vhich Mr.
Justice Holmes stated that, "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to
produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the
cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in
getting him within its power."
See also the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Ford V. United States, 273 U.S.
593, 623 (1927), stating that
The principle that a man who outside of a country villfully puts in motion a
force to take effect in it, is answerable at the place where the evil is done, is
recognized in the criminal jurisprudence of all countries. And the methods
which modern invention has furnished for the performance of criminal acts
in that manner has made this principle one of constantly growing importance
and of increasing frequency of application.
Assertion of jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct having effects in the regulating
State is also referred to as "objective territoriality." See Blakesley, supra note 43, at
1123 ("American law has traditionally allowed the assertion of jurisdiction over
offenses when the conduct giving rise to the offense has occurred extra-territorially,
as long as the harmful effect(s) or result(s) take place within the jurisdiction's
territorial boundaries (objective territoriality)"): Donald I. Baker, Antitrust and
World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 16, 37
(1974) ("Suffice it to say, however, that it is no longer the place of the act that is key.
When the act or agreement can be shown to have a direct effect on the markets
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
as the basis for the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in other
securities law cases,'53 although the doctrine's applicability to
within the United States, our law should reach it-and this is especially so where the
act was clearly intended to affect our market. Of course, under our traditional
jurisprudence, it is necessary to have personal jurisdiction over the party committing
the act. This normally presents no problem with respect to the subsidiary of an
American corporation, let alone the corporation itself. It may, of course, pose a
problem where the potential defendants are foreign corporations which do no
business in the United States"); see also Podgor, supra note 43, at 342. Professor
Perkins has referred to this basis of jurisdiction as the "injured forum theory."
Perkins, supra note 41, at 1155.
153. See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1995); Consol.
Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1939). amended by,
890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d
Cir. 1975); SEC v. United Fin. Group, 474 F.2d 354, 356-57 (9th Cr. 1973); Roth v.
Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421, 422 (2d Cir. 1968); Schoenbaum v. First Brook,
405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968), modified as to liability of some defendants, 405 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1968). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has had the
greatest impact on the development of the law with respect to the extraterritorial
application of U.S. securities law. See Russell J. Weintraub, supra qote 107, at 1812
("The decisions of the Second Circuit because of its location at the f, nancial center of
the country, have had the greatest impact on the development of the law"); see also
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals is regarded as the "Mother Court" of securities law).
However, other circuits also have grounded extraterritorial application of the
securities law on an effects analysis. See, e.g., Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d
133, 135-36 (9th Cir. 1977); SEC v. United Fin. Group, 474 F.2d 354, 356-57 (9th Cir.
1973); Selas of Am. (Nederland) N.V. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 365 F. Supp. 1382, 1386
(E.D. Pa. 1973). Additionally, extraterritoriality based on effects in the United States
has been the long rule with respect to the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. at 796 ("it is well established by now that the Sherman Act
applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States"); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons
not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends"); see also Michael Goldsmith & Vicki Kinne,
Civil RICO, Foreign Defendants, and 'ET', 73 MINN. L. REv. 1023, 1028 (1989)
("[A]bsent extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws, United States producers
and consumers could be victimized by foreign anti-competitive activity"). Effects-
based liability extends to criminal violations of the Sherman Act, as well. United
States v. Nippon Paper Indus., Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
685 (1998). See generally Stephen Boatwright, Reversing the Trend of Extraterritorial
Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Bad Conduct Under Rule 106-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 487 (1988); Russell E. Brooks, The
Extraterritorial Reach of the Securities Exchange Act, 24 SEC. REG. L.J. 306, 310-13
(1996); Donald H.J. Hermann, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdicton in Securities
Laws Regulation, 16 CUMBERLAND L. REv. 207, 213-22 (1988); John D. Kelly, Let
There Be Fraud Abroad: A Proposal for a New U.S. Jurisprudence with Regard to the
Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts, 28 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477 (1997); Louis Loss, E::tra-Territoriality
in the Federal Securities Code, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305, 313-19 (197P); Turley, supra
[Vol. 22:407
1999] Extraterritorial Reach of Campaign Against International Bribery 447
instances of solely economic effect within U.S. territory has been
questioned.' The effects doctrine supports the assertion of
jurisdiction over non-U.S. citizens in criminal prosecutions as well.'
note 45, at 613-17; Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89
HARv. L. REv. 553, 556-63 (1976). In contrast, where a cognizable effect in the
United States was not shown or where the object of the securities law diolation was a
security traded on a foreign exchange, the U.S. court would not have jurisdiction.
See, eg., MCG, Inc. v. Great NV. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 1990;
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27,31-33 (D.C. Cir. 19S7); Butte Mining
PLC v. Smith, 876 F. Supp. 1153,1163 (D. Mont. 1995).
154. For example, the Reporter for the American Law Institute noted %%ith regard
to limitations on the jurisdiction to prescribe that "[s]ome states, particularly the
United Kingdom, have questioned various applications of United States la~vs as
'exorbitant.' ... [I]n particular, some states have questioned the law.fulness of
applying the 'effects doctrine' ... to economic effects. RESTATEMiENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403, rep. note 1 (1986); see also Weintraub, supra note 107, at
1807 ("[i]t is the 'effects' basis for jurisdiction to prescribe ... that creates the most
problems and controversy, particularly when asserted to apply United States antitrust
or securities law to activities abroad"). See for example, In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 19S0), in which the governments of Australia,
Canada, Northern Ireland, South Africa and the United Kingdom appeared as amici
curie questioning the jurisdiction of the U.S. district court.
155. See, eg., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 621-M2 (1927) (conspiracy to
import liquor into the United States); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997)(conspiracy among Japanese facsimile paper manufacturers in
Japan to fix prices in the United States); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Marc Rich &
Co, A.G), 707 F.2d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1983) (Alleged conspiracy by a Swiss
corporation to commit tax fraud in Switzerland could be prosecuted in the United
States); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 835-86 (5th Cir. 1967) (Canadian
nationals conspired in Canada to smuggle heroin into the United States); United
States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1982) (telephone conversations between
Hong Kong and New York and the transfer of funds from Hong Kong to the
Bahamas through New York, all in furtherance of a wire fraud scheme, was sufficient
to establish U.S. jurisdiction over the defendant who was a citizen of Norway residing
in Hong Kong); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 196S) (false
statement by foreign citizen on U.S. visa application); see also Strassheim v. Daily,
221 U.S. at 284-85 (defendant engaged in a scheme in Illinois to defraud the state of
Michigan). U.S. citizens also have been prosecuted for crimes in the United States
based on acts outside U.S. territory that had an effect in the United States. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (conspiracy to defraud a shipping
company owned by the United States by mailing false claims for fuel on the high seas
and in Rio de Janeiro); United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 463-64 (3rd Cir.
1987) (defendant, while in prison in the United States, caused fraudulently obtained
wire transfers of funds to be made from Canada to the Bahamas); Stegemen v.
United States, 425 F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1970) (concealment of debtor's assets in
Canada); United States v. Braverman, 376 F.2d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 1967) (defendant
cashed forged money order in Rio de Janeiro that was drawn on a Brooklyn bank);
Londos v. United States, 240 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1957) (defendants, acting solely in
Mexico, caused the transportation of worthless securities into the United States);
United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (conspiracy and aiding
and abetting the murder of a U.S. congressman in Jonestown, Guyana). Congress
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Indeed, Congress authorized this "jurisdiction to prescribe" in
enacting a variety of criminal statutes.
15 6
In enacting the FCPA, Congress attempted to remedy the
domestic effects of overseas bribery. During its consideration of
legislation relating to foreign corrupt practices, Congress was
confronted with evidence that U.S. interests were affected by the
corrupt activities of U.S. companies overseas. For example, in
reporting on S.305 (the Senate version of the FCPA), the Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Development stated:
Recent investigations by the SEC have revealed corrupt foreign
payments by over 300 companies involving hundreds of millions of
dollars. These revelations have had severe adverse effects. Foreign
governments friendly to the United States in Japan, Italy and the
Netherlands have come under intense pressure from their own
people. The image of American democracy abroad has been
tarnished. Confidence in the financial integrity of our corporations
has been impaired. The efficient function of our capital markets
has been hampered."5 7
has extended U.S. territorial jurisdiction to crimes committed on the high seas as well
as other geographical areas not under the jurisdiction of another government. For
example, in Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890), the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the jurisdiction of the U.S. district court, under the Guano Islands Act of
August 18, 1856, over a murder that occurred on the uninhabited island of Navassa in
the Caribbean Sea.
156. In addition to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1999), see, for example,
Violence at International Airports, 18 U.S.C. § 37 (1999); Animal Enterprise
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1999); Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of
1989, 18 U.S.C. § 175 (1999); Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1999); Solicitation to
Commit Crime, 18 U.S.C. § 373 (1999); Counterfeiting Outside the United States, 18
U.S.C. § 470 (1999); Smuggling Goods into Foreign Countries 18 U.S.C. § 546 (1999):
Espionage, 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1999); Interstate Communication of Demands for
Ransom, 18 U.S.C. § 875 (1999); Mailing a Threatening Communication from a
Foreign Country, 18 U.S.C. § 877 (1999); Threats Against Foreign Officials, 18 U.S.C.
§ 878 (1999); Unlicensed Transport of Firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1999); Foreign
Murder of U.S. Nationals, 18 U.S.C. § 1119 (1999); Hostage Taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203
(1999); International Parental Kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1999); Piracy, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (1999); Assassination of the President and Presidential Staff, 18 U.S.C. § 1751
(1999); Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (1999); Travel Act, 18 U.SC. §
1952 (1999); Money Laundering, 19 U.S.C. § 1956 (1999); Racketecring, 18 U.S.C. §
1961 (1999); Destruction of Vessels, 19 U.S.C. § 2271 (1999); Transportation of
Stolen Property, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1999); Terrorism, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1999); Inciting
to Rebellion, 18 U.S.C. § 2383 (1999); Trafficking in Controlled Substances, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 (1999); Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1999); and Trading with
the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702, app. § 3 (1999).
157. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101.
The report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce concerning H.R.
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In view of the significant U.S. interests at stake, the exercise of
Congressional authority to regulate commerce outside the territorial
United States was clearly warranted. Likewise, although there is a
presumption that absent a clear intent otherwise, laws have effect
only within the territory of the United States, ' Congressional intent
to give the FCPA extraterritorial effect is explicit,"" and for that
3815 (the House version of the FCPA) contained similar observations:
Corporate bribery also creates severe foreign policy problems for the United
States. The revelation of improper payments invariably tends to embarrass
friendly governments, lower the esteem for the United States among the
citizens of foreign nations, and lend credence to the suspicions sown by.
foreign opponents of the United States that American free enterprises e'ert
a corrupting influence on the political processes of their nations. For
example, in 1976, the Lockheed scandal shook the government of Japan to
its political foundation and gave opponents of close ties between the United
States and Japan an effective weapon with which to drive a wedge betv, een
the two nations. In another instance, Prince Bernhardt of the Netherlands
was forced to resign from his official position as a result of an inquiry into
allegations that he received $1 million in pay-offs from Lockheed. In Italy.
alleged payments by Lockheed, Exxon, Mobil Oil, and other corporations to
officials of the Italian Government eroded public support for that
government and jeopardized U.S. foreign policy, not only %,ith respect to
Italy and the Mediterranean area, but with respect to the entire NATO
alliance as well.
H. REP. 95-640, at 5 (1977).
158. See Sidney G. Wigfall, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Sccuritics
Fraud Cases: The Second Circuit's Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraul
Provisions of the 1934 Exchange Act and Congressional Intent, 5 IN-T'L L. REv. 233.
249-50 (1994).
159. Thus, the Supreme Court observed:
It is a long-standing principle of American law that legislation of Congress.
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.... [W]e assume that Congress legislates
against the backdrop of the presumption against extra-territoriality.
Therefore, unless there is the affirmative intention of Congress clearly
expressed.... we must presume it is primarily concerned %%ith domestic
conditions.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commn v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244. 24S
(1991) (citations and internal quotations omitted); accord Sale v. Haitian Ctr'.
Counsel, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2567 (1993). Congress also legislates against the
backdrop of due process, and accordingly, it is necessary to determine both that
Congress intended to exercise extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction and v,as
permitted to do so under the due process clause. See American Adjudiation of
Transnational Securities Fraud, supra note 153, at 554; John NV. Curtis. The
Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securities Code, 9 CoNN. L. REv. 67, 71-72
(1976).
160. In this regard, it was observed that "[w]here Congress explicitly enacts a
statute with the intent to control conduct occurring outside it borders, the decision to
focus on international activity is clear. In the white-collar area, several criminal
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reason, the FCPA has been described as sui generis.161
Commendably, in the Montedison case, the SEC limited its
enforcement action to the accounting and controls provisions of the
FCPA rather than seeking to impose liability under the anti-bribery
provisions as well. The SEC did so in recognition that the alleged
corrupt payments that resulted in the accounting and controls
violations were purely internal to Italy.'62 By doing so, the SEC
avoided an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction that surely would
have been viewed as "unreasonable" under international law, since
the center of gravity of the conduct occurred in Italy." 3
statues fall within this realm. Perhaps the most noteworthy is the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act." Podgor, supra note 43, at 329.
161. The FCPA has been described as sui generis in that the FCPA is "a domestic
criminal law that applies extra-territorially to U.S. citizens and companies to prohibit
bribery of foreign government officials in a foreign country." DONALD ZARIN,
DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1-2 (1995).
162. See INT'L SEC. REGULATION REP., Apr. 10, 1997 ("Because the payments
were intra-national, they did not violate the FCPA [anti-bribery provisions], an SEC
attorney explains, but that did not shield it from FCPA's bookkeeping obligations
when filing U.S. regulatory reports."); John F.X. Pelso, SEC Rejuvvenates Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, N.Y.L.J., May 21, 1997, at 2 ("Because the purported illicit
payments were made in Montedison's home country and did not involve the mails or
any instrumentality of interstate commerce, they did not violate the FCPA
antibribery provisions. However, the alleged corresponding falsification of the
company's books and records, as well as Montedison's failure to have adequate
internal accounting controls to prevent such conduct, allegedly violated the FCPA.
The Montedison action, which is still pending, reportedly represents the first time
that the Commission has brought an FCPA enforcement action whcre the issuer is a
foreign company and all the alleged misconduct occurred outside of the United
States").
163. It is presumed that in enacting legislation, Congress acted Nithin the bounds
of "customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe." See Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993). Thus, as Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall cautioned, "An act of Congress ought never be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be
construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is
warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country." Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 81 (2 Cranch 1804). As the Restatement notes:
International law has long recognized limitations on the authoity of states
to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe in circumstances affecting the interests of
other states. In the past, the jurisdiction of a state to make its law applicable
in a transactional context was determined by formal criteria supposedly
derived from concepts of state sovereignty and power. In prirciple, it was
accepted that a state had jurisdiction to exercise its authority within its
territory and with respect to its nationals abroad.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, pt. IV, ch. 1, intro. note (1986).
However, largely as a result of the hostility engendered by some countries'
attempts to construe jurisdictional concepts of territoriality and nationality broadly
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(primarily the United States), the assertion of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction
is tempered by reason and reasonableness to adapt to the complexities of
international commerce. As the Restatement explains:
Increasingly, the practice of states has reflected conceptions better adapted
to the complexities of contemporary international intercourse. State
sovereignty was to be controlled by law, and its power tempered by reason
and reasonableness. States have not in fact regulated all the foreign
activities of their nationals (or affiliates of their nationals), nor every activity
that could be said to have some effect in their territory.
Id. As a result of this accommodation, formal criteria and strict rules of
extraterritorial jurisdiction were supplanted by concepts of reasonableness in w~hich
the interests of all involved States are weighed and considered:
Territoriality and nationality remain the principal bases of jurisdiction to
prescribe, but in determining their meaning rigid concepts have been
replaced by broader criteria embracing principles of reasonableness and
fairness to accommodate overlapping or conflicting interests of states, and
affected private interests. Courts and other decision makers, learning from
the approach to comparable problems in private international law, are
increasingly inclined to consider various interests, examine contacts and
links, give effect to justified expectations, search for the "center of gravity"
of a given situation, and develop priorities.
Id. Thus, the Restatement provides that "[e]ven when one of the bases for
jurisdiction ... is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to a person or activity having connections with another state %%hen the
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." Id. § 403(1). The Restatement recites a
variety of factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a state's
exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such
regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id- § 403(2). These factors are to be considered particularly vhen "one state
exercises jurisdiction over activity in its territory and the other [state's territory] on
the basis of the effect of that activity in its territory." Id. § 403 cmt. d. Accordingly,
"[v]here regulation of transnational activity is based on its effects in the territory of
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In a second case filed subsequently to Montedis on, the SEC
sought enforcement of the FCPA's anti-bribery and accounting
provisions against a domestic issuer based primarily on corrupt
payments and associated recordkeeping violations by the issuer's
subsidiary in Indonesia."' The domestic issuer, Triton Energy
Corporation, is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Dallas,
Texas.'65 Triton Energy's stock is registered with the SEC and trades
on the New York Stock Exchange."6  The subsidiary, Triton
Indonesia, Inc., was also a Delaware corporation and wholly owned
by Triton Energy. 7
In its complaint, the SEC alleged that in September of 1988,
Triton Indonesia assumed control over an oil and gas recovery
project, known as the Enim Project, under contract witb the National
Oil Company, owned by the Republic of Indonesia.' The Enim
Project was subject to taxation in Indonesia and the taxes could be
reduced by the amount of "recoverable costs" determined by
National Oil Company's auditors. 9
Triton Energy's management informed a manager, Philip W.
Keever, assigned to Triton Indonesia in 1988, that his performance
would be evaluated on the extent to which expenditures were found
to be cost-recoverable.' Keever understood this to mean that ninety-
five percent of the expenditures on the Enim Project would have to
be certified as recoverable costs in order for him to receive a
satisfactory performance review.'
Enim Project's recoverable costs were determined largely
through negotiations between Triton Indonesia and National Oil
the regulating state, the principal of reasonableness calls for limiting the exercise of
jurisdiction so as to minimize conflict with the jurisdiction of other states, particularly
with the state where the act takes place." Id. § 403 rep. n.3. The requirement of
reasonableness in the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not simply a matter of
comity, but a rule of international law. See id. § 403 cmt. a ("Some United States
courts have applied the principle of reasonableness as a requirement of comity, that
term being understood not merely as an act of discretion and courtesy but as
reflecting a sense of obligation among states. This section states the principal of
reasonableness as a rule of international law.").
164. SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., Civ. Action No. 97-0401 (filed Feb. 27, 1997).




169. Id. [ 11-12.
170. Id. $ 19.
171. Id.
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Company auditors." That is to say, the auditors performed annual
audits and prepared preliminary findings, which were presented at an
exit conference."7 Triton Indonesia then was permitted to respond to
audit exceptions in the findings after which Triton Indonesia and the
auditors negotiated whether to exclude the exceptions in the auditors
final report.74
According to the SEC, between 1989 and 1990, Keever and the
General Manager of Triton Indonesia, Richard L. McAdoo,'
authorized at least eight payments to the auditors and Indonesian tax
officials for the purpose of receiving favorable tax treatment."" These
172- Id. T 14.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Both Keever and McAdoo also were named, individually, as defendants in
the SEC action.
176. Id. % 20. In July 1989, following the assessment of taxes in the amount of
$350,000 relating to technical services, Keever and McAdoo authorized Triton
Indonesia's agent, Roland Siouffi, to make payments of $150,000 to the auditors and
$165,000 to Indonesian tax officials to obtain a favorable ruling on the recoverability
of the technical services fees. Shortly thereafter, the Indonesian Auditing Board
accepted Triton Indonesia's position that no additional taxes were due in regard to
technical services. Id. TT 22-23. In August 1989, the Indonesian government
informed Triton Indonesia that it still owed $233,000 in taxes. In December 1939, on
Siouffi's instructions, McAdoo offered to comprise a claim for taxes at SN00JAiU less
than the amount claimed by tax authorities. Keever and McAdoo authorized Siouffi
to pay the auditor $20,000 in order to reduce the taxes. Approximately two weeks
later, the Indonesian government accepted the proposed compromise. IL 9K 24-26.
Corrupt payments were also made in connection with certification of the
unrecovered cost pool in the 1988 and 1989 audits. In April 19,9. Keever and
McAdoo authorized Siouffi to pay the auditors $20,000 to certify the 19SS cost pool.
The auditors allowed all but $139,000 of over $8 million in unrecovered costs. Id. U
27-29. Similarly, in March 1990, Siouffi was paid $38-500 to obtain favorable tax
treatment of the 19S9 cost pool. The auditors made only $275,000 in reductions and
certified over $8 million in costs. Id. TT 30-32.
Payments were made to Siouffi in order to obtain a refund for taxes paid by
Triton Indonesia's predecessor at the Enim Project. In that connection, in May 1989.
Keever and McAdoo agreed to pay Siouffi $7,500, and in June, Triton Indonesia
received a tax refund in the amount of $94,000 from the Ministry of Finance. I& 119
33-36.
Between May and September 19S9. Triton Indonesia submitted invoices totaling
$119,000 to the national oil company for the purpose of determining the amount of
valued-added tax (VAT) to be refunded. Siouffi informed Keever and McAdoo that
a favorable tax decision would require a payment of $10,000, which %%as made. In
November 1989, Triton Indonesia received a VAT reimbursement of S109,000. IA.
I 37-39.
Finally, in April 1990, Triton Indonesia sought a refund of $50,000 for purported
overcharges of pipeline fees by the national oil company. Siouffi was paid $10,00 to
obtain a revision of the pipeline rates. In June 1990, the national oil company agreed
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payments were conveyed through an agent, Roland Siouffi, who acted
as the intermediary between Triton Indonesia and the Indonesian
government."i False entries were made in the books and records of
Triton Indonesia to disguise payments to Siouffi.73
The liability of the parent corporation, Triton Energy, for the
acts of its subsidiary was grounded on the apparent knowledge of and
acquiescence to the corrupt payments. The SEC's complaint cited a
variety of "danger signals," which "should have led to a heightened
degree of vigilance about the possibility of violations" of the FCPA,
but which Triton Energy's management ignored.'79 The SEC also
noted that in 1989 and 1990, Keever informed Triton Energy's
management that payments to Siouffi were for the purpose of
obtaining favorable government action, but management had not
directed Keever to discontinue the practice.""
As further evidence of Triton Energy's knowledge and
acquiescence in the FCPA violations, the SEC pointed to the
response of the former president of Triton Energy to the findings of
an internal audit concerning the activities of Keever, McAdoo and
Siouffi. 8' The SEC noted that rather than verifying the audit findings,
to the refund. Id. 40-43.
177. Id. 11 16,20.
178. The payments to Siouffi were recorded in the books and r2cords of Triton
Indonesia as payments to entities controlled by Siouffi. Thus, between May 1989 and
June 1990, payments totaling $114,500 were made to P.T. Windtsari Danuta for
equipment service and repair. In August 1989, payments totaling $165,000 were
made to Orix Resources, Inc. for the purchase of seismic data, and in October 1989,
Development Engineering and Rehabilitation Company S.A. was paid $23,000 for
acquisition and interpretation of seismic data. Id. 17, 23, 26, 29, 32, 36, 39, 43.
Triton Indonesia also falsely documented and recorded payments of $13,500 to the
oil company auditors to develop good will and payments of $1,000 - month between
January 1987 and May 1992 to oil company clerical employees to expedite payment
of crude oil invoices. Id. 44.
179. In this regard, the SEC noted that, although Triton Energy's management
had concerns about the vagueness of Siouffi's duties, the amounts of money he
received and his honesty, the management did not establish policies and procedures
governing the activities in which Siouffi was authorized to engage or under which
payments to Siouffi could be made. Id. 11 45-46. The SEC also noted that
management was aware of the predecessor's practice of making payments to the oil
company and its auditors, and even though the person responsible for making the
payments had been terminated, he was reinstated at the insistence cf the national oil
company and continued to be employed by Triton Indonesia after Triton Energy's
management was informed of the corrupt payments referred to in the SEC's
complaint. Id. 47.
180. Id. 48.
181. According to the SEC's complaint, in 1989, Triton Energy's internal auditor
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the former president attempted to cover up the audit report' and
withheld pertinent information from Triton Energy's independent
auditors."n Triton Energy, Keever and McAdoo consented to the
entry of a permanent injunction without admitting or denying the
allegations in the SEC's complaint."M
Imposition of liability on Triton Energy and the individual
visited Triton Indonesia where he reviewed documents and interviewed Keever,
McAdoo and others. Based on that information, the auditor submitted a written
report in which he expressed his concerns about, among other things, improper
payments by Triton Indonesia to Indonesian government officials. The auditor
specifically reported that Triton Indonesia paid oil company auditors "in order to
have their audit exceptions taken care of." The auditor further reported that these
payments were documented in a "creative wvay" to make them cost recoverable. The
internal auditor's report was distributed to senior management at Triton Energy. i.
149.
182. Rather than attempting to discern whether the report was accurate, Triton
Energy's then-president ordered the internal auditor to collect all copies of the report
and destroy them. Triton Energy's senior management dismissed the allegations in
the report, and as the SEC observed, "No investigation was conducted and no
policies or procedures were revised as a consequence of the conduct described" in the
report. Id. TT 49-50.
183. During their audit of fiscal year 1991, Triton Energy's outside auditors
became aware of the internal audit report and raised concerns about possible
unlawful activities by Triton Indonesia. Keever prepared a report delineating the
payments made to Indonesian officials and the false books and records created by
Triton Indonesia. However, as the SEC stated in its complaint:
Rather than fully disclosing each of these transactions to the auditors, Triton
Energy management made a partial disclosure, omitting most of the
improper payments and most of the false books and records. At a meeting
with the auditors, Triton Energy's then senior management represented that
there was no evidence that money was paid to Indonesian auditors.
Id. T 51.
184. See Exchange Act Release No. 889, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 63 SEC Docket
2490-1, n.2 (Feb. 27, 1997) describing orders of permanent injunction as to Triton
Energy Corporation and Phillip W. Keever entered on March 3, 1997. In addition to
the entry of orders of permanent injunction, Triton Energy was ordered to pay a civil
penalty of $300,000, and Keever was ordered to pay a penalty of S50,000. IU.; sce also
SEC Litigation Release No. 15266, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 63 SEC Docket 2490-1
(Feb. 27, 1997). McAdoo subsequently consented to the entry of an order of
permanent injunction and was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $35,OW. See SEC
Litigation Release No. 15396 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 63 SEC Docket 2490-1(June
26, 1997). The SEC also brought an administrative action pursuant to section 21c of
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1998), against four other employees of the
Triton Energy Corporation concerning their roles in approving the payments to
Siouffi and the falsification of Triton Indonesia's books and records. In re David
Gore, Robert Puetz, William McClure and Robert P. Murphy, Exchange Act Release
No. 889, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 63 SEC Docket 2490-1 (Feb. 27, 1997). The
respondents consented to the entry of cease and desist orders. SEC Litigation
Release No. 15266, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 63 SEC Docket 2490-1 (Feb. 27, 1997).
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defendants for their acts and the acts of Triton Indonesia was in
accordance with controlling principles of international law. To the
extent that the falsification of Triton Indonesia's books and records
resulted in false or inaccurate filings with the SEC by the issuer-
parent corporation, as in Montedison, prescriptive jurisdiction would
be warranted under the effects principle."
Additionally, one can justify prescriptive jurisdiction in the case
of Triton Energy and the individuals involved on the nationality
principle.1" That is, a State is recognized as having jurisdictional
authority to govern the conduct of its citizens even for acts committed
outside the State's territorial jurisdiction." Since all of the
defendants appear to be citizens and residents of the United States,
prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of nationality would lie as well.
C. Prescriptive Jurisdiction over "Domestic Concerns"
In addition to "issuers," the FCPA also applies to '"any domestic
concern, other than an issuer."'" Within this class of persons and
entities are the following:
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the
United States; and (B) any corporation, partnership, association,
joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization,
or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in
the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a state of
the United States, or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of
the United States.18
In fashioning this definition of "domestic concern," Congress was
185. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 112, §
403(2).
186. As the Supreme Court stated in Blackmer v. United States, 2.34 U.S. 421, 438
(1932), "The jurisdiction of the United States over its absent citizen, so far as the
binding effect of the legislation is concerned, in personam, as he is personally bound
to take notice of the laws that are applicable to him and to obey them."
187. Thus, the Restatement provides that "a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law
with respect to... the activities, interests, status or relations of its nationals outside
as well as within its territory .... RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §
402(2) (1986). Although nationality is considered an "exceptional" basis for the
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction (territoriality being considered tht, "normal" basis
for jurisdiction), the nationality principle of jurisdiction is applicable to "juridical"
persons, and the nationality of a corporation is determined by the state of
incorporation. Id. § 402(2) cmt. b. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344
U.S. 280,282 (1952).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (Supp. 1997).
189. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(1).
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attentive to the international law implications arising from the
assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction beyond readily definable bounds
of nationality and territoriality. Congress was well aware of the role
played by foreign agents and consultants as intermediaries in corrupt
payments to foreign officials.' Likewise, Congress had substantial
evidence of the use of foreign subsidiaries as repositories for off-book
"slush funds" and as conduits for corrupt payments. '
To address the problem of foreign subsidiaries, the House bill
included within the definition of "domestic concern" an entity:
(1) which is owned or controlled by individuals who are citizens or
nationals of the United States; (2) which has its principal place of
business in the United States; or (3) which is organized under the
laws of a state of the United States or any territory, possession or
commonwealth of the United States.92
190. For example, Richard NV. Millar, a member of Northrop Corporation's board
of directors, testified that between 1961 and 1974 a foreign consultant secretly
returned approximately $476,000 in fees to Northrop officials who used the funds to
make unlawvful political contributions. Multinational Corps. and U.S. Foreign Policy,
supra note 52, at 110. Mr. Millar testified that payments totaling S450,0O also were
made to Adnan Khashoggi, ostensibly to pay two Saudi Air Force generals. Ild. at
112. D.J. Houghton, Chairman of Lockheed Corporation, testified that Lockheed
too paid Mr. Khashoggi $400,000 as a payoff to a Saudi official. Id. at 350. Deputy
Assistant Attorney General John C. Keeny also testified during consideration of the
1988 amendments that "[t]he majority of the FCPA cases w~hich have been
investigated involve payments made to agents." Btsiness Accounting and Foreign
Trade Simplification Act Hearings, supra note 11, at 64.
191. Congress was well aware of the role foreign subsidiaries played as
repositories of slush funds and conduits for corrupt payments. The Chairman of Gulf
Oil Corporation testified that political contributions in South Korea (SO million) and
Bolivia ($460,000) were made through Gulfs subsidiary, Bahamas Exploration
Company. Multinational Corps. and U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 52, at 8-58.
Senior officials of Exxon and Mobil Oil Corporations similarly testified concerning
millions of dollars in political contributions made in Italy through their Italian
subsidiaries. Id. at 241-340. The Chairman of Lockheed Corporation also testified
concerning payments to Mr. Khashoggi through Lockheed's Swiss subsidiary. Id. at
345-92. The SEC's report on questionable payments noted payments through foreign
subsidiaries by General Tire and Rubber, Ashland Oil Company, Gulf Oil
Corporation and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company. SEC Report,
supra note 74, at app. B. Indeed, in reporting out its bill, the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce noted that -[a] survey of public documents filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission which disclose questionable or
improper payment activities shows that at least 64 U.S. public corporations made
such payments through foreign subsidiaries. Of those companies, 19 corporations
have made payments aggregating S1 million or more over various periods of time."
H. REP. No. 95-640, at 12 n.2 (1977).
192. H.R. CoN REP. No. 95-831, at 13 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4121,4126. In this regard, the Senate bill defined "control" to mean:
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As the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
explained:
By so defining domestic concern, the Committee intends to reach
not only all U.S. companies other than those subject to SEC
jurisdiction, but also foreign subsidiaries of any U.S. corporation.
The Committee found it appropriate to extend the cove rage of the
bill to non-U.S. based subsidiaries because of the extensive use of
such entities as a conduit for questionable or improper foreign
payments authorized by their domestic parent. '
The Senate's definition of "domestic concern" was not so
expansive."' In conference, the House receded to the Senate
definition "with an amendment to make clear that any company
having a principal place of business in the United States would be
subject to the bill.""19
The conferees adopted the Senate's more restrictive approach
because of their concern for the possible conflict with international
law principles if Congress exercised prescriptive jurisdiction over
foreign subsidiaries. The conferees emphasized, however, that the
U.S. entity, either issuer or domestic concern, would remain liable if it
engaged in violative conduct indirectly through a third party. As the
conference stated:
In receding to the Senate, the conferees recognized the inherent
jurisdictional, enforcement and diplomatic difficulties raised by the
inclusion of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies in the direct
prohibitions of the bill. However, the conferees intend to make it
clear that any issuer or domestic concern, which engages in bribery
of foreign officials indirectly through any other person or entity,
would itself be liable under the bill. The conferees recognized that
The power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or
policies of a domestic concern, unless such power is solely the result of an
official position with such domestic concern. In determining whether a
person controls a domestic concern for purposes of this section, any person
who owns beneficially, either directly or through one or more controlled
domestic concerns, more than 50 per centum of the voting securities of a
domestic concern shall be presumed to control such domestic concern, and
any person who does not so own more than 50 per centum of the voting
securities of a domestic concern shall be presumed not to control such
domestic concern.
Id. at 3-4.
193. H. REP. No. 95-640, at 12 (1977).
194. See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 17, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4115.
195. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-831, at 13 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4121,4126.
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such jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties may
not be present in the case of individuals who are U.S. citizens,
nationals or residentsl1 6
Because different jurisdictional considerations apply to U.S.
citizens, nationals and residents than apply to foreign nationals or
residents, the conferees restricted the liability of persons involved in
the affairs of a foreign subsidiary, other than those persons specified
in the definitions of "issuer" and "domestic concern," to U.S. citizens,
nationals or residents."' Foreign nationals or residents who are
otherwise subject to U.S. jurisdiction would remain liable for
violations of the FCPA in the same way as an issuer or domestic
concern." However, this jurisdictional basis over foreign nationals
196. I. at 14; see Jeffrey P. Bialos & Gregory Husisian, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Dealing with Illicit Payments in Transitional and Elnerging Economics.
8 INT'L Q. 183, 184-85 (1996). However, one commentator noted that, as a practical
matter, the FCPA's requirements and prohibitions may be imposed by the parent on
the subsidiary because of the parent's third party liability-
[A]s a practical matter, because of its broad wording, the law does affect
subsidiaries indirectly. For example, if a U.S. corporation owns a foreign
subsidiary in Switzerland, and knows or has reason to know that this foreign
subsidiary's business depends upon the making of bribes to a foreign
government official, the U.S. company may be in violation of the law. One
consequence is that the foreign subsidiary must conform its behavior to the
requirements of U.S. law even though neither it, nor its officers, directors, or
employees may be penalized directly, or risk having its parent found to be in
violation of U.S. law and subject to penalties. There is thus some
extraterritorial consequence, regardless of whether one characterizes the act
as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
Stanley J. Marcuss, Extraterritoriali,: U.S. Anti-Boycott Law and the Forqign
Corrupt Practices Act, 15 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1135, 1144-45 (19"3). The U.S.
parent will be subject to taxation on any income a foreign subsidiary uses to make
corrupt payments. Lord, supra note 38, at 1072 n.34.
197. In this connection, the conferees stated:
Individuals other than those specifically covered by the bill (e.g., officers,
directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on behalf of an issuer or
domestic concern) will be liable when they act in relation to the affairs of
any foreign subsidiary of an issuer or domestic concern if they are citizens,
nationals, or residents of the United States.
Id. Jurisdiction over foreign nationals who have no direct contacts with the United
States is highly problematic. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738
F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Harvey L Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Sceurities Rteulation
by Enforcement A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. REG. 149,215 (1990).
198. As explained in the 1977 Conference Report, "The conferees determined that
foreign nationals or residents otherwise under the jurisdiction of the United States
would be covered by the bill in circumstances where an issuer or domestic concern
engaged in conduct proscribed by the bill." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-831, at 14
(1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4121,4126.
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and residents is not a model of clarity.'"
The only reported decision in this regard" ' is equally
unenlightening. An employee of Sikorsky Aircraft brought a civil
action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO)" ' alleging "a wide-ranging conspiracy encompassing foreign
and domestic corporations, individuals and governments."2 '  The
gravamen of the claim was that Sikorsky and its U.S. parent, United
Technologies Corporation, conspired with various Brilish and Saudi
199. The conferees did not explain what was meant by "otherwise under the
jurisdiction of the United States." It would appear, however, that foreign nationals
or foreign residents who are subject to the adjudicative jurisdiction of the United
States will be subject to prosecution (civil or criminal) for violations of the FCPA.
The Restatement explains that "[a] State may exercise jurisdiction through its courts
to adjudicate with respect to a person or thing if the relationship of the State to the
person or thing is such as to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 421(1) (1986). Among the bases
of adjudicative jurisdiction enumerated in the Restatement are the following: being
present (other than transitory presence) in the territory; carrying on business
regularly in the State; carrying on the activity in the State that is the subject of the
adjudication; and carrying on activity outside the State that has a "substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect within the State," if that activity is tht! subject of the
adjudication. Id. § 421 cmt. c. The Reporter for the American Law Institute noted
that, "[t]he modem concepts of jurisdiction to adjudicate under international law are
similar to those developed under the due process clause of the United States
Constitution." Id. at rep. note 1.
Under U.S. law, the jurisdiction to adjudicate is subject to the requirements of
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) ("The requirement
that a court has personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. III, but from the due
process clause."). Thus, the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction must "not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
Typically, this requires that a defendant have established certain "minimum contacts"
with the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-
92 (1980) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316). These "minimum
contacts" must have a basis in "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
475 (1985) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Thus, the U.S.
Supreme Court said that "[j]urisdiction is proper.., where the contacts proximately
result from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection'
with the forum state." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.. at 475; accord
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-16 (1983). In addition, there
must be authorization for service on the defendant. See Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v.
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97,104 (1987).
200. Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1992).
201. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1999).
202. Dooley, 803 F. Supp. at 431.
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Arabian individuals and entities to bribe members of the Saudi royal
family in order to sell twelve Black Hawk helicopters to the Saudi
Ministry of Defense.- Among the predicate acts of racketeering
underlying the plaintiff's claim ' were violations of the Travel Act:"
and the FCPA.'
203. Id. at 432.
204. Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 and 1964(c) (1999), a person "injured in his business
or property" by reason of a RICO violation may bring an action to recover treble
damages. However, to establish RICO liability it must be shown that the defendant
participated in the affairs of an "enterprise" through "a pattern of racketeering
activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Establishment of such a pattern of racketeering
activity requires proof of at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity. See IS
U.S.C. § 1961(5); H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229. 237 (1"89).
RICO enumerates criminal acts constituting "racketeering activity." Sce 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a).
206. Dooley, 803 F. Supp. at 428. Although recommended by the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (see H. REP. No. 95-4, at 10
(1977)), Congress did not provide a private right of action under the FCPA and
courts have declined to imply one. See Lamb v. Philip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024
(6th Cir. 1990); McLean v. Int'l Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 193'7);
Citicorp Int'l Trading Co. v. Western Oil & Ref. Co., 771 F. Supp. (ft, 696 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Shields v. Erickson, 710 F. Supp. 686, 688 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Le%%is v. Sprock, 612
F. Supp. 1316, 1332-33 (N.D. Cal. 1985); see also Eisenberger v. Spectrex Indus., Inc.,
644 F. Supp. 48 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (no private right of action under the books and
records provisions); Pines, supra note 5. at 216; Mary Siegel, The Inplication
Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 79 CoLui. L. REv. 1085, 1114 (1979)
("The Act reflects Congress' condemnation of bribery by imposing both civil and
criminal penalties on those who make payments in violation of the Act. These
penalties demand that the business community conform to a certain standard of
conduct. As such, the Act's purpose is to deter bribery, not to compensate those
injured by the prohibited payments."). However, private plaintiffs %%ere able to
assert claims based on violations of the FPCA under the civil provisions of RICO.
since interstate or foreign travel in furtherance of foreign bribery may constitute a
violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1999). which is a specified
racketeering activity under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B). See Environmental
Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3rd Cir. 1988); United States v.
Young & Rubicam Inc., 741 F. Supp. 334 (D. Conn. 1990) (decided under 1S U.S.C. §
1962(c)); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) (commercial bribery
constitutes an "unlawful activity" under the Travel Act). Plaintiffs grounding civil
RICO claims on wrongful terminations resulting from their exposure to FCPA
violations have not fared as well due to a lack of standing. See, e.g., Reddy v. Litton
Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990); Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F2d 347 (ist
Cir. 1987); see also Adler v. American Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1",7)
(employee who claimed he was terminated because he w as going to disclose foreign
corrupt payments did not state a cause of action under Maryland law). But see
Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 643 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (plaintiff w~ho proved the
existence of a RICO conspiracy would have standing to recover damages resulting
from overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy). Civil damages may also be
available under federal antitrust laws. See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d at
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On defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint, the district
court first found that in personam jurisdiction under the District of
Columbia "long arm" statute 7 was proper" but con ziuded that a
claim grounded on violations of the FCPA was not actionable under
RICO.29
The district court noted that neither the British defendants nor
Saudi defendants met the FCPA's definitions of "issuer" or "domestic
concern." 210  Instead, the foreign defendants were either foreign
corporations or employees of those corporations." The plaintiff
contended that the defendants were subject to the FCPA's anti-
bribery prohibitions as agents of a U.S. issuer,212 but the district court
disagreed.
Although the district court read the conferees' reference to
"foreign nationals or residents otherwise under the jurisdiction of the
United States" to mean that "in certain circumstances, foreign
nationals may be subject to the provisions of the FCPA," it also
interpreted the conferees' comment as limiting the FCPA's
applicability to "foreign individuals who act as agents" of U.S.
211companies. Further, the district court concluded that the phrase
"foreign nationals or residents" was intended to apply only to
individuals.214 The court based this determination on lhe conferees'
expressed concerns as to "the inherent jurisdictional, enforcement,
and diplomatic difficulties" arising from assertion of the FCPA's
prohibitions to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies (in contrast to
1030.
207. D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1) (1998).
208. Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428,435-37 (D.D.C. 1992).
209. Id. at 438.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 431.
212. Id. at 438. The plaintiff contended that the foreign defend ants had acted as
agents of "one of the UTC defendants." Id. at 438 n.19.
213. Id. As the district court explained, "While the language itself is not limiting,
the logic of the Conference Report's explanation implies that the Act is limited to
individuals who act as agents." Id. at 439.
214. Id. As the district court observed:
[I]t is implausible that Congress intended to exclude U.S.-controlled foreign
subsidiaries, but not non-subsidiary foreign companies, as plaintiff Dooley
suggests. The Conference Report clearly indicates that the authors of the
Act were concerned with international comity. The same concerns over
diplomatic difficulties and jurisdictional contacts would apply whether a
U.S.-owned foreign subsidiary or a foreign corporation was invo ved.
[Vol. 22:407
1999] Extraterritorial Reach of Campaign Against International Bribery 463
the liability of the U.S. parent, and U.S. citizens, nationals and
residents involved in the affairs of a foreign subsidiary). Accordingly,
the court dismissed the complaint as to the foreign corporation
defendants.' With respect to the individual defendants subject to the
court's jurisdiction who had acted as agents for a U.S. issuer or
domestic concern, the district court held that subject matter
jurisdiction existed, and that the plaintiff could pursue a RICO claim
against them, grounded on the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions:""
The district court's decision was not wholly satisfactory. Indeed,
it is clear that a foreign corporation, either a subsidiary or a separate
corporation, can act as an agent of a U.S. company:' Although
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on an overseas
payment to a foreign official would be problematic, it would seem a
foreign corporation that engaged in foreign bribery as the agent of a
U.S. company would remain subject to the prohibitions of the FCPA
if U.S. jurisdiction otherwise existed over the foreign entity.2' Thus,
it would appear to be equally implausible that Congress would
establish agency liability for foreign individuals while at the same
time excluding foreign entities from liability under the same
circumstances.
Congress clearly contemplated some degree of third party
liability under the FCPA. Reporting on the House bill, the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce observed that "the
concepts of aiding and abetting and joint participation would apply to
a violation under this bill in the same manner in which those concepts
215. Id. at 439-40.
216. Id. at 441.
217. Indeed, that is a basis on which the parent corporation can be held vicariously
liable for the acts of a subsidiary corporation. See H. Lowell Brown, Parent-
Subsidiaty Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 1
(1997); Glenn R Sarno, Haling Foreign Subsidiary Corporations into Court Under the
1934 Act Jurisdictional Bases and Fortun Non Conveniens, 55 LAW & COTEMP.
PROB. 379, 385-88 (1992).
218. As Professor Robert Thompson noted, "United States policy sometimes
requires that the subsidiary's foreign character be disregarded in order to reveal the
essential U.S. character of the enterprise, which must then abide by the laws of the
United States." Robert B. Thompson, United States Jurisdiction over Foreign
Subsidiaries: Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
319, 321 (1983). Although there is precedent for disregarding the corporate
separateness of a foreign subsidiary and asserting jurisdiction over the subsidiary, as
Professor Thompson pointed out, the rules for piercing the corporate veil, %%here the
interests of the State of incorporation of the parent and the subsidiary's State of
incorporation conflict, are murky at best. Id. at 372-80.
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have always applied in both civil actions and implied private actions
brought under the securities laws generally.""' 9 This comment may
relate only to officials or employees of the U.S. company with
knowledge of the corrupt payment." The reference to agents in both
the anti-bribery prohibitions respecting issuers and domestic
concerns, ' however, strongly suggests that even a foreign national,
acting with the knowledge or at the direction of an official or
employee of the U.S. company, and over whom U.S. jurisdiction
otherwise exists, would be subject to FCPA liability.
However, third-party liability, as an aider, abettor or co-
conspirator, does not extend to the foreign official who accepted the
corrupt payment. The fact that Congress demonstrated its intent to
reach at least some non-citizens, but did not do so explicitly with
regard to foreign officials, persuaded the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit that Congress had not intended to exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign officials.' The court also
concluded that because foreign officials were excluded from
prosecution for the substantive offense of accepting a bribe in
violation of the FCPA,' 4 their conduct could not be prosecuted
derivatively under the conspiracy statute either.26
219. H. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
220. The Committee noted in this connection:
The committee fully recognizes that the proposed law will not reach all
corrupt payments overseas. For example, Sections 2 and 3 [the anti-bribery
provisions] would not permit prosecution of a foreign national who paid a
bribe overseas acting entirely on his own initiative. The committee notes,
however, that in the majority of bribery cases investigated by the SEC some
responsible official or employee of the U.S. parent company had knowledge
of the bribery and either explicitly or implicitly approved ihe practice.
Under the bill as reported, such persons could be prosecuted. The concepts
of aiding and abetting and joint participation would apply to a violation
under this bill in the same manner in which those concepts have always
applied in both SEC civil actions and in implied private actions brought
under the securities laws generally.
Id.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (1999).
222. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b).
223. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (adopting the opinion of
the district court in United States v. Blondek, 741 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1990)).
224. United States v. Blondek, 741 F. Supp. at 117.
225. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1999).
226. 741 F. Supp. at 118. It was similarly observed in this regard that:
When Congress drafts a statute specifically focused on international
activities, it is likely that there has been congressional reflection on the
international ramifications of the criminal application. The enactment of the
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Even if U.S. jurisdiction otherwise existed over a foreign official,
prosecution for violation of the FCPA would implicate the act of state
doctrine, which in essence provides that a U.S. court will not question
the public acts of a foreign sovereign undertaken within its own
territory.' The Act of State Doctrine is not a rule of international
law, rather, the doctrine is a principle of decision- or rule of
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act demonstrates a clear intent on the part of
Congress to transcend the borders of the United States with regard to
specific conduct. Congress has, however, tailored the statute to encompass
limited conduct and individuals.
Podgor, supra note 43, at 332.
227. The act of state doctrine is set forth in the Restatement, which states that
"[in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles, courts in the United States will generally refrain from ... sitting in
judgment on... acts of a governmental character done by a foreign State v, ithin its
own territory and applicable there." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREI6%
RELATIONS § 443(i) (1986). The U.S. Supreme Court also stated the doctrine as
follows:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 612, 691 n.7 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 16S U.S. 2,50, 252 (1897)); see
also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 4Wk) (1964) ("The act of
state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from
inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power
committed within its own territory"). For a discussion of the development of the act
of state doctrine, see Michael J. Bazler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U.
PENN. L. REv. 325, 330-65 (1986); Daniel C.K. Chow, Rethinking the Act of State
Doctrine: An Analysis in Terns of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 62 WASH. L. RE%,. 397.
404-30 (1987); Bernard Ilkhanoff, United States v. Noriega: The Act of State Doctrine
and the Relationship Between the Judiciary and the Executive, 7 TEMP. I T'L & COMP.
LJ. 345, 352-56 (1993); Tracie A. Sundack, Republic of the Philippines v. Mircos:
The Ninth Circuit Allows a Former Ruler to Invoke the Act of State Doctrine Against a
Resisting Sovereign, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 225, 228-31 (19SS); Christopher B. Walther.
Motivation Cases and WS. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l.
80 KY. LJ. 269, 272-75 (1992); Note, ]AM v. OPEC: "Acts of States" and "Passive
Virtues," 5 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP Li. 159, 161-65 (1983).
228. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421 ("[tihat international
law does not require application of the doctrine is evidenced by the practice of
nations").
229. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 49',.
406 (1990); See Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 427; Kathleen Karelis.
Comm ent: The Act of State Doctrine; Reconciling Justice and Diplomacy on a Case-
by-Case Basis, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1169, 1169 (1989); Veronica Ann Deberardine.
Comment, Foreign Corrupt Practices: Creating an Exception to the Act c.f State
Doctrine, 34 AM. U. L. RE,. 203,203-05 (1984).
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abstention. " Although the doctrine is not of constitutional
dimension,21 its "underpinnings" lie in the Constitution's separation
of powers clause.3 2 The doctrine, therefore, "is a reflection of the
executive's primary competency in foreign affairs, and an
acknowledgment of the fact that in passing upon foreign
governmental acts the judiciary may hinder or embarrass the conduct
of our foreign relations. 'n33
The act of state doctrine pertains to a foreign official's public or
official acts and not to actions that official takes in a private
capacity." Conceivably, acceptance of a corrupt payment by an
official could be construed as a private act and, as a result, not be
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the act of state doctrine!' Indeed,
230. See Lynn E. Parseghian, Comment: Defining the "Public Act" Requirement in
the Act of State Doctrine, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1151, 1153 n.12 (1991). This led to some
confusion as to the nature and scope of the doctrine. See Chow, supra note 227, at
399-400.
231. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423 ("The text of the
Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove
from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of State").
232. Id. ("The act of state doctrine does, however, have 'constitutional
underpinnings.' It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of
government in a system of separation of powers").
233. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 108-09
(C.D. Cal. 1971); see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). Indeed, one commentator
suggested that an exception to the doctrine should be recognized when the Executive
Branch seeks to prosecute a foreign official for acts having a "catastrophic effect" in
the United States. Ilkhanoff, supra note 227, at 364-66.
234. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706
(1974) (plurality opinion); see also Ilkhanoff, supra note 227, at 362-63; Sundack,
supra note 227, at 237-38; see generally Parseghian, supra note 230, at 1158-67.
235. See Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 909-10 (E.D. Mich.
1981) ("[I]t is noteworthy that support exists for the proposition thot corrupt activity
by foreign sovereigns is beyond the umbrella of the Act of State Doctrine. This
concept rests on the idea that such activity would be violative of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act ... and on the premise that to shield such activity would be violative of
the spirit of the Act .... Because the claims in the instant case properly are viewed
as avoiding allegations of direct wrongdoing by the foreign sovereigns themselves,
final resolution of whether, if allegations of corruption were made, the Act of State
Doctrine could be avoided is not necessary at this time. It is enough simply to
observe, on the basis of these comments, that there is a likelihood that the doctrine
could be avoided were the allegations such as to call for review of foreign sovereign
corruption charges"); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc.,
473 F. Supp. 680, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("The allegations here that government actions
were procured by fraud and coercion thus suffice to preclude application of the act of
state doctrine even to the expropriation issue at this stage of the litigation"); see
generally Maureen A. Dowd & Theodore B. Eichelberger, Act of State Doctrine: An
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there are cases that suggest bribery is not within the ambit of the
doctrine. 6 It has also been suggested that because the enforcers of
Emerging Corruption Exception in Antitrust Cases?, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 455
(1984). It was observed in this regard that "[since acceptance of corporate payments
seems to violate foreign laws and judging from the recent reactions of foreign
governments, to overstep the limits of official authority, it would be inappropriate to
invoke the act of state doctrine to protect corporations that induce such conduct by
government officials." McManis, supra note 48, at 2.7.
236. See Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1962) (former
Venezuelan President's "acts constituting the financial crimes of embezlement or
malversation, fraud or breach of trust, and receiving money or valuable securities
knowing them to have been unlawvfully obtained as to which probable cause of guilt
had been shown were not acts of Venezuela sovereignty"). For example,
Environmental Tectonics Corporation (ETC) brought a RICO and antitrust action
against W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. and others for damages in connection with
Kirkpatrick's award of a contract with the Nigerian government to construct an air
force base that ETC alleged was procured by Kirkpatrick through bribery of Nigerian
government officials. The district court dismissed ETC's complaint on the grounds
that proof of ETC's claim would require "establishment of corruption by high
Nigerian Government and military officials and necessarily implies a criticism of the
Republic of Nigeria... " and accordingly, the act of state doctrine barred the action.
Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 13S1,
1398 (D.N.J. 1987). The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of ETC's
complaint. Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc., 847 F.2d 1052
(3d Cir. 1987). Although the appellate court agreed with the district court that the
award of a government procurement contract could be "a sufficiently formal
expression of a government's public interests to trigger application of the [act of
state] doctrine," it concluded that the district court would simply have to determine
as a factual matter that the bribery of the Nigerian officials motivated the award. Id
at 1058, 1061. Thus, the district court would not have to inquire into the legality of
the contract and, therefore, the act of State doctrine did not apply. Id. at 102. The
Court of Appeals also noted that the defendants failed "to demonstrate that the
litigation process was bound to result in the type of institutional conflict betw een the
political and judicial branches that would justify invoking the doctrine." Id. The U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to reinstate the complaint.
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
The Court agreed that the effect of an action by a foreign sovereign was not at issue;
accordingly, the act of state doctrine was not implicated. As the Court explained:
Act of state issues only arise when a court must decide-that is, %Nhen the
outcome of the case turns upon-the effect of official action by a foreign
sovereign. When that question is not in the case, neither is the Act of State
doctrine. That is the situation here. Regardless of what the court's factual
findings may suggest as to the legalit, of the Nigerian contract, its legality is
simply not a question to be decided in the present suit, and there is thus no
occasion to apply the rule of decision that the Act of State doctrine requires.
Id. at 406; see also Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473
F. Supp. at 690 ("Even an unrepudiated act of state may be scrutinized b the courts
if it resulted from corruption of government officials"); see generally Deberardine,
supra note 229; Maureen A. Dowd & Theodore B. Eichelberger, Act of State
Doctrine: An Emerging Corruption Exception in Antitrust Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 455,467-69 (1984); Sundack, supra note 227, at 248-50.
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the FCPA, the SEC and the Department of Justice, consult with the
U.S. Department of State regarding the foreign relations impact of
proposed enforcement actions, the interests the doctrine seeks to
protect are adequately safeguarded; therefore, the act of state
doctrine should not apply to public prosecutions."
Nevertheless, although a foreign official's acceptance of a
corrupt payment could be viewed as a private act not subject to the
Act of State Doctrine, the official action that the payment was
intended to influence, would be a public act to which the doctrine
would apply. It is for that reason courts are reluctant to inquire into
the motivation for official conduct and held, instead, that such inquiry
is barred by the act of state doctrine.'
237. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 409
(9th Cir. 1982); see also Bernstein v. N.Y. Nederlandschc-Amerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappis, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949); compare Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964) ("Respondents do not ... contest the
view that these letters [from the Legal Advisor to the State Department] were
intended to reflect no more than the Department's then wish not to make any
statement bearing on this litigation"); see generally Karelis, supra nate 229, at 1197-
1201; Sundack, supra note 227, at 235-37.
238. See Republic of the Phillipines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir. 1987)
("Plaintiffs case implicates the Act of State Doctrine in its most fundamental sense.
In order to resolve plaintiffs various claims against Marcos, the court will have to
adjudicate whether Marcos' actions as president were lawful under Philippine law. A
number of the acts plaintiff challenges are purely governmental ones, such as
expropriation of property and creation of public monopolies. These were not merely
the acts of Ferdinand Marcos, private citizen, while he happened to be president;
they were an exercise of his authority as the country's head of state and, as such, were
the sovereign acts of the Philippines"); Republic of the Philippine:; v. Marcos, 806
F.2d 344, 359 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Appellants simply fail to make the crucial distinction
between acts of Marcos as head of state, which may be protected from judicial
scrutiny even if illegal under Philippine law, and his purely private acts"); Clayco
Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d at 407 ("In this case ... the
very existence of plaintiffs' claim depends upon establishing that the motivation for
the sovereign act was bribery, thus embarrassment would result from adjudication");
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 113 (C.D. Cal.
1971) ("Nor is this conclusion [that the act of state doctrine applies] disturbed, as
regards [the Ruler of] Sharjah, by plaintiffs' assertion that some of the conduct of its
ruler was motivated by 'his own personal gain and benefit' ... . [T]he complaint
clearly indicates that the Ruler of Sharjan acted at all times in his official capacity and
on behalf of his State. In these circumstances ... the act of state dcctrine applies");
see also O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449,
452-53 (2d Cir. 1987) ("O.N.E.'s allegations make clear that its antitrust suit is
premised on contentions that it was harmed by acts and motivations of a foreign
sovereign which the District Court would be called on to examine and pass judgment
on .... When the causal chain between a defendant's alleged conduct and plaintiff's
injury cannot be determined without an inquiry into the motives of the foreign
government, claims made under the antitrust laws are dismissed."); West v.
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D. Summary
In enacting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Congress
exercised prescriptive jurisdiction to the fullest extent consistent with
due process under the Commerce Clause. : ' Congress was deeply
concerned by the role that foreign nationals played and the matter in
which foreign entities were used in the incidents of foreign bribery
that gave rise to the FCPA. Nevertheless, Congress took care not to
exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction in a way that conflicted with
Multibanco Comertrex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 19S7) ("The evaluation by
one sovereign of foreign officers' compliance with their own lawvs would, at least in
the absence of the foreign sovereign's consent, intrude upon that State's coequal
status.... [T]hus, further inquiry into the actual operation of the nationalized
Mexican banking system to the extent that it implicates the non-compliance of
officials with their own laws is barred under the act of state doctrine."), Compania de
Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. l9S2)
("Resolution of the charges made by CGNL would require a determination of the
legality of the Mexican government's action in appointing an 'intervenor' to take
over CGNL's operations in Nuevo Laredo, and the validity of such action under
Mexican law."); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68,77 (2d Cir. 1977) (examination
of Libyan officials' motivation in nationalizing oil holding would inevitably involve
determination of the validity of the official action, an inquiry barred by the act of
state doctrine). See generally Karelis, supra note 229, at 1186-91;, Walther, supra note
227, at 277-92.
239. The FCPA is not the only U.S. law implicated by the payment of a foreign
bribe. As previously noted, international travel in connection with the payment of a
bribe would violate the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. sections 1961-6S (1999). In like
fashion, the use of the manner and means of interstate communication in furtherance
of a bribery scheme could form the predicate of a mail or wire fraud Violation under
18 U.S.C. sections 1341 and 1343. Felony violation of the FCPA is a -specified
unlawful activity" under the money laundering statute, which makes the transmission
of funds from the United States to a place outside the United States with the intent to
promote the carrying on of a "specified unlawful activity" a violation of 18 U.S.C.
section 1956(a)(2). The unreported transportation of S10,0O0 in cash or a cash
equivalent outside the United States violates the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. sections 5311-5330 (1999). The United States also imposes
various disclosure requirements concerning overseas payments in connection with the
licensing of exports, particularly military goods. Under the Arms Export Control
Act, 22 U.S.C. section 2779 (1999) and the implementing International Traffic in
Arms Regulation, 22 C.F.R. pt. 130 (1999), sellers of defense articles valued at
$500,000 must disclose to the U.S. Department of State if aggregate political
contributions of $5,000 or more were made or if fees or commissions in excess of
$100,000 were paid. 22 C.F.R. § 130.9(a). If the overseas sale of military goods is
funded through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or Foreign Military Financing
(FIF) programs, there are additional disclosure requirements. FMS sales require
certification that commissions paid were "bona fide" (i.e., not more than S50O.30)
and identified to the customer (some of whom prohibit commissions or require
advance approval). FMF sales do not permit the payment of commissions or agent's
fees with federal funds. See Defense Security Assistance Agency Guidelines §
225.7303-4.
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accepted principles of international law or would otherwise offend
the sovereignty of other nations. The actions brought to enforce the
provisions and prohibitions of the FCPA, including the recent SEC
actions against Montedison, S.P.A. and Triton Energy Corporation,
reflect the wariness of the executive and judiciary in asserting
enforcement jurisdiction in accordance with international law and the
intentions of Congress.
Nevertheless, while confirming the FCPA's extraterritorial reach,
Congress made clear its wish that the problem of international
bribery be addressed globally, on a multilateral basis, and not simply
by the unilateral prohibition against bribery by U.S. firms alone.
Indeed, the need for an international solution to official corruption
has been a recurring theme since the earliest Congressional hearings
on questionable payments in 1976. Since that time, U.S. government
agencies have undertaken a variety of initiatives aimed at securing
international agreement to outlaw bribery. Most recently, these
efforts produced official actions by the Organization of American
States ("OAS") and the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development ("OECD"), which, if implemented, could
substantively address international bribery and level the playing field
of international commerce.
Ifi. International Anti-Corruption Initiatives
Public corruption is rightly viewed as "an international problem
that requires an international solution.""24 International corruption
not only adversely affects the political, economic and moral fiber of
the "receiving country,"24' it also significantly harms vital U.S.
240. THE WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE
OF THE WORLD BANK ch. 8 (1997); see also Robert H. Sutton, Controlling Corruption
Through Collective Means: Advocating the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1427,1470-72 (1997).
241. Corruption at the public and private levels has significant a~verse effects on
the country in which the corrupt payments are made. A recent study by the
International Monetary Fund notes that "the amount of corruption is negatively
linked to the level of investment and economic growth, that is to say, the more
corruption, the less investment and the less economic growth." PAOLO MAURO,
WHY WORRY ABOUT CORRUPTION (1997). As another commentator noted:
The payment of bribes is wasteful and inefficient and has been found to be
associated with low economic growth as measured by gross domestic
product. Bribery pollutes the purity of transactions in a free market place, in
which buyers and sellers ideally compete for business on the bosis of value
optimization. Without bribes, buyers purchase from the best bidder in terms
of relevant issues of transactional value such as price, service and quality.
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interests. 2  The expansion of cross-border trading and the
Bribery subverts the underlying transaction by diverting decisionmaker
attention to extraneous considerations. When a seller wins a contract by
paying a bribe, the buyer is replacing consideration of price, service, and
quality with an interest in transactionally irrelevant side payments. This
phenomenon harms rejected potential sellers who might have won a contract
in the absence of bribery, as well as a public that relies on government
officials to optimize value in purchasing decisions.
Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. RE%,. 229, 249 (1997); sce also Michael A.
Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption, Corporate
Responsibility and Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. IN-rL L.
& CoM. REG. 389, 434 (1997); Mark J. Murphy, International Bribery- An Erample
of an Unfair Trade Practice?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 385, 390-92 (1995); Sutton, supra
note 240, at 1430-41. The insidious effects of corruption are particularly severe in
developing nations. See Jennifer M. Hartman, Government By Thieves: Revcaling~
the Monsters Behind the Kleptocratic Masks, 24 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & C(-)%1. 157,
159 (1997) ("The destabilizing effects of corruption pose an even greater threat to
developing countries, which are attempting to build economies to compete in the
international market. High levels of corruption have, in fact, been shown to preclude
high growth of a nation's gross domestic product. When this occurs, the general
population of a state pays a price that is far greater than that which is gained by the
conspirators, thus, the ultimate victims ... are ordinary citizens."); David G. Sialise
& Patricia J. DeGuzman, Foreign Investment in the Philippines, 29 GEO.WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 145, 187-90 (1995). These effects are also severe in transitional
economies. See Karl M. Meessen, The Role of International Last, in the Twenty-First
Century: Fighting Corruption Across the Border, 18 FoRDHA INT'L LJ. 1647, 1647
(1995) ("Times of [economic] transition are times of corruption. To some extent one
will therefore simply have to wait for the new structures to become firmly
established. In the east of Europe, however, the process of consolidation could easily
be overtaken by a gradual or even sudden return to the authoritarian structures.
Corruption both in government and private business has no small role in discrediting
freshly installed free market systems."); see also Bialos & Husisian, supra note 196, at
183-84; Agnieszka Klich, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 121, 130 (1996) ("Bribery in the public sector ...
touches upon more than economic issues; it concerns the legitimacy of the state.").
An example of the destabilizing effect of corruption is the partnership between the
Russian "Mafiya" and Russian government officials discussed by Scott P. Boy lan in
International Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Can International Lawt, Truly Effect
Global Political and Economic Stability,? Organized Crime and Corruption in Russia.
Implications For U.S. and International Law, 19 FORI-A.m INT'l. L.J. 1999, 2004-13
(1996).
242. At the time of the original enactment of the FCPA, Congress found that
questionable overseas payments by U.S. companies adversely affected U.S.
diplomatic and political interests by embarrassing or destabilizing governments allied
with the United States. See text accompanying note 57, supra. As Theodore
Sorensen noted at the time:
Even before they were uncovered, these bribes-merely by being offered
and accepted-had damaged American foreign policy and made it more
vulnerable to its adversaries. By engaging in such debilitating practices. U.S.
businessmen, who in most countries are more visible representatives of the
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concomitant premium on "hard" currencies increased the incentives
for both demanding and making corrupt payments.2-
Virtually all countries, and certainly all industrialized countries,
prohibit the payment of bribes domestically.2" Ne'-ertheless, the
United States is the only country to criminalize the payment of bribes
to foreign officials. 5 Similar assertions of extraterritoral jurisdiction
engendered hostility among the community of nations,4" and the
FCPA in particular has been susceptible to the charge of moral
imperialism.247
American way of life than our diplomats, tarnished our country's image;
subverted the lawful basis of friendly governments; aggravated the economic
inequities and instability that inevitably accompany this subsidization and
corruption of a power elite; and rendered both the host government and our
own government more susceptible to an ultimate backlash.
Sorensen, supra note 91, at 128. Additionally, however, foreign corruption can have
a larger, more direct effect in the United States. For example, Scott Boylan
attributes the growing power of the Russian Mafiya in America to its involvement in
the corruption of the former Soviet Republics. See Boylan, supra note 241, at 2004-
14.
243. See Meessen, supra note 241, at 1648 ("Foreign hard currency often provides
the strongest incentive for bribes").
244. See FCPA-Oversight Hearings, supra note 11, at 67 (statement of Professor
Marshall B. Clinard); id. at 73 (statement of former Ambassador James E. Akins);
Almond & Syfert, supra note 241, at 428; Hartman, supra note 241, at 168: Seymour
Rubin, International Aspects of the Control of Illicit Payments, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& COM. 315, 315 (1982); see also Bruce Zagaris, Avoiding Criminal Liability in the
Conduct of International Business, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 74), 788-94 (1996)
(citing examples).
245. Boylan, supra note 241, at 2020; Hartman, supra note 241, at 168; Salbu, supra
note 241, at 231; THE WORLD BANK, supra note 240.
246. As one commentator wryly observed, "In the past twenty-five years the
United States has had three major exports: rock music, blue jeans, and United States
law. The first two have acquired an acceptance the last can never ,achieve. People
resent being told what to do." V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The
Extraterritorial Application of United States Law, 14 INT'L LAv. 257, 257 (1980). As
noted in the Restatement, "Attempts by some states-notably the United States-to
apply their law on the basis of very broad conceptions of territoriality or nationality
bred resentment and brought forth conflicting assertions of the rules of international
law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS ch. IV, intro, note (1986).
247. See, e.g., Joongi Kim & Jong Bum Kim, Cultural Differences in the Crusade
Against International Bribery: Rice-Cake Expenses in Korea and the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 549, 552 (1997) ("While agreeing that
egregious forms of influence buying should be prohibited ... objecting countries
similarly decry that forcing them to enact [laws prohibiting international bribery]
represents no more than extraterritorial bullying that infringes upon their national
sovereignty. In particular, demands against countries that they must adopt expansive
anti-bribery legislation such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act raises these various
concerns"); Kimelman, supra note 5, at 50 ("Rarely have the puritanical roots of this
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When the FCPA was first considered, Congress was aware that
international initiatives, rather than simple unilateral action, would be
necessary to address the problem of international corruption."' It was
recognized that absent international agreement and cooperation in
eliminating official corruption, U.S. companies would be left standing
alone.2 9 Congress made its view on this subject explicit in the 1988
country come back to life so forcefully in recent years as wvith the passage of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977"): Salbu, supra note 241, at 275
("Commentators have observed that Americans abroad should acknowledge cultural
differences and avoid imposing controversial values on hosts operating in their o,,n
countries. The disturbing image of the ugly, ethnocentric American stands in bold
relief when Congress imposes its will beyond the confines of the United States.
Legislative overreaching evokes concerns that the United States is engaging in moral
imperialism").
248. Prior to consideration of the FCPA. the Senate adopted Resolution 265 on
November 12, 1975, which called on all U.S. negotiators to urge the adoption of
codes of conduct by all appropriate international forums to "eliminat[e] bribery,
kickbacks, unethical political contributions and other such similar disreputable
activities." See Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearings, supra note 9, at 43; NYC BAR
REPORT, supra note 88, at 34-35. In its report, the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York stated:
It is clear that the problem of questionable foreign payments is an
international problem. As such, any solution attempted unilaterally through
legislative action by one state is necessarily incomplete and may also be
unwise ... . United States business cannot be taken out of the bribers
syndrome so long as it remains a 'way of life' for competing firms not subject
to United States jurisdiction.
Id. The Richardson Task Force, on behalf of the Ford Administration, also advised
Congress:
It is the view of the President and the task force that the ultimate legal basis
for adequately addressing the questionable payments problem must be an
international treaty along the lines proposed by the United States. A treaty
is required to make the "criminalization" of foreign bribery fully
enforceable-for, in the absence of foreign cooperation, it v,.ould be
extremely difficult, and in many cases impossible, for U.S. law enforcement
officials and potential defendants to be assured of access to relevant
evidence. A treaty is also required to treat the actions of foreign as w,,ell as
domestic parties to a questionable transaction. And a treaty is required to
assure that all nations, and the competing firms of differing nations, are
treated on the same basis.
Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearings, supra note 9, at 45-46. The Carter
Administration, National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of
Commerce were of a similar view. See Unlawfid Payments Act of 1977, supra note 911
at 179 (statement of Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal), 245,237.
249. See Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearings, supra note 9, at 46.
Commentators at the time also emphasized the need for multinational agreement so
as not to disadvantage U.S. businesses in competition with others that %,ere not
subject to the prohibition against corrupt payments. See, e.g., Steven Morgan. In
Search of an International Solution to Bribery. The Impact of the Forcqn Compt
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amendments to the FCPA.' However, even before the passage of
the FCPA in 1977, intermittent efforts were made to address official
corruption multilaterally. These efforts continued over the following
two decades and within the past several years resulted in potentially
significant breakthroughs by the OAS and the OECD.
A. Early Efforts at Achieving an International Consensus Against
Bribery
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT)
Senate Resolution 265 "' directed the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations to "initiate at once negotiations within the
framework of the current multilateral trade negotiations in
Geneva"' to reach an international consensus against bribery. The
efficacy of the GAIT negotiations as a forum for a multinational
agreement on prohibiting government bribery has been questioned,'"
Practices Act of 1977 on Corporate Behavior, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 385
(1979) ("Actions by the United States government, acting alone, will not be fully
effective in dealing with bribery until those efforts are matched by :;imilar action by
other nations. Critics of the FCPA assert that if only United States corporations are
prohibited from bribing foreign officials, then United States corporations are likely to
lose their competitive position vis-t-vis foreign corporations whose governments take
a more benign view toward the payment of corporate funds to foreign officials").
250. Section 5003(d) of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988,
Pub .L. No. 100-418,102 Stat. 1415, provided:
It is the sense of Congress that the President should pursue the negotiation
of an international agreement, among the members of the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development, to govern persons from those
countries concerning acts prohibited with respect to issuers and domestic
concerns by the amendments made by this section.
It has been suggested that this provision of the 1988 amendments intended to
underscore Congressional concern that U.S. companies should not be disadvantaged
by being alone in their injunction against corrupt payments. See Adam Freemantle &
Sherman Katz, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1986, 23 INT'L
LAW. 755, 764 (1989) ("It appears that the purpose of this requirement is to respond
to the concern that other nations do not have the same standards Congress has
enshrined in the FCPA. If not, American corporations will continue to be at a
competitive disadvantage. Some commentators have suggested that, should such
negotiations fail, the bribery provisions of the FCPA may be completely eliminated
from U.S. law.").
251. S. REs. 94-265 (1975).
252- See NYC BAR REPORT, supra note 88, at 41.
253. Id. As the Association's Report noted:
It is ... open to question whether the fact that GATT is concerned with
trade, but not with investment, impairs its suitability as a forum. Although
the negotiators at the Multinational Trade Negotiations are engaged in an
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and the Special Trade Representative's proposal was met with what
was described as "polite silence."' When the multilateral trade
negotiations concluded in 1979, public corruption was not one of the
trade distorting practices addressed. -5
2. The Organization of American States
Somewhat greater success was achieved in the OAS. :_ On July
10, 1975, the Permanent Council of the OAS adopted a resolution on
the behavior of transnational enterprises.' The resolution
condemned, "in the most emphatic terms any act of bribery, illegal
payment or offer of payment by any transnational enterprise; any
demand for acceptance of improper payments by any public or
private person, as well as any act contrary to ethics and legal
procedures .... "" The OAS resolution urged its members to
conform to its laws regarding such paymentsf' As a statement of
policy, however, the resolution made no provision for enforcement.:
attempt to establish fair rules for government procurement policies, the
problem of questionable foreign payments applies to government actions
affecting investment as well as procurement. Furthermore, the effect of
injecting these sensitive issues into the already delicate negotiations relating
to international trade and the possible cost to the United States in terms of
concessions in other areas argue against use of GATT for this purpoye.
Id.
254. Rubin, supra note 244, at 317-18.
255. Id.
256. The Organization of American States (OAS) is the oldest regional
organization in the world, tracing its origins to the Congress of Panama, convened by
Simon Bolivar in 1826. In 1890, the International Union of American Republics vas
established and became the Pan American Union in 1910. The current OAS charter
was adopted in 1948, under article 52 of the U.N. charter. The OAS is comprised of
thirty-five member nations: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, United
States, Uruguay and Venezuela. Cuba is also a member but has been excluded from
participation since 1962. See U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes: Organization of
American States (last modified Mar. 1998)<http:/vww.state.goviwwwibackground-
notes/oas_0398_bgn.html>; Sutton, supra note 240, at 1450-52.
257. NYC BAR REPORT, supra note 88, at 39.
258. Id.
259. Morgan, supra note 249, at 3S6.
260. Id.
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3. The United Nations
On December 15, 1975, the U.N. General Assembly adopted
Resolution 3514 entitled "Measures Against Corrupt Practices of
Transnational and Other Corporations, Their Intermediaries and
Others Involved."261  The resolution condemned corrupt practices,
including bribery, and instructed the Economic and Social Council
("ECOSOC") to direct the U.N. Commission on Transnational
Corporations to include international bribery in its program work."
The following March, at the Commission's meeting in Lima,
Peru, the United States proposed that ECOSOC formulate and adopt
a code outlawing corrupt payments in international trade."
However, once again, "deafening silence" met the U.S. proposal. "
261. NYC BAR REPORT, supra note 88, at 38.
262. Id; see also Hartman, supra note 241, at 166; Murphy, supra note 241, at 393-
94.
263. NYC BAR REPORT, supra note 88, at 38. According to the Richardson Task
Force, the U.S. proposal included the following principles:
(i) It would apply to international trade and investment transactions
with governments, i.e., government procurement and other
governmental actions affecting the international trade and
investment as may be agreed;
(ii) It would apply equally to those who offer to make improper
payments and to those who request or accept them;
(iii) Importing governments would agree to establish clear guidelines
concerning the use of agents in connection with government
procurement and other covered transactions, and establish appropriate
criminal penalties for defined corrupt practices by enterprises and
officials in their territory:
(iv) All governments would cooperate and exchange information to help
eradicate corrupt practices;
(v) Uniform provisions would be agreed upon for disclosure by enterprises,
agents and officials of political contributions, gifts and payments made
in connection with covered transactions.
Foreign Payment Disclosure Hearings, supra note 9, at 44.
264. As Professor Seymour Rubin, who was then U.S. Representative to the
United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations, explained:
At Lima ... there was nothing on the Commission's agenda which
indicated that the subject of illicit payments would be discussed. Instead, tile
Commission was focusing on other aspects of the regulation or conduct of
transnational corporations. Nonetheless, I received instructions to present
the subject at four o'clock on a Friday afternoon, with the understanding
that Mr. Ingersoll, who was then Undersecretary of State, would make a
presentation before Senator Proxmire's committee at the same time.
Surprisingly, I succeeded in introducing the subject at that time.
The subject of illicit payments was brought up in that forum, at least
partially, because there had been a great deal of noise made in the United
Nations about the reprehensible conduct of certain corporations, which were
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Subsequently, the ECOSOC established the Ad Hoc Inter-
Governmental Working Group on Corrupt Practices, which
completed a draft agreement on corrupt payments in 1979.: No
action was taken on this agreement largely because the United States
was unable to garner support from the developed countries of
Europe.6
4. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
In January 1975, the OECD, whose membership is restricted to
developed nations,6 established a Committee on International
known to be bribing governments of developed and developing countries
alike. Iran was one of the chief proponents of this kind of activity. In Iran,
under the Shah, there was considerable activity which fell into the category
of reprehensible conduct. The Japanese cases were also receihing
substantial publicity. I was, therefore, not entirely prepared for the
deafening silence which greeted my own suggestion that the Commission on
Transnational Corporations take up this particular topic, especially since it
was discussing a code of conduct to instruct transnational corporations on
the proper mode of conduct in the international arena. Needless to say, I
received support from only a few members of the Commission.
Rubin, supra note 244, at 319-20.
265. See Murphy, supra note 241, at 394: NYC BAR REPORT, supra note 'S. at 3S.
266. As Professor Rubin reported:
Interestingly, America's Western European allies have created the greatest
difficulties. Although the Western European countries usually side with the
United States in most matters, whether it be Restricted Business Practices or
the general conduct of transnational corporations, the United States has not
been able to obtain their support for a code of conduct on illicit payments in
the U.N. forum. Consequently, it is easy to understand why, in the area of
illicit payments, there is great difficulty in arriving at any agreed-upon code.
Rubin, supra note 244, at 321. Professor Rubin also noted that an impediment to
achieving consensus on international bribery was the disconnect between perceived
and actual standards of conduct on the part of the "moral allies" of the United States:
The problem in the United Nations stems partially from the fact that there
exists a difference in perception between what the conduct really is, or what
the standards of conduct really are, and what they are said to be.
Specifically, this situation occurs when a nation has a law opposed to
bribery, as well as a law permitting a tax deduction for a payment that is
stated to have been made for the purposes of a bribe and justified as being in
the regular course of business. For this reason, the United States has not
been able to achieve any degree of consensus with its moral allies in the
United Nations.
Id. at 332.
267. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) %%as
formed as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) follouing
World War II to administer the Marshall Plan to reconstruct Europe. On April 14,
1960, the Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
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Investment and Multinational Enterprises to draft a code of conduct
for multinational corporations."" On June 21, 1976, the OECD
Ministerial Conference adopted a Declaration on International
Investment; annexed to it were guidelines for multinational
enterprises."'
Although OECD policy and guidelines addressed a number of
issues pertaining to multinational enterprise activities, the policy
specifically prohibited the solicitation and payment of bribes and
political contributions unless such contributions were "legally
permissible." The policy also provided that multinational enterprises
should "abstain from any improper involvement in local political
activities."" However, like the OAS policy, compliance with the
OECD policy and guidelines was voluntary and established no
substantive enforcement mechanisms.271
B. Non-Governmental Initiatives
1. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
On March 2, 1976, the ICC announced the formation of a
Commission on Unethical Practices, under the chairmanship of Lord
Shawcross of the United Kingdom, to propose guidelines "for
promoting correct conduct" of companies engaged in international
transactions.m At the ECOSOC meeting in Geneva, the ICC also
supported an international convention under which signatories would
be obliged to take steps to eradicate corrupt practices of their citizens;
including disclosure of all political contributions and a prohibition
Development was signed in Paris and the OEEC was transformed to the OECD.
The OECD currently has twenty-nine members including: Austria, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand,
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom and United States. The governing body is the Council comprised of
representatives of the member States. The OECD headquarters is in Paris, France
and is administered by the Secretary General. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
CqOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ABOUT OECD (1998); see Sutton, supra note
240, at 1450-52.
268. Morgan, supra note 249, at 386.
269. Id.
270. Id.; Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearings, supra note 9, at 43.
271. NYC BAR REPORT, supra note 88, at 40.
272. Id. at 42.
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against making foreign political contributions. "
On November 29, 1977, the ICC Commission issued its report,
which was adopted by the ICC Council!" The report revealed that
enforcement of existing antibribery laws was inconsistent from
country to country.' 5 The report endorsed the enactment of strict
laws prohibiting and punishing corrupt practices and advocated
multinational agreements prohibiting corruption.'
The report also stressed self-regulation as the most effective way
to eliminate corruption and set forth proposed "Rules of Conduct to
Combat Extortion and Bribery."' The rules prohibited the request,
payment or acceptance of a bribe.' 3 They also required fair and
accurate recording of all financial transactions and prohibited the
maintenance of off-book accounts.""r The guideline section of the
rules encouraged the adoption of corporate codes of conduct and the
establishment of rigorous accounting controls.
The ICC report and rules were updated on March 26, 1996.:"
The updated report confirmed "the basic approach" set forth in the
ICC's 1977 report, the need for multinational action "to meet the
challenging goal of greater transparency in international trade."' -
Noting that "major responsibility" for effecting reform "undoubtedly
rests with governments," the report urged the prompt
implementation of the May 1994 OECD Recommendation on
Bribery in International Business Transactions.?
2. Transparency International
The first major private organization formed to combat
international corruption was established in May 1993. Modeled after
the human rights advocacy organization Amnesty International, a
273. Id.







281. International Chamber of Commerce: 1996 Revisions to the ICC Rules of
Conduct on Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions, 35 LLM.
1306 (1996).
282. Id. at 1307.
283. Id. The 1994 OECD recommendation is discussed infra.
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former World Bank official, Peter Eigen, founded Transparency
International, which is headquartered in Berlin.'
According to Transparency International, its mission is to curb
corruption through international and national coalitions encouraging
governments to establish and implement effective laws, policies and
anti-corruption programs; to strengthen public support and
understanding for anti-corruption programs and enhance public
transparency and accountability in international business transactions
and in the administration of public procurement; and to encourage all
parties involved in international business transactions to operate at
the highest levels of integrity.'
Rather than investigate and expose incidents of bribery,
Transparency International has practiced "quiet diplomacy" through
a network of chapters in fifty-two countries, including the United
States.286 In conjunction with G6ttingen University, Transparency
International publishes an index of international corruption. This
index ranks eighty-five countries based on the perceptions of people
engaged in international commerce.' Working through its country
chapters, Transparency International lobbied governments to enact
FCPA-like laws and establish anti-corruption mechanisms." For
example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament
asked Transparency International to submit proposals for new anti-
corruption laws.' Transparency International was also strongly
influential in gaining support among members for the OECD Anti-
Bribery Recommendation.' 9
284. See Beverley Earle, The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the
Money Argument, 14 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 207, 209 (1996); Hartman, supra note 241, at
167-68; Salbu, supra note 241, at 235; Raymond Bonner, The Worldly Business of
Bribes: Quiet Is Joined, N.Y. TIME_.S, July 8, 1996, at A3; Barbara Crossette, A Global
Gage of Greased Palms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, at sec. 4 P3.
285. Transparency International Mission Statement (last modified Apr. 1997)
<http://wvv.transparency.de/mission.html>.
286. Bonner, supra note 284.
287. The latest index, ranked Denmark as being perceived as the least corrupt and
Cameroon as being perceived as the most corrupt of the eighty-five countries in the
survey. The United States ranked seventeenth. The Transparency International 1998
Corruption Perception Index (last modified Apr. 21, 1999) <http://wv.transparency.
de/documents/cpi/index.html>.
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C. Recent Developments
1. The Organization of American States: The Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption
On December 11, 1994, the leaders of the governments of the
Western Hemisphere met in Miami, Florida for the "Summit of the
Americas."'" Finding that -[e]ffective democracy requires a
comprehensive attack on corruption as a factor of social
disintegration and distortion of the economic system that undermines
the legitimacy of political institutions,"4 the summit adopted a plan
of action!" Under the plan, thirty-four signatories ' agreed to the
following:
" Promote open discussion of the most significant problems
facing government and develop priorities for reforms needed to
make government operations transparent and accountable;
" Ensure proper oversight of government functions by
strengthening internal mechanisms, including investigative and
enforcement capacity regarding acts of corruption and
facilitating public access to information necessary for
meaningful outside review;
" Establish conflict of interest standards for public employees
and effective measures against illicit enrichment, including stiff
penalties for those who utilize their public position to benefit
private interests;
" Call on the governments of the world to adopt and enforce
291. Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action. 34
I.L.M. 808 (1995).
292. Id. at 811.
293. Id. at 815. In the Declaration of Principles, summit participants reaffirmed
their commitment and adherence "to the principles of international law and the
purposes and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and in the Charter
of the Organization of American States (OAS), including the principles of the
sovereign equality of States, non-intervention, self-determination, and the peaceful
resolution of disputes." Id. at 810.
294. The Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action was signed by
representatives on behalf of Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica.
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti.
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and
Tobago, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. Id. at SOS.
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measures against bribery in all financial and commercial
transactions within the hemisphere; toward this end inviting the
OAS to establish liaison with the OECD Working Group on
Bribery in International Business Transactions;
* Develop mechanisms of cooperation in the judicial and
banking areas to make possible rapid and effective response in
the international investigation of corruption cases;
* Give priority to strengthening government regulations and
procurement, tax collection, the administration of ,ustice and
the electoral and legislative processes, utilizing the support of
the [Inter-American Development Bank] and other
international financial institutions where appropriate; and
* Develop within the OAS, with due regard to applicable treaties
and national legislation, a hemispheric approach to acts of
corruption in the public and private sectors that would include
extradition and prosecution of individuals so charged, through
the negotiation of a new hemispheric agreement or new
arrangements within existing frameworks for international
cooperation.295
Summit participants recognized the OAS's "paramount role" in
following up on the decisions made, particularly regarding the anti-
corruption directives,2' and the importance of "public and private
sector partnerships."2'
The anti-corruption measures in the Summit's plan of action
served as the basis for the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, which opened for signature in Caracas, Venezuela on
March 29, 1996.2" The Convention, which at the time was described
as "one of the most important developments ever in the international
295. Id. at 818-19. In setting out this action plan, it was noted that:
The problem of corruption is now an issue of serious interest not only in this
Hemisphere, but in all regions of the world. Corruption in both the public
and private sectors weakens democracy and undermines the legitimacy of
governments and institutions. The modernization of the state, including
deregulation, privatization and the simplification of government procedures,
reduces the opportunities for corruption. All aspects of public
administration in a democracy must be transparent and open to public
scrutiny.
Id. at 818.
296. Id. at 835-36.
297. Id. at 838.
298. Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996) [hereinafter Convention Against Corruption].
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ethics area,"' called for action at the national and multi-national
levels, as well as cooperation among nations to address the problem
of corruption. c  Thus, the Convention stated the followving two
purposes:
1. To promote and strengthen the development by each of the
299. Michael Skol, An Ethical Bonanza: The Caldera Convention and the
Internationalization of the FCPA, 3 Fed. Ethics Rep. 1 (1996).
300. Thus, the Preamble to the convention stated that the members of the OAS
adopted the convention:
CONVINCED that corruption undermines the legitimacy of public
institutions and strikes at society, moral order and justice, as well as the
comprehensive development of peoples;
CONSIDERING that representative democracy, an essential condition
for stability, peace and development of the region, requires, by its nature,
the combating of every form of corruption in the performance of public
functions, as well as acts of corruption specifically related to such
performance;
PERSUADED that fighting corruption strengthens democratic
institutions and prevents distortions in the economy, improprieties in public
administration and damage to a society's moral fiber,
CONVINCED of the importance of making people in the countries of
the region aware of this problem and its gravity, and of the need to
strengthen participation by civil society in preventing and fighting
corruption;
RECOGNIZING that in some cases, corruption has international
dimensions, which requires coordinated action by States to fight it
effectively;
CONVINCED of the need for prompt adoption of an international
instrument to promote and facilitate international cooperation in fighting
corruption and, especially, in taking appropriate action against persons who
commit acts of corruption in the performance of public functions, or acts
specifically related to such performance, as well as appropriate measures
with respect to the proceeds of such acts;
DEEPLY CONCERNED by the steadily increasing links between
corruption and the proceeds generated by illicit narcotics trafficking which
undermine and threaten legitimate commercial and financial activities, and
society, at all levels;
BEARING IN MIND the responsibility of States to hold corrupt persons
accountable in order to combat corruption and to cooperate with one
another for their efforts in this area to be effective; and
DETERMINED to make every effort to prevent, detect, punish and
eradicate corruption in the performance of public functions and acts of
corruption specifically related to such performance.
Convention Against Corruption, supra note 298, at 727.
As one commentator noted, "Taken as a whole, the Convention involves both
state-level and transnational approaches, attacking individual acts of corruption and
the systems which permit such acts to flourish, as well as promoting cooperation
among states in a collective effort to eradicate corruption." Sutton, supra note 241), at
1457.
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States parties of the mechanisms needed to prevent, detect,
punish and eradicate corruption; and
2. To promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among the
States parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and
actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in
the performance of public functions and acts of corruption
specifically related to such performance. 1
a. Offenses
The Convention is intended to apply to the following: a public
official's solicitation or acceptance of a corrupt payment; the offer or
payment of money or benefit to a public official in exchange for an
act or omission in the performance of a public function; an act or
omission by a public official for the purpose of illegally obtaining a
benefit either for the official or a third party; the fraudulent use or
concealment of property obtained through corrupti on; and the
participation as a principal or a third party ("instigator, accomplice or
accessory after the fact") in the commission, attempted commission
or conspiracy to commit an act of corruption."' The Convention
made clear that the enumerated acts were not exclusive and that two
or more parties could agree the Convention would apply to other acts
301. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 298, at 728, art. 2.
302. The Convention defined the acts of corruption to which it applied as follows:
a. The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a government
official or a person who performs public functions, of any article of
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or
advantage for himself or for another person or entity, in exchange for
any act or omission in the performance of his public functions;
b. The offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a government official
or a person who performs public functions, of any article of monetary
value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for
himself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or
omission in the performance of his public functions;
c. Any act or omission in the discharge of his duties by a government
official or a person who performs public functions for the purpose of
illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party;
d. The fraudulent use or concealment of property derived fror any of the
acts referred to in this article; and
e. Participation as a principal, coprincipal, instigator, accomplice or
accessory after the fact, or in any other manner, in the commission or
attempted commission of, or in any collaboration or conspiracy to
commit, any of the acts referred to in this article.
Id. at 729, art. VI(1).
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of corruption as welli 3 The Convention also provided that States
that had not already done so should establish an offense of "illicit
enrichment" defined as "a significant increase in the assets of a
government official that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to
his lawful earning during the performance of his functions." "
Additionally, States were asked to consider establishing other
offenses under their laws to promote "the attainment of the purposes
of this Convention."" These offenses included a government
official's use of classified information or government property for
personal gain or for the gain of a third party; procuring a decision
from a public authority for personal benefit or benefit of a third
party; and diverting government property or monies to a third party
for the benefit of the government official or a third party. " These
offenses, if adopted, would be considered "acts of corruption" for
303. Id. at art. VI(2).
304. Id. at 730, art. IX.
305. Id. at art. X(1).
306. Id. at 730-31. Article XI of the Convention provided:
In order to foster the development and harmonization of their domestic
legislation and the attainment of the purposes of this Convention, the States
Parties view as desirable, and undertake to consider, establishing as offenses
under their laws the following acts:
a. The improper use by a government official or a person who
performs public functions, for his own benefit or that of a third
party, of any kind of classified or confidential information which
that official or person who performs public functions has obtained
because of, or in the performance of, his functions;
b. The improper use by a government official or a person %,ho
performs public functions, for his own benefit or that of a third
party, of any kind of property belonging to the State or to any firm
or institution in which the State has a proprietary interest, to which
that official or person who performs public functions has access
because of, or in the performance of, his functions;
c. Any act or omission by any person who, personally or through a
third party, or acting as an intermediary, seeks to obtain a decision
from a public authority whereby he illicitly obtains for himself or
for another person any benefit or gain, whether or not such act or
omission harms State property; and
d. The diversion by a government official, for purposes unrelated to
those for which they were intended, for his owvn benefit or that of a
third party, of any movable or immovable property, monies or
securities belonging to the State, to an independent agency, or to an
individual, that such official has received by virtue of his position
for purposes of administration, custody or for other reasons.
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purposes of the Convention.3
Finally, States were to criminalize "transnational bribery."'
Under that provision, signatories were to enact laws prohibiting and
punishing the offering or making of a corrupt payment to a
government official of another State "in connection with any
economic or commercial transaction in exchange for any act or
omission in the performance of that official's public functions."
b. National Actions
In addition to enacting laws criminalizing the "acts of
corruption" enumerated in the Convention,31 signatories agreed to
consider taking other actions to strengthen their internal standards of
conduct and the transparency of governmental funclions. These
actions included the establishment of standards of conduct with
mechanisms for training and enforcement; establishment of
mechanisms for oversight and reporting acts of corruption without
fear of retaliation; adoption of requirements for disclosure of public
officials' income and assets and recordkeeping and account controls
requirements for publicly held corporations; establishment of systems
for government hiring and procurement of goods and services; and
elimination of favorable tax treatment of expenses in violation of the
State's anti-corruption laws.3
307. Id. at 731, art. XI(2).
308. Id. at 730, art. VIII.
309. Id. Article VII of the Convention provided the following regarding
transnational bribery:
Subject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system,
each State Party shall prohibit and punish the offering or granting, directly
or indirectly, by its nationals, persons having their habitual residence in its
territory, and businesses domiciled there, to a government official of another
State, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor,
promise or advantage, in connection with any economic or commercial
transaction in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of that
official's public functions.
Id.
310. Id. at 731, art. VII.
311. Id. at 728, art. III. The parties to the Convention were to consider "the
applicability of measures ... to create, maintain and strengthen" the following:
1. Standards of conduct for the correct, honorable, and proper fulfillment
of public functions. These standards shall be intended to prevent
conflicts of interest and mandate the proper conservation and use of
resources entrusted to government officials in the performance of their
functions. These standards shall also establish measures and systems
requiring government officials to report to appropriate authorities acts
[Vol. 22,407
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States were also to adopt laws affecting the jurisdiction of their
courts- " The Convention called on States to invoke territorial
jurisdiction," jurisdiction predicated on nationalit , and jurisdiction
based on the universality principle."' Once again, the Convention
of corruption in the performance of public functions. Such measures
should help preserve the public's confidence in the integrity of public
servants and government process.
2. Mechanisms to enforce these standards of conduct.
3. Instruction to government personnel to ensure proper understanding of
their responsibilities and the ethical rules governing their activities.
4. Systems for registering the income, assets and liabilities of persons %ho
perform public functions in certain posts as specified by law and, where
appropriate, for making such registrations public.
5. Systems of government hiring and procurement of goods and services
that assure the openness, equity and efficiency of such systems.
6. Government revenue collection and control systems that deter
corruption.
7. Laws that deny favorable tax treatment for any individual or
corporation for expenditures made in violation of the anticorruption
laws of the States Parties.
S. Systems for protecting public servants and private citizens who, in good
faith, report acts of corruption, including protection of their identities,
in accordance with their Constitutions and the basic principles of their
domestic legal systems.
9. Oversight bodies with a view to implementing modem mechanisms for
preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating corrupt acts.
10. Deterrents to the bribery of domestic and foreign government officials,
such as mechanisms to ensure that publicly held companies and other
types of associations maintain books and records which, in reasonable
detail, accurately reflect the acquisition and disposition of assets, and
have sufficient internal accounting controls to enable their officers to
detect corrupt acts.
11. Mechanisms to encourage participants by civil society and
nongovernmental organizations in efforts to prevent corruption.
12. The study of further preventive measures that take into account the
relationship between equitable compensation and probity in public
service.
312. Id. at 729, art. V.
313. Id. Accordingly, "[each State Party shall adopt such measures as may b.,
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in
accordance with this Convention when the offense in question is committed in its
territory." Id.
314. Id. Accordingly, "[e]ach State Party may adopt such measures as may ba
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in
accordance with this Convention when the offense is committed by one of its
nationals or by a person who habitually resides in its territory." Id.
315. Id. Accordingly:
[e]ach State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in accordance
with this Convention when the alleged criminal is present in its territory and
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
made it clear that the enumeration of these three bases of jurisdiction
were not intended to be exclusive of any other basis of jurisdiction
adopted by a State.316
c. International Actions
The Convention also mandated that the parties cooperate with
one another to ensure enforcement of each State's anti-corruption
measures. The Convention pledged the parties to cooperate with
each other by doing the following:
including the offenses described in the Convention as
extraditable offenses in treaties among the parties and, if
no extradition treaty exists, considering the Convention as
the legal basis for extradition;317
it does not extradite such person to another country on the ground of the
nationality of the alleged criminal.
Id. Jurisdiction based on universality is somewhat unusual since the principle is
typically invoked with regard to crimes that are universally condemned, for example,
terrorism, and which are often committed in Stateless territories, for example, piracy.
316. Id. The Convention stated, "This Convention does not preclude the
application of any other rule of criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party
under its domestic law." Id.
317. Id. at 731. With respect to extradition, article XIII provides:
1. This article shall apply to the offenses established by the States Parties
in accordance with this Convention.
2. Each of the offenses to which this article applies shall be deemed to be
included as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty existing
between or among the States Parties. The States Parties undertake to
include such offenses as extraditable offenses in every extradition treaty
to be concluded between or among them.
3. If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a
treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with
which it does not have an extradition treaty, it may consider this
Convention as the legal basis for extradition with respect to any offense
to which this article applies.
4. State Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence
of a treaty shall recognize offenses to which this article applies as
extraditable offenses between themselves.
5. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of
the Requested State or by applicable extradition treaties, including the
grounds on which the requested State may refuse extradition.
6. If extradition for an offense to which this article applies is refused solely
on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, or because the
Requested State deems that it has jurisdiction over the offense, the
Requested State shall submit the case to its competent au:horities for
the purpose of prosecution unless otherwise agreed with the Requesting
State, and shall report the final outcome to the Requesting State in due
course.
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" processing requests for evidence and otherwise facilitating
investigations and prosecuting acts of corruption; '
" sharing information and experiences in preventing,
detecting, investigating and prosecuting acts of
corruption; '
" assisting in the identification and retrieval of property or
proceeds derived from or used in the commission of acts
of corruption;"
7. Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its extradition treaties.
the Requested State may, upon being satisfied that the circumstances so
warrant and are urgent, and at the request of the Requesting State, take
into custody a person whose extradition is sought and who is present in
its territory, or take other appropriate measures to ensure his presence
at extradition proceedings.
Id. at 731-32.
318. Id. at 732, art. XIV(1). Article XTV(1) provides:
In accordance with their domestic laws and applicable treaties, the States
Parties shall afford one another the idest measure of mutual assistance by
processing requests from authorities that, in conformity with their domestic
laws, have the power to investigate or prosecute the acts of corruption
described in this Convention, to obtain evidence and take other necessar'
action to facilitate legal proceedings and measures regarding the
investigation or prosecution of acts of corruption.
Id
319. Id. Article XIV(2) provides:
The States Parties shall also provide each other with the widest measure of
mutual technical cooperation on the most effective 'ays and means of
preventing, detecting, investigating and punishing acts of corruption. To
that end, they shall foster exchanges of experiences by way of agreements
and meetings between competent bodies and institutions, and shall pay
special attention to methods and procedures of citizen participation in the
fight against corruption.
Id.
320. Id. Article XV provides:
1. In accordance with their applicable domestic laws and relevant treaties
or other agreements that may be in force between or among them, the
States Parties shall provide each other the broadest possible measure of
assistance in the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and forfeiture
of property or proceeds obtained, derived from or used in the
commission of offenses established in accordance with this Con'ention.
2. A State Party that enforces its own or another State Party's forfeiture
judgment against property or proceeds described in paragraph 1 of this
article shall dispose of the property or proceeds in accordance with its
laws. To the extent permitted by a State Party's law's and upon such
terms as it deems appropriate, it may transfer all or part of such
property or proceeds to another State Party that assisted in the
underlying investigation or proceedings.
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" refraining from invoking bank secrecy a:s a basis for
refusing to provide assistance subject to the requesting
State's obligation not to use the information in any other
proceeding unless authorized by the providing State; -1 and
" establishing a central authority for making and receiving
requests for assistance.
3 2
Thus far, twenty-five nations, including the United States, have
signed the Convention;3 however, only sixteen nations have ratified
it. 2  In transmitting it to the Senate for advice and consent to
ratification,3  the President hailed the Convention as "the first
multilateral Convention of its kind in the world to be adopted."'1'
Others share the President's appraisal.' The President also advised
321. Id. Article XVI provides:
1. The Requested State shall not invoke bank secrecy as a basis for refusal
to provide the assistance sought by the Requesting State. The
Requested State shall apply this article in accordance with its domestic
law, its procedural provisions, or bilateral or multilateral agreements
with the Requesting State.
2. The Requesting State shall be obligated not to use any information
received that is protected by bank secrecy for any purpose other than
the proceeding for which that information was requested, unless
authorized by the Requested State.
Id.
322. Id. at 732-33. Article XVIII provides:
1. For the purposes of international assistance and cooperation provided
under this Convention, each State Party may designate a central
authority or may rely upon such central authorities as are provided for
in any relevant treaties or other agreements.
2. The central authorities shall be responsible for making and receiving
the requests for assistance and cooperation referred to in this
Convention.
3. The central authorities shall communicate with each other directly for
the purposes for this Convention.
Id.
323. Organization of American States, Interamerican System of Legal Information
(visited Oct. 14, 1999) <http://wwv.oas.org/en/prog/juridico/english/sigslb-58.html>.
324. The OAS reported that Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Domincan Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela ratified the
Convention. Id.
325. The Convention must be ratified in order to become effective. Convention
Against Corruption, supra note 298, at 733, art. XXII.
326. Transmittal to Congress on Inter-American Convention, 34 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 554 (Apr. 1, 1998).
327. See Nancy Zucker Boswell, Nurturing the Seeds of Reform, 4 Fed. Ethics Rep.
1, 4 (1997) ("the Convention is a powerful political statement and its provisions are
broad"). Ms. Boswell is the U.S. Executive Director of Transparency International.
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the Senate that ratification would not require implementing
legislation.- Although the OAS Convention represents a significant
accomplishment in galvanizing multinational action against
corruption, its long-term effectiveness remains to be seen.
2. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development: The 1996 Recommendation on the Tax
Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Officials and the 1997
Convention on Bribery in International Business Transactions
In 1996 and 1997, the OECD realized two major
accomplishments in the effort to eliminate bribery as an accepted
means of international business. These two initiatives, the 1996
Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes Paid to Foreign
Officials and the 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials, were the culmination of over seven years of study
and negotiation by the United States and fellow members of the
OECD.
a. The 1996 Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes
Paid to Foreign Officials
In 1990, the Council of the OECD, comprised of the ministers or
permanent representatives of member countriesJ ' requested that the
Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise
("CIME") study the feasibility of cooperative action by member
governments to combat illicit payments[.' The CIME study, issued in
1992, included a section on the tax treatment of bribes paid to foreign
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott also described the convention as -a
powerful statement by the governments of the hemisphere that corruption will no
longer be considered business as usual" and serves "as an outstanding, indeed,
unique role model for similar efforts around the world." Deputy Secretary of State
Talbott, U.S. Signs Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (June 2. 1t6)
(press release) (visited October 14, 1999) <http:fIpdq2.usia.gov>; see also Sutton,
supra note 240, at 1470-78. The success in obtaining criminalization of international
bribery was attributed primarily to the efforts of the United States. See a Defeat for
Business Bribery Abroad, N.Y. TmES, Apr. 16, 1996, at A20; Against Latin
Corruption, WASH. POST, Apr. 12,1996, at A24.
328. Transmittal to Congress on Inter-American Convention, supra note 326, at
554.
329. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Dec. 14, 1960, art. 7 (visited May 29, 1999) <http:ffwvw.
oecd.orgfabout/originsf convention/conventn.htm>.
330. Implementing the OECD Recommendation, supra note 6.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
government officials. 31
At the urging of then Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the
OECD Council took up the question of international bribery at their
May 1994 meeting. 32 Acting on the CIME study, the OECD Council
adopted what has been described as the first multilateral agreement
to combat foreign bribery 33 The Recommendation on Bribery in
International Business Transactions' was premised on the
recognition that "bribery is a widespread phenomenon in
international business," and "all countries share responsibility to
combat bribery." '335 The OECD Council also recognized that all
member countries had laws prohibiting domestic bribery "while only
a few Member countries have specific laws making the bribery of
foreign officials a punishable offense ... .""' For those reasons the
Council was "[c]onvinced that further action is needed on both the
national and international level to dissuade both enterprises and
public officials from resorting to bribery when negotiating
international business transactions and that an OECD initiative in
this area could act as a catalyst for global action." '337
Accordingly, the OECD Council recommended "that Member
countries take effective measures to deter, prevent and combat the
bribery of foreign public officials in connection with international
business transactions."3" To that end the Council called on member
nations to take domestic action regarding their own laws and
international action regarding cooperation among member and non-
member countries.
Domestically, the Council called on OECD members to "take
331. Id.
332. See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks at the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development Signing Ceremony for the Anti-Bribery
and Corruption Convention (Dec. 17, 1997); see also Summary of OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, INT'L LAW NEWS, Winter 1998, at 10 (prepared by U.S.
Commerce, Justice and State Departments).
333. American Bar Ass'n Section of Int'l Law and Practice, Report to the House of
Delegates Concerning Corrupt Practices in the Conduct of International Business, 30
Int'l'Law. 193,196 (1996).
334. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Council
Recommendation on Bribery in International Business Transactions, OECD Doc.
C(94)75/Final (May 27, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Bribery Recommendation].
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concrete and meaningful steps" to deter, prevent and combat bribery.
These steps included examination of the country's laws regarding
bribery of foreign officials and regarding tax laws, regulations and
practices that may favor bribery.
3")
Internationally, the Council recommended that member nations
take steps to foster cooperation with each other and with non-
member countries to confront international bribery. Member
countries were encouraged to cooperate wvith authorities in other
countries in the investigation and prosecution of bribery, including
the sharing of information, the provision of evidence and
extradition. 40 Member countries were also encouraged to "make full
use of existing agreements and arrangements for mutual international
legal assistance" and, if necessary, enter into new agreements to that
end.31 They were further encouraged to "ensure that their national
laws afford an adequate basis for this cooperation."2 Both member
countries and the OECD Secretariat were urged to consult with non-
member countries and international organizations to promote anti-
corruption policies and "encourage them to join in the effort to
combat such bribery in accordance wvith this recommendation.""3
As part of the 1994 Bribery Recommendation, the Council
339. Id. at 1391. Thus, the Council recommended that:
[E]ach member country examine the following areas and, in conformity with
its jurisdictional and other basic legal principles, take concrete and
meaningful steps to meet this goal. These steps may include:
i) criminal laws, or their application, in respect of the brib-ry of
foreign public officials;
ii) civil, commercial, administrative laws and regulations so that
bribery would be illegal;
iii) tax legislation, regulations and practices. insofar as they may
indirectly favor bribery;
iv) company and business accounting requirements and practices
in order to secure adequate recording of relevant payments;
v) banking, financial and other relevant provisions so that
adequate records would be kept and made available for
inspection or investigation; and
vi) laws and regulations relating to public subsidies, licences (sic),
government procurement contracts, or other public advantages






343. Id. at 1392.
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directed CIME to monitor its implementation.' CIME was invited
to form a working group to assist in that effort, 5 directed to report to
the Council after its first review of implementation and review the
Recommendation within three years.4'
Thereafter, acting on a proposal from the OECD Committee on
Fiscal Affairs ("CFA"), on April 11, 1996, the OECD Council
adopted a further recommendation addressing the tax deductibility of
bribes to foreign officials? 7 The Council recommended "that those
Member countries which do not disallow the deductibility of bribes to
foreign public officials re-examine such treatment with the intention
of denying this deductibility."' s The Council noted in this connection
that "[s]uch action may be facilitated by the trend to treat bribes to
foreign public officials as illegal.""3 9  Once again, the CIME, in
cooperation with the CFA, was directed to monitor implementation
and promote the Recommendation in contacts with non-member
governments.5
On May 26, 1997, the CFA made its report on implementation of
the Recommendation on Tax Deductibility.3 1  The CFA reported
that, while most OECD member countries treated bribes as taxable
income to the recipient, the tax treatment of the person or firm
paying the bribe was determined, in most instances, according to
whether the recipient was a domestic or foreign official. ' 2 The report
noted that bribes paid to foreign officials were "in principle"




347. OECD Council Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to
Foreign Public Officials, OECD Doe. C(96)27/Final, 35 I.L.M. 131J (Apr. 11, 1996)
[hereinafter 1996 Recommendation on Tax Deductibility]. This action was taken at
the urging of the United States. See Marlise Simons, U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in
Move to End Business Bribes, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 1996, at A10 ("Under intense
pressure from the United States, the world's richest nations today took an important
step to fight corruption in international business dealings by agreeing that bribes paid
to foreign officials, often listed as commissions or fees, should ro longer be tax
deductible").
348. 1996 Recommendation on Tax Deductibility, supra note 347, at 1312.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See Implementing the OECD Recommendation, supra note 6.
352. Id. § V(2).
353. Id. These countries included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, New Zealand and Switzerland.
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However, Norway and the Netherlands enacted new legislation at
least limiting the deductibility of bribes, and deductibility was under
reexamination in Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and
Switzerland. -'
b. The 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions
Meanwhile, the CIME and the Working Group on Bribery
continued their work with member and non-member countries to
implement the 1994 Recommendation on Bribery and develop a
revised recommendation 5 5  The CIME reported that the
criminalization of bribery of foreign officials received priority "since
it has ramifications for actions in other fields."' In May 1996, the
OECD Council endorsed the conclusion that it was necessary to
criminalize bribery of foreign government officials in a coordinated
manner.' As the CIME noted, "[a]n important concern was to
ensure that companies face substantially similar rules and penalties
for international bribery, no matter what their own country of origin,
and that the network of laws forged by the combined effort will
permit effective enforcement and mutual legal assistance."'. -3 The
CIME submitted a Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery
in International Business Transactions, which the OECD Council
adopted on May 23, 19972"9
The Council's revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery
replaced the broad statements of principle in its earlier
Id. In addition, bribes were deductible in Denmark and Sweden "if they [were] the
customary practice in the country of the recipient." Id.
354. Id. § VI(2).
355. See Review of the 1994 Recommendation on Bribery in International Business
Transactions, Including Proposals to Facilitate the Criminalization of Bribery of
Foreign Officials, OECD Doc. CIMIN(97)IADDI(CORRI (May 26, 1997)
[hereinafter Review of the 1994 Recommendation].
356. Id. § Il. For example, the CFA reported that, under Dutch law, expenses for
illicit activities could not be deducted if a Dutch criminal court ruled that an illegal
act was committed. The CFA noted, however, that "there is at present nojurisprudence with regard to the question whether the bribery of a foreign public
official constitutes a criminal offense according to Dutch criminal law."
Implementing the OECD Recommendation, supra note 6, S 32.
357. Review of the 1994 Reconunendation, supra note 355, §III(A).
358. Id.
359. Revised Reconmendation on Combating Briber, in International Business
Transactions, OECD Doc. C(97)123/Final, 36 I.LM. 1016 (May 29, 1997) [hereinafter
1997 Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery].
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recommendation with specific proposals for legislative action by
member governments. The Recommendation included "concrete and
meaningful steps" to be taken regarding the revisions of criminal
laws, tax laws, accounting requirements and practices, banking laws,
public contracting, civil laws and administrative regulations and
international cooperation.' With certain technical amendments, the
Council adopted the Recommendation as a convention on December
18, 1997.361
The parties to the Convention recognized that bribery of public
officials was a widespread problem that all countries shared
responsibility for and required a multilateral response."' The
360. Id. at 1019, § II.
361. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International
Business Transactions, DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20 (Apr. 8, 1998) [hereinafter 1997
Convention].
362. Thus, the Convention states in its preamble that the Convention was adopted
by the parties:
Considering that bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international
business transactions, including trade and investment, which raises serious
moral and political concerns, undermines good governance and economic
development, and distorts international competitive conditions;
Considering that all countries share a responsibility to combat bribery in
international business transactions;
Having regard to the Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery
in International Business Transactions, adopted by the Council of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on
May 23, 1997, C(97)123/Final, which, inter alia, called for effective measures
to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in
connection with international business transactions, in particular the prompt
criminalisation of such bribery in an effective and coordinated manner and
in conformity with the agreed common elements set out in that
Recommendation and with the jurisdictional and other basic legal principles
of each country;
Welcoming other recent developments which further advance
international understanding and cooperation in combating bribery of public
officials, including actions of the United Nations, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, the
Organisation of American States, the Council of Europe and the European
Union;
Welcoming the efforts of companies, business organisations and trade
unions as well as other non-governmental organisations to combat bribery;
Recognising the role of governments in the prevention of solicitation of
bribes from individuals and enterprises in international business
transactions;
Recognising that achieving progress in this field requires not only efforts
on a national level but also multilateral cooperation, monitoring and follow-
up;
Recognising that achieving equivalence among the measures to be taken
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Convention solemnized the principal reforms set forth in the earlier
Recommendation regarding criminalization of foreign bribery,
establishment of accounting and controls requirements, clarification
of jurisdiction and the rendering of mutual legal assistance in matters
of foreign bribery, including extradition.
i. Offenses
Under the Convention, bribery of a foreign public official,"
either directly or through an intermediary, is a criminal offense:"
by the Parties is an essential object and purpose of the Convention, %, hich
requires that the Convention be ratified without derogations affecting this
equivalence.
Id. at 4.
363. Id. "foreign public official" was defined in the Convention to mean, "[A]ny
person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country.
whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a foreign
country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent
of a public international organisation." Id.
In addition, the Convention defined "foreign country" to include "all levels and
subdivisions of government, from national to local." Id. In this connection, the
Commentaries accompanying the Convention provide further guidance concerning
the meaning and scope of "foreign public official." As explained in the
Commentaries, the exercise of a public function includes "any activity in the public
interest, delegated by a foreign country, such as the performance of a task delegated
by it in connection with public procurement." Id. at 9. Similarly, a "public agency"
includes any "entity constituted under public law to carry out specific tasks in the
public interest." Id. "Public enterprise" is broadly defined to include pri% ate entities
owned or controlled by the government:
A "public enterprise" is any enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over
which a government, or governments, may, directly or indirectly, exercise a
dominant influence. This is deemed to be the case, inter alia, %,.hen the
government or governments hold the majority of the enterprise's subscribed
capital, control the majority of votes attaching to shares issued by the
enterprise or can appoint a majority of the members of the enterprise's
administrative or managerial body or supervisory board.
Id. An officer or manager of a government owned or controlled enterprise will be
considered a public official unless the enterprise is in actuality a commercial venture.
"An official of a public enterprise shall be deemed to perform a public function
unless the enterprise operates on a normal commercial basis in the relevant market,
i.e., on a basis which is substantially equivalent to that of a private enterprise, without
preferential subsidies or other privileges." Id. A foreign public official within the
contemplation of the Convention may also be an official of an international
organization that may include, "any international organization formed by States,
governments, or other public international organizations, %%hatever the form of
organization and scope of competence, including, for example, a regional economic
integration organization such as the European Communities." Id.
364. Id. at 4. Article 1 of the Convention provides:
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it
is a criminal offense under its law for any person intentionally to offer,
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However, under the Convention, liability only extends to the person
or entity that offers or pays the bribe and not to the foreign official
who demands or accepts it."' The Recommendation recognizing
promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or
through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a
third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to
the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retairk business or
other improper advantage in the conduct of the international business.
Id. With respect to liability for a bribe paid through an intermediary, the
Commentaries noted that "the conduct described in paragraph 1 is an offence
whether the offer or promise is made or the pecuniary or other advantage is given on
that person's own behalf or on behalf of any other natural person or legal entity." Id.
at 9. Liability extends to natural persons and legal persons. Under article 2 of the
Convention, parties were to take the necessary measures "to establish the liability of
legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public official." Id. at 4. However, as the
Commentaries explain, the Convention is not to be applied strictly. Instead, the
Convention establishes a standard which is to be integrated into the parties' laws:
This Convention seeks to assure a functional equivalence among the
measures taken by the Parties to sanction bribery of foreign public officials,
without requiring uniformity or changes in fundamental principles of a
Party's legal system.
Article 1 establishes a standard to be met by Parties, but doe;; not require
them to utilize its precise terms in defining the offence under their domestic
laws. A Party may use various approaches to fulfill its obligations, provided
that conviction of a person for the offence does not require proof of
elements beyond those which would be required to be proved iF the offence
were defined as in this paragraph. For example, a statute prohibiting the
bribery of agents generally which does not specifically address bribery of a
foreign public official, and a statute specifically limited to thi. case, could
both comply with this Article. Similarly, a statute which defined the offence
in terms of payments "to induce a breach of the official's duty" could meet
the standard provided that it was understood that every public official had a
duty to exercise judgment or discretion impartially and this was an
"autonomous" definition not requiring proof of the law of the particular
official's country.
Id. at 8. The Convention does not require the parties to extend criminal liability to
"legal persons" if the country's laws do not otherwise provide for such liability.
Instead, under article 3 of the Convention, "legal persons" must be subject to
"effective, proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions." Id. at 5 (emphasis
added). Thus, article 3(2) of the Convention provides, "In the event that, under the
legal system of a Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons, that
Party shall ensure that legal persons shall be subject to effective, and dissuasive non-
criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions, for bribery of foreign public
officials." Id. The failure of the Convention to require legal liability for corporations
and other entities has been criticized as not "leveling the playing field" for countries,
like the United States, which impose criminal liability on corporations. See Geoffrey
R. Watson, The OECD Convention on Bribery, INSIGHT, Mar. 1998, at 1.
365. 1997 Convention, supra note 361, at 8. This is made clear in the
Commentaries to the Convention that state:
This Convention deals with what, in the law of some countries, is called
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accomplice and conspirator liability, as well as liability for attempts.,"
The purpose of the bribe must be to induce the public official to
"act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official
duties" for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business or to secure
some "other improper advantage in the conduct of international
business." ''6  The Convention broadly construes the acting or
refraining to act by a foreign official to include "any use of the public
official's position, whether or not within the official's authorised
competence." The Commentaries to the Convention make it clear
that it is no defense that the company offering the bribe was the best
qualified bidder or the award of the business otherwise would have
been proper.
+9
'active corruption' or 'active briber,,' meaning the offence committed by the
person who promises or gives the bribe, as contrasted with 'passive bribery,'
the offence committed by the official who receives the bribe. The
Convention does not utilise the term 'active bribery' simply to avoid it being
misread by the non-technical reader as implying that the briber has taken
the initiative and the recipient is a passive victim. In fact, in a number of
situations, the recipient will have induced or pressured the briber and will
have been, in that sense, the more active.
Id.
366. Id. at 4. Article 1 further provides in this regard that:
Each Party shall take any measures necessary to establish that complicity in,
including incitement, aiding and abetting, or authorisation of an act of
bribery of a foreign public official shall be a criminal offence. Attempt and
conspiracy to bribe a foreign public official shall be criminal offences to the
same extent as attempt and conspiracy to bribe a public official of that Party.
Id. However, as pointed out in the Commentaries, if such accessory liability is not
otherwise prohibited under the country's laws and if the specified acts do not result in
further action in violation of the Convention, the country would not be required to
make the acts punishable solely by virtue of the Convention:
The offences set out in paragraph 2 are understood in terms of their normal
content in national legal systems. Accordingly, if authorisation, incitement,
or one of the other listed acts, which does not lead to further action, is not
itself punishable under a Party's legal system, then the Party would not be
required to make it punishable with respect to bribery of a foreign public
official.
Id. at 9.
367. Id. at 4.
368. Id. This was highlighted in the Commentaries which noted that:
One case of bribery which has been contemplated under the definition in
paragraph 4.c is where an executive of a company gives a bribe to a senior
official of a government, in order that this official use his office-though
acting outside his competence-to make another official award a contract to
that company.
Id. at 9.
369. Id. The Commentaries explained, "It is an offence within the meaning of
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Further, the Convention criminalizes payments made to secure
an "advantage" other than obtaining or retaining business.
According to the commentaries, such an advantage may include
anything "to which the company concerned was not clearly entitled."
As an example, they cite "an operating permit for a factory which
fails to meet the statutory requirements."'37 It is no defense in this
regard that payments were customary in the country or necessary to
obtain the official benefit?7 However, "facilitating payments" are not
bribes within the meaning of the Convention,' and it is also not an
offense if the payment was for an "advantage" required or permitted
under the country's laws.37 Additionally, countries charging money
laundering as an offense in regard to domestic bribery are to make
the same offense applicable to bribery of a foreign official."
paragraph 1 to bribe to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage
whether or not the company concerned was the best qualified bidder or was
otherwise a company which could properly have been awarded the business." Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. Additionally, the amount of the bribe has no effect on culpability. As the
Commentaries explained, "It is also an offence irrespective of, inter alia, the value of
the advantage, its results, perceptions of local customer, the tolerance of such
payments by local authorities, or the alleged necessity of the payment in order to
obtain or retain business or other improper advantage." Id. Thus, the Commentaries
also suggested that culpability is unaffected by whether the bribe resulted in
obtaining or retaining the business or advantage. With regard to the tax deductibility
of bribes, however, unlike the 1997 Recommendation, which urged "prompt
implementation" of the OECD's 1996 Recommendation on Tax Deductibility, the
Convention is silent concerning the elimination of tax deductibility. S2ee 1997 Revised
Recommendation on Combating Bribery, supra note 359, at 1020.
372. Id. Although the Commentaries clearly state that the practice of facilitating
payments is not condoned:
Small 'facilitation' payments do not constitute payments made 'to obtain or
retain business or other improper advantage' within the meaning of
paragraph 1 and, accordingly, are also not an offence. Such payments,
which, in some countries, are made to induce public officials to perform their
functions, such as issuing licenses or permits, are generally il egal in the
foreign country concerned. Other countries can and should address this
corrosive phenomenon by such means as support for programmes of good
governance. However, criminalisation by other countries does not seem a
practical or effective complementary action.
373. 1997 Convention, supra note 361, at 9. The Commentaries note in this regard
that "it is not an offence, however, if the advantage was permitted or required by the
written law or regulation of the foreign public official's country, including case law."
Id.
374. Id. Article 7 of the Convention provides, with respect to the offense of
money laundering, that "each Party which has made bribery of its owvn public official
a predicate offence for the purpose of the application of its money laundering
legislation shall do so on the same terms for the bribery of a foreign public official,
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ii. Jurisdiction
The Convention adopted, with some modification, the
Recommendation's provisions regarding assertions of territorial and
nationality-based jurisdiction." However, rather than call for the
extradition of citizens if the party did not assert nationality-based
jurisdiction, as the Recommendation did,- the Convention requires
countries having jurisdiction (either territorial or national) to consult
"with a view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for
prosecution."!'  The Convention includes additional procedural
without regard to the place where the bribery occurred." Id. at 5. The
Commentaries explain that reference to the predicate offense of "briber' of its own
public official" is intended broadly so that the laundering of funds used for bribery
will be prohibited whether the country makes "active bribery" or "passive bribery"
the predicate for money laundering:
'[B]ribery of its own public official' is intended broadly, so that bribery of a
foreign public official is to be made a predicate offence for money
laundering legislation on the same terms, when a Party has made either
active or passive bribery of its own public official such an offence. When a
Party has made only passive bribery of its own public officials a predicate
offence for money laundering purposes, this article requires that the
laundering of the bribe payment be subject to money laundering legislation.
Id. at 10.
375. With respect to territorial jurisdiction, the Commentaries reiterate the
sentiment in the Recommendation that "Ithe territorial basis for jurisdiction should
be interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery act is
not required." Id. With respect to nationality-based jurisdiction, the Commentaries
noted that:
[n]ationality jurisdiction is to be established according to the general
principles and conditions in the legal system of each Party. These principles
deal with such matters as dual criminality. However, the requirement of
dual criminality should be deemed to be met if the act is unla%%ful %%here it
occurred, even if under a different criminal statute. For countries w~hich
apply nationality jurisdiction only to certain types of offences, the reference
to 'principles' includes the principles upon which such selection is based.
Id.
376. See 1997 Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery, supra note 359, at
1023 ("States which do not prosecute on the basis of the nationality principle should
be prepared to extradite their nationals in respect of the bribery of foreign public
officials").
377. 1997 Convention, supra note 361, at 5. Article 4 of the Convention provides
with respect to jurisdiction:
1. Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offense
is committed in whole or in part in its territory.
2. Each Party which has jurisdiction to prosecute its nationals for offences
committed abroad shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction to do so in respect of the bribery of a foreign
public official, according to the same principles.
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provisions as well 8
iii. Accounting and Controls
The Convention expanded the Recommendation's accounting
and control provisions. 9  While continuing the prohibition against
Id. The Recommendation provisions concerning extradition in the event a country
declined to exercise nationality-based jurisdiction were incorporated into Article 10
of the Convention, which dealt specifically with extradition and is discussed infra.
378. Id. The Convention included other procedural provisions a!; well. Article 5
emphasized the necessity of independent judgment in conducting irvestigations and
prosecutions of internal bribery:
Investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign public official shall
be subject to the applicable rules and principles of each Party. They shall
not be influenced by considerations of national economic interest, the
potential effect upon relations with another State or the identity of the
natural or legal persons involved.
Id. Article 6 requires that an adequate period for investigation and prosecution be
allowed when establishing the applicable statute of limitations: "Any statute of
limitations applicable to the offense of bribery of a foreign public official shall allow
an adequate period of time for the investigation and prosecution of this offense." Id.
Article 11 requires the designation of a responsible authority to consult on
jurisdictional issues and to make or receive requests for legal assistance and
extradition:
For the purposes of Article 4, paragraph 3, on consultation, Article 9, on
mutual legal assistance and Article 10, on extradition, each Party shall notify
the Secretary-General of the OECD of an authority or authorities
responsible for making and receiving requests, which shall serve as a channel
of communication for these matters for that Party, without prejudice to
other arrangements between Parties.
Id. at 6.
The Commentaries further underscore the importance of article 5 (enforcement)
in assuring that prosecutorial discretion with respect to bribery of foreign officials
would be based on professional, rather than political considerations:
Article 5 recognises the fundamental nature of national regimes of
prosecutorial discretion. It recognises as well that, in order to protect the
independence of prosecution, such discretion is to be exercised on the basis
of professional motives and is not to be subject to improper influence by
concerns of a political nature. Article 5 is complemented by paragraph 6 of
the Annex to the 1997 OECD Revised Recommendation on Combating
Bribery in International Business Transactions, C(97)123/Final ...which
recommends, inter alia, that complaints of bribery of foreign public officials
should be seriously investigated by competent authorities and that adequate
resources should be provided by national governments to permit effective
prosecution of such bribery. Parties will have accepted this
Recommendation, including its monitoring and follow-up arrangements.
Id. at 10.
379. The 1997 Recommendation enumerated standards for accounting and
controls requirements to be adopted by member countries. These standards
included: maintenance of adequate books and records identifying "the matters in
respect of which the receipt and expenditure takes place"; prohibition of "off-book"
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"off-book" transactions and the maintenance of "off-book" accounts,
the Convention enlarged the requirements of accuracy of books,
records and financial statement disclosures. Under the Convention,
companies are prohibited from misidentifying the purpose of
liabilities and using false documents to camouflage corrupt
payments.
,1
transactions or the maintenance of "off-book" accounts; disclosure in financial
statements of the "full range of material contingent liabilities"; sanctions for
omissions, falsifications or fraud in accounting records; independent audit of financial
statements; standards for the independence of auditors; reporting requirements for
auditors who discover indications of possible bribery; standards for internal controls
including standards of conduct; statements by management in the annual report
concerning internal control mechanisms, particularly mechanisms that prevent
bribery; establishment of independent monitors, such as audit committees or
supervisory boards; and establishment of mechanisms that prevent bribery;
establishment of mechanisms for receiving communications from "persons not willing
to violate professional standards or ethics under instructions or pressure from
hierarchical supervisors." 1997 Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery.
supra note 359, at 1020-21.
380. The expanded accounting and controls requirements wvill be the subject of
continuing discussions in the Working Group. However, as the Commentaries point
out, the Convention's disclosure requirements will have an immediate effect:
Article 8 is related to section V of the 1997 OECD Recommendation, xNhich
all Parties vdll have accepted and which is subject to follow-up in the OECD
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions. This
paragraph contains a series of recommendations concerning accounting
requirements, independent external audit and internal company controls the
implementation of which wvill be important to the overall effectiveness of the
fight against bribery in international business. However, one immediate
consequence of the implementation of this Convention by the Parties will be
that companies which are required to issue financial statements disclosing
their material contingent liabilities will need to take into account the full
potential liabilities under this Convention, in particular its Articles 3 and 8,
as well as other losses which might flow from conviction of the company or
its agents for bribery. This also has implications for the execution of
professional responsibilities of auditors regarding indications of bribery of
foreign public officials. In addition, the accounting offences referred to in
Article 8 will generally occur in the company's home country, when the
bribery offence itself may have been committed in another country, and this
can fill gaps in the effective reach of the Convention.
1997 Convention, supra note 361, at 10.
381. Id. at 5. Under Article 8 of the Convention:
In order to combat bribery of foreign public officials effectively, each Party
shall take such measures as may be necessary, within the framework of its
laws and regulations regarding the maintenance of books and records,
financial statement disclosures, and accounting and auditing standards, to
prohibit the establishment of off-the-books accounts, the making of off-the-
books or inadequately identified transactions, the recording of non-existent
expenditures, the entry of liabilities with incorrect identification of their
object, as well as the use of false documents, by companies subject to those
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iv. Sanctions
The punishment for violation of the Convention's anti-bribery
provisions is to consist of "effective, proportionate and dissuasive
civil, administrative or criminal penalties" comparable to the
punishment imposed for domestic bribery." In addition, the bribe
and any proceeds of the bribery, or property of corresponding value,
are to be subject to seizure, confiscation and forfeiture."" Monetary
laws and regulations, for the purpose of bribing foreign public officials or of
hiding such bribery.
Id.
382. Id. Article 3 of the Convention provides, with respect to penalties for bribery
of a foreign official, that:
[t]he bribery of a foreign public official shall be punishable by effective,
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties. The range of penalties shall
be comparable to that applicable to the bribery of the Party's own public
officials and shall, in the case of natural persons, include deprivation of
liberty sufficient to enable effective mutual legal assistance and extradition.
Id. Liability for bribery of a foreign official is to extend to "legal persons" as well as
"natural persons." As stated in article 2 of the Convention, "Each Party shall take
such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to
establish the liability of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public official." Id.
at 4. However, if the laws of the country do not provide for the criminal liability of
legal person generally, the Convention will not require establishrent of criminal
liability solely in cases of bribery of foreign officials. As explained in the
Commentaries, "In the event that, under the legal system of a Party, criminal
responsibility is not applicable to legal persons, that Party shall not be required to
establish such criminal responsibility." Id. at 9. Nevertheless, parties to the
Convention must establish "effective, proportionate and dissuasive" non-criminal
penalties for legal persons if the country's laws do not provide for criminal liability.
Thus, the Convention stated that, "[i]n the event that, under the legal system of a
Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons, that party shall ensure
that legal persons shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive non-
criminal sanctions, for bribery of foreign public officials." Id. at 5.
383. Article 3 of the Convention provides that the bribe and the "proceeds of the
bribery" of property of equivalent value will be subject to seizure and confiscation:
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to provide that the
bribe and the proceeds of the bribery of a foreign public official, or property,
the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds, are subject to
seizure and confiscation or that monetary sanction of comparable effect are
applicable.
Id. at 5. The "proceeds of bribery" referred to in article 3 "are the profits or other
benefits derived by the briber from the transaction or other improper advantage
obtained or retained through bribery." Id. at 9. Article 3 also provides for the
seizure and confiscation of property corresponding in value to the bribe or the
proceeds of bribery. The confiscation of property contemplated in the Convention
includes forfeiture and means "the permanent deprivation of property by order of a
court or other competent authority" and is to be exercised "without prejudice to the
rights of victims." Id.
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sanctions of "comparable effect" may also apply.-" Parties to the
Convention are to consider further civil or administrative penalties,
including denial of public benefits, debarment from contracting and
dissolution. '  "Effective, proportionate dissuasive civil,
administrative or criminal penalties" are also to be imposed for
omissions and falsifications in books, records and financial statements
of companies. 6
v. Mutual Assistance and Extradition
The Convention expanded upon the Recommendation regarding
mutual assistance and extradition. Parties to the Convention are to
provide prompt and effective legal assistance, to the fullest extent
possible, in both criminal and civil proceedings. This includes
promptly informing the requesting party of any additional
384. Id. at 5 (art 3).
385. Under article 3, parties are to consider the imposition of additional chil or
administrative sanctions. Id. These sanctions include: denial of public benefits.
debarment from contracting, placement under judicial supervision and dissolution.
As the Commentaries explain:
Among the civil or administrative sanctions, other than non-criminal fines.
which might be imposed upon legal persons for an act of bribery of a foreign
public official are: exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid;
temporary or permanent disqualification from participation in public
procurement or from the practice of other commercial activities; placing
under judicial supervision; and a judicial winding-up order.
Id. at 9. The OECD Council included in the 1997 Recommendation that suspension
from public contracting be adopted as a sanction when it was determined -on
substantial evidence" that an enterprise had engaged in foreign bribery. Member
countries were also urged to require anti-corruption provisions in bilateral aid funded
procurements; to promote implementation of anti-corruption provisions in
international development institutions; and to cooperate with development partners
in combating corruption, all in accordance with the earlier recommendation of the
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 1997 Revised Recomincudation
on Combating Bribery, supra note 359, at 1021. On May 6 and 7, 1996, DAC
members endorsed a recommendation on anti-corruption proposals for aid-funded
procurement. DAC recommended that [m]embers work to ensure the proper
implementation of their anti-corruption provisions and that they draw to the
attention of the international development institutions to which they belong, the
importance of proper implementation of the anti-corruption provisions envisaged in
their rules of operation." The DAC Reconmmendation on Anti-Corruption Prop)sI.s
.for Aid-Funded Procurement, OECD Doc. CQMIN(97)17/ADD2 Annex 1 (May
1997).
386. Id. at 5. Article 8 of the Convention provides, with regard to penalties for
omissions and falsifications in accounting records and financial statements, that
"Each Party shall provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative
or criminal penalties for such omissions and falsifications, in respect of the books.
records, accounts, and financial statements of such companies." Id.
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information needed to render assistance and informing the requesting
party of the status and outcome of a request." Additionally, the
requirement of dual criminality or bank secrecy should not impede
mutual legal assistance.'
The Convention established bribery of a foreign official as an
387. Id. at 6. Article 9 of the Convention provides, with respect to mutual
assistance, that:
Each Party shall, to the fullest extent possible under its laws and relevant
treaties and arrangements, provide prompt and effective legal assistance to
another Party for the purpose of criminal investigations and proceedings
brought by a Party concerning offences within the scope of this Convention
and for non-criminal proceedings within the scope of this Convention
brought by a Party against a legal person. The requested Party shall inform
the requesting Party, without delay, of any additional information or
documents needed to support the request for assistance and, where
requested, of the status and outcome of the request for assistance.
Id. at 10. The legal assistance contemplated under article 9 of the Convention
includes the transportation of persons, including those in custody, to the requesting
country for purposes of assisting in an investigation or testifying at trial. Such
transportation apparently would require the person's consent, however. As stated in
the Commentaries:
Within the framework of paragraph 1 of Article 9, Parties should, upon
request, facilitate or encourage the presence or availability of persons,
including persons in custody, who consent to assist in investigations or
participate in proceedings. Parties should take measures to be able, in
appropriate cases, to transfer temporarily such a person in custody to a Party
requesting it and to credit time in custody in the requesting Party to the
transferred person's sentence in the requested Party. The Parties wishing to
use this mechanism should also take measures to be able, as a requesting
Party, to keep a transferred person in custody and return this person without
necessity of extradition proceedings.
Id.
388. Id. at 5. Article 9 of the Convention provides with respect to dual criminality
and bank secrecy requirements:
Where a Party makes mutual legal assistance conditional upon the
existence of dual criminality, dual criminality shall be deemed to exist if the
offence for which the assistance is sought is within the scope of this
Convention.
A Party shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance for criminal
matters within the scope of this Convention on the ground of bank secrecy.
Id. With regard to the requirement of dual criminality as a predicate to extradition,
the Commentaries explain that the Convention:
[A]ddresses the issue of identity of norms in the concept of dual criminality.
Parties with statutes as diverse as a statute prohibiting the bribery of agents
generally and a statute directed specifically at bribery of foreign public
officials should be able to co-operate fully regarding cases whose facts fall
within the scope of the offences described in this Convention.
Id. at 10.
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extraditable offense." If a Party's laws make extradition conditional
upon the existence of a treaty, the Convention is to be considered
such a treaty.9 If a Party declines extradition on the grounds that the
person is a national, the Party must refer the person to "competent
authorities" for prosecution."' If extradition is made conditional
upon a requirement of dual criminality, by operation of the
Convention, the condition is deemed to have been fulfilled in cases of
bribery of foreign public officials. 2
vi. Monitoring and Implementation
Under the OECD Recommendation on Bribery, the deadline for
member countries to submit proposed implementing legislation to
their legislative bodies was April 1, 1998. They were supposed to
3S9. Id. at 5. Article 10 of the Convention provides: "Bribery of a foreign public
official shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence under the lav, s of
the Parties and the extradition treaties between them." Id.
390. Id. Article 10 further provides:
If a Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of an
extradition treaty receives a request for extradition from another Party with
which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention to be the
legal basis for extradition in respect of the offense of bribery of a foreign
public official.
Id. As the Commentaries explain:
A Party may consider this Convention to be a legal basis for extradition if.
for one or more categories of cases falling vithin this Convention, it requires
an extradition treaty. For example, a country may consider it a basis for
extradition of its nationals if it requires an extradition treaty for that
category but does not require one for extradition of non-nationals.
Id. at 10.
391. Id. at 5. In this regard, article 10 of the Convention provides:
Each Party shall take any measures necessary to assure either that it can
extradite its nationals or that it can prosecute its nationals for the offence of
bribery of a foreign public official. A Party, which declines a request to
extradite a person for briber' of a foreign public official solely on the ground
that the person is its national shall submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
Id.
392- Id. Article 10 provides in regard to the requirement of dual-criminality:
Extradition for bribery of a foreign public official is subject to the conditions
set out in the domestic law and applicable treaties and arrangements of each
Party. Where a Party makes extradition conditional upon the existence of
dual criminality, that condition shall be deemed to be fulfilled if the offence
for which extradition is sought is within the scope of Article 1 of this
Convention [defining the offense of bribery of a foreign public officiall.
Id. The Commentaries also note in this regard that "the requirement of dual
criminality should be deeded to be met if the act is unlawful where it occurred, even
if under a different criminal statute." Id. at 10.
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seek enactment of the legislation by the end of 1998. 3" Parties to the
Convention are to "co-operate in carrying out a program of
systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full implementation
of this Convention. '"" The apparatus for carrying out this monitoring
function is the Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions, which will continue its efforts under the charter
adopted in the recommendation."' The OECD Council was expected
to further consider the Convention at the Spring 1999 meeting."6
393. 1997 Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery, supra note 359, at
1019.
394. Article 12 of the Convention provides:
The Parties shall co-operate in carrying out a programme of systematic
follow-up to monitor and promote the full implementation of this
Convention. Unless otherwise decided by consensus of the Parties, this shall
be done in the framework of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in the
International Business Transactions and according to its terms of reference,
or within the framework and terms of reference of any successor to its
functions, and Parties shall bear the costs of the programme in accordance
with the rules applicable to that body.
1997 Convention, supra note 361, at 6.
395. Id. Thus, the Commentaries note that:
The current terms of reference of the OECD Working Group on Bribery
which are relevant to monitoring and follow-up are set out in Section VIII of
the 1997 OECD Recommendation. They provide for:
i) receipt of notifications and other information submitted to it by the
[participating] countries;
ii) regular reviews of steps taken by [participating] countries to
implement the Recommendation and to make proposals, as
appropriate, to assist [participating] countries in its
implementation; these reviews will be based on the following
complementary systems:
- a system of self evaluation, where [participating]
countries' responses on the basis of a questionnaire will
provide a basis for assessing the implementation of the
Recommendation;
- a system for mutual evaluation, where each [participating]
country will be examined in turn by the Working Group
on Bribery, on the basis of a report which will provide an
objective assessment of the progress of the [participating]
country in implementing the Recommendatioa.
iii) examination of specific issues relation to bribery in international
business transactions;
iv) ....
v) provision of regular information to the public on its work and
activities and on implementation of the Recommendation.
id. atll.
396. The OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business
transactions was scheduled to discuss this issue during a seminar from February 10
through February 12, 1999. See generallyhttp:/lwww.oecd.org (visited October 15,
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The United States hailed the Convention as "a bold and historic
step in the fight against international commercial bribery.""
Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright described the Convention as
a "victory for good government, fair competition and open trade."'
Transparency International characterized the Convention as having
"global impact" because the criminalization of bribery would reduce
the "supply-side" of bribery and because the stronger internal anti-
bribery procedures would reduce the "demand-side" in developing
and transitional economies.
The twenty-nine OECD members signed the Convention on
December 17, 1997.*4s In addition to the member country signatories,
five non-member countries that participated in the OECD discussions
signed the Convention.'
Under the framework of the Convention, five of the ten
countries having the largest share of exports, representing at least
sixty percent of the combined total exports of those ten countries,
must deposit instruments of acceptance, approval or ratification on or
before December 31, 1998, for the Convention to enter into force.
1999).
397. U.S. Dep't of State, OECD, Anti-Bribery Convention (Nov. 21, 1997) (press
statement) (visited October 13, 199)
<http/l/secretary.state.gov/wwwlbriefingstatement971121.htm>.
398. At the signing ceremony in Paris on December 17, 1997, Secretary Albright
stated, "Four years ago, my predecessor Secretary of State Christopher proposed that
the OECD take the lead in making international bribery a crime. Today, %%ith our
signatures, that goal has been realized. It is a victory for good government, fair
competition and open trade." Albright, supra note 332.
399. Thus, Transparency International stated:
The Convention will have a global impact. It will reduce the supply-side of
corruption as the OECD countries are the home states of most international
companies. It will be important on the demand-side, strengthening domestic
anti-corruption efforts in developing countries and in those countries in
transition in Central and Eastern Europe.
Transparency International, OECD Anti-Corruption Convention Lcares Critical
Questions Still Open (Nov. 5, 1997) (press statement) (last modified Dec. 8, 1997)
<http:/wwv.transparency.defdocumentspress-releaseJ19971997.11.3.oecd-
convention.html>.
400. Summary of OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 332.
401. These countries were Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and the Slovak
Republic. OECD, Press Release on Agreement Criminalizing Bribery (Nov. 21,
1997); see also Lawrence Speer, OECD Approves Pact to Combat Bribe6r; Bribe's
Tax Deductibility Not Eliminated, 14 INT'LTRADE REP. (BNA) 2031 (Nov. 26, 1997).
402. 1997 Convention, supra note 361, at 7 (art. 15). The Annex to the Convention
identifies the following ten countries and the relative percentage of their aggregate
imports as follows:
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
If the Convention has not entered into force by December 31, 1998,
any signatory that deposited instruments of acceptance, approval or
ratification may declare its readiness to accept the Convention, which
will then enter into effect after two signatories deposit declarations.4"
During its discussions, the Working Group could not agree about
the treatment of payments to political parties and candidates in
anticipation of their becoming public officials. At times these
discussions were quite contentious,' 04 and the Convention recognized
that additional work would be necessary in this area." However, in
certain circumstances the Convention includes political party officials












403. Id. The Convention was sent to the Senate on May 1, 1998 for advice and
consent to ratification. THE WHITE HOUsE, LETrER TO CONGRESS ON BRIBERY OF
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS (May 1, 1998) (press release) (visited Oct. 13, 1999)
<http://lwv.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-
resII2R?urn:pdi:/oma.eop.gov.us1998/514/11.text.l>. In his message to the Senate
urging favorable consideration, the President noted, "While the Convention is largely
consistent with existing U.S. law, my administration will propose certain amendments
to the FCPA to bring it into conformity with and to implement the Convention." Id.
404. See Speer, supra note 401, at 2031 ("Prior to the final round of negotiations
Nov. 18-21, U.S. and European Union negotiators were deadlocked over whether the
treaty would apply to sitting parliamentarians, officials of state-owned, or para-statal
enterprises, and political parties. The United States had threatened not to sign the
agreement if those categories were excluded."); see also Gary G. Yerkey,
International Agreements: U.S., EU Still Differ in OECD Talks on Curbing Foreign
Bribery, Official Says, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 511 (March 19, 1997).
405. 1997 Convention, supra note 361, at 9. The Commentaries to the Convention
note in this regard that:
under the legal system of some countries, an advantage promised or given to
any person, in anticipation of his or her becoming a foreign public official,
falls within the scope of the offences described in Article 1, paragraph 1 or 2.
Under the legal system of many countries, it is considered technically
distinct from the offences covered by the present Convention. However,
there is a commonly shared concern and intent to address this phenomenon
through further work.
Id.
406. Id. As explained in the Commentaries:
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political party official could contravene the Convention.
Additionally, although not explicit in the Convention, there
apparently was agreement, at least among the Working Group, that
corrupt payments to foreign officials made through political parties
would be prohibited, as would payments directed by a foreign official
to be made to a political party..4 It was anticipated that the OECD
Council would revisit this issue in Spring 1999.:
D. Other Recent International Initiatives Against Bribery and
Corruption
Other governmental organizations also recently addressed the
problem of international corruption. Among the most significant of
these initiatives are the U.N. Declaration on Corruption and Bribery,
the Protocols of the European Union and the Anti-Corruption
Guidelines of the World Bank/International Monetary Fund.
1. The United Nations
Noting the efforts of the OAS and the OECD, on December 16,
[I]n special circumstances, public authority may in fact be held by persons
(eg., political party officials in single party states) not formally designated as
public officials. Such persons, through their de facto performance of a
public function, may, under the legal principles of some countries, b-
considered to be foreign public officials.
Id.
407. See Summary of OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 332, at 10-11:
Although the text does not specifically cover political parties, the negotiators
agreed that the convention wll cover business-related bribas to foreign
public officials made through political parties and party officials, as well as
those bribes, which corrupt foreign public officials direct to political parties.
Some persons who are not formally designated as public officials but who
may in fact perform a public function (e.g., political party officials in single
party states) may, under the legal principles of some countries, b-
considered to be foreign public officials. In addition, under the legal systems
of some countries, an advantage promised or given to a parson in
anticipation of that person's becoming a foreign public official may fall
within the scope of the convention. Negotiators agreed to an accelerated
work plan to address several outstanding issues related to the convention,
including acts of bribery relating to foreign political parties and relating to
persons in anticipation of their becoming foreign public officials. The results
of this review will be reported to Ministers by the 1999 OECD Council
meeting.
Id.
408. Id.; see also Albright, supra note 332 ("we have also agreed to address
outstanding issues by the Spring of 1999. We %ill have an opportunity to expand the
Convention to cover bribes to political parties and their officials").
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1996, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a Declaration Against
Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions. "
In its Declaration, the General Assembly stated, "A stable and
transparent environment for international commercial transactions in
all countries is essential for the mobilization of investment, finance,
technology, skills and other important resources across national
borders in order, inter alia, to promote economic and social
development and environmental protection.""41  The Declaration
defined bribery to include the solicitation and making, of a corrupt
payment.
41
The Declaration called on member countries to "commit
themselves" to a variety of measures to combat bribery and
corruption. Member countries were to take "effective and concrete
action to combat all forms of corruption, bribery and related illicit
practices in international commercial transactions," ' 2 including the
409. Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial
Transactions, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doe. A/RES/51/91
(1996); reproduced in 1 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACS. Acr REP. 150.013 (1997).
410. Id. at 150.013.
411. Id. Thus, the Declaration provided that bribery included the following
elements:
(a) The offer, promise or giving of any payment, gift or other advantage,
directly or indirectly, by any private or public corporation, including a
transnational corporation, or individual from a State to any public
official or elected representative of another country as undue
consideration for performing or refraining from the performance of that
official's or representative's duties in connection with an international
commercial transaction;
(b) The soliciting, demanding, accepting or receiving, directly or indirectly,
by any public official or elected representative of a State from any
private or public corporation, including a transnational corporation, or
individual from another country of any payment, gift or other
advantage, as undue consideration for performing or refiaining from
the performance of that official's or representative's duties in
connection with an international commercial transaction ....
Id.
412. Id. The Declaration states:
Member States, individually and through international and regional
organizations, taking actions subject to each State's own constitution and
fundamental legal principles and adopted pursuant to national laws and
procedures, commit themselves:
To take effective and concrete action to combat all forms o; corruption,
bribery and related illicit practices in international commercial
transactions, in particular to pursue effective enforcement of existing
laws prohibiting bribery in international commercial transactions, to
encourage the adoption of laws for those purposes where they do not
exist, and to call upon private and public corporations, including
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criminalization of bribery of foreign officials41 and the denial of the
tax deductibility of bribes paid to public officials."' Member
countries were also to consider establishing "illicit enrichment" as an
offense. "
The Declaration also called on member States to adopt
corporate governance requirements prohibiting bribery. States were
encouraged to develop accounting standards and practices that
encouraged transparency and codes of conduct for corporations that
prohibited bribery. 6
The Declaration committed member States to mutual
cooperation in investigating and prosecuting acts of bribery and
corruption. 7  In particular, States were to facilitate access to
transnational corporations, and individuals within their jurisdiction
engaged in international commercial transactions to promote the
objectives of the present Declaration....
Id.
413. Member States are to "criminalize such bribery of foreign public officials in
an effective and coordinated manner, but without in any way precluding, impeding or
delaying international, regional or national actions to further the implementation of
the present Declaration...." Id.
414. Member States further agreed:
To deny, in countries that do not already do so, the tax deductibility of
bribes paid by any private or public corporation or individual of a State to
any public official or elected representative of another country and, to that
end, to examine their respective modalities for doing so ....
Id.
415. Thus, States are to "'examine establishing illicit enrichment by public officials
or elected representatives as an offence." Id.
416. Member States are to:
[D]evelop or maintain accounting standards and practices that improve the
transparency of international commercial transactions, and that encourage
private and public corporations, including transnational corporations, and
individuals engaged in international commercial transactions to avoid and
combat corruption, bribery and related illicit practices.
Id.
417. Member States are to:
[C]ooperate and afford one another the greatest possible assistance in
connection with criminal investigations and other legal proceedings brought
in respect to corruption and bribery in international commercial
transactions. Mutual assistance shall include, as far as permitted under
national laws or as provided for in bilateral treaties or other applicable
arrangements of the affected countries, and taking into account the need for
confidentiality as appropriate:
(a) Production of documents and other information, taking of evidence
and service of documents relevant to criminal investigations and
other legal proceedings:
(b) Notice of the initiation and outcome of criminal proceedings
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documents and records418 and ensure that bank secrecy laws did not
impede investigations and legal proceedings concerning corruption.41
2. The European Union
Following the effective date of the Maastricht Treaty on
November 1, 1993, the former European Community formally
became the European Union ("EU").420 The European Union
currently has fifteen members21 and is comprised of the European
Commission (formerly the Commission of European Communities),
the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Court of
Justice."2
On December 3, 1995, at the U.S.-European Summit in Madrid,
Spain, President Clinton, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales
and European Commission President Jacques Santer announced a
"New Transatlantic Agenda" for U.S.-European cooperation. -
Among the agenda items addressed to strengthening the multilateral
trading system was the agreement to "combat corruption and bribery
by implementing the 1994 OECD Recommendation on Bribery in
International Transactions., 42 4  The agenda also called for the
strengthening of international judicial assistance and cooperation in
concerning bribery in international commercial transactions to
other States that may have jurisdiction over the same offence;
(c) Extradition proceedings where and as appropriate.
Id. at 150.015-150.016.
418. The Declaration commits States to "take appropriate action to enhance
cooperation to facilitate access to documents and records about transactions and
about identities of persons engaged in bribery in international commercial
transactions." Id. at 150.016.
419. States are also committed to "ensure that bank secrecy provisions do not
impede or hinder criminal investigations or other legal proceedings relating to
corruption, bribery or related illicit practices in international commercial
transactions, and that full cooperation is extended to governments that seek
information on such transactions." Id.
420. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: European Union (May 12, 1997).
421. Id. The current membership of the European Union is Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Bulgaria, Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey have applied for membership. Id.
422. Id.
423. Dep't of State, Joint U.SJEU Action Plan (Dec. 3, 1995).
<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edulERCbureaus/eur/releases/951203EUAction.html>
424. Id. at 2.
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obtaining evidence.4"
In a communication to the Council of Ministers and European
Parliament on May 21, 1997, the European Commission underscored
the need for a stronger EU policy against corruption inside and
outside the European Union. :  To that end, the Commission
proposed the criminalization of bribery of foreign officials, the
disallowance of the deductions for illegal payments, improved roles
for public procurement, standards for effective auditing of company
accounts, blacklisting of firms convicted of corruption, criminalization
of the laundering of corruption proceeds and civil causes of action
against competitors who obtain contracts through corruption. "
On May 26, 1997, the Convention on the Fight Against
Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or
Officials of Member States of the European Union was signed. The
Convention called for the criminalization of "passive corruption '" :'
and "active corruption." ' Member States were to take the measures
necessary "to allow heads of businesses or any persons having power
to make decisions or exercise control within a business to be declared
criminally liable" for the acts of persons "under their authority acting
on behalf of the business."431
425. Id. at S.
426. EU Bulletin EU5-1997 (Mar. 9, 1997).
427. Id.; see also Boswell, supra note 327, at 4.
428. 1997 Convention, supra note 361, at 12.
429. Id. at 16. Article 2 of the Convention defines "passive corruption" as:
The deliberate action of an official, who, directly or through an
intermediary, requests or receives advantages of any kind whatsoever, for
himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such an advantage, to act
or refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of his
functions in breach of his official duties ....
Id.
430. Id. Article 3 of the Convention defines "active corruption" as:
The deliberate action of whosoever promises or gives, directly or through an
intermediary, an advantage of any kind whatsoever to an official for himself
or for a third party for him to act or refrain from acting in accordance with
his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his official duties....
Id.
431. Id. Article 6 provides:
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to allow heads of
businesses or any persons having power to take decisions or exercise control
within a business to be declared criminally liable in accordance with the
principles defined by its national law in cases of corruption, as referred to in
Article 3, by a person under their authority acting on behalf of the business.
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Member States were to establish jurisdiction based on
territoriality, nationality, where the offense was committed against an
official of the European Union or member State official or where the
offender was an EU official.4  When extradition was denied on the
basis of nationality, the State denying extradition was to establish
jurisdiction over the offense, and documents and evidence were to be
transmitted to that State in aid of prosecution.433 Member States were
also to cooperate with each other in investigating cases of bribery
432- Id. at 16-17. Convention Article 7 provides:
1. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences it has established in accordance with the
obligations arising out of Articles 2, 3 and 4 where:
(a) the offence is committed in whole or in part within its territory;
(b) the offender is one of its nationals or one of its officials
(c) the offence is committed against one of the persons referred to in
Article 1 or a member of one of the European Community
Institutions referred to in Article 4(1) who is at the same time one
of its nationals;
(d) the offender is a Community official working for a European
Community Institution or a body set up in accordance with the
Treaties establishing the European Communities which has its
headquarters in the Member State in question.
2. Each Member State may declare, when giving the notification provided
for in Article 13(2), that it will not apply or will apply only in specific
cases or conditions one or more of the jurisdiction rules laid down in
paragraph 1(b), (c) and (d).
Id.
433. Id. at 17. Convention Article 8 provides:
1. Any Member State which, under its law, does not extradite its own
nationals shall take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction
over the offences it has established in accordance with the obligations
arising out of Articles 2, 3 and 4, when committed by its own nationals
outside its territory.
2. Each Member State shall, when one of its nationals is allkged to have
committed in another Member State an offense eslablished in
accordance with the obligations arising out of Articles 2, 3 and 4 and it
does not extradite that person to that other Member State solely on the
found of his nationality, submit the case to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution if appropriate. In ordex to enable
prosecution to take place, the files, information and exhibits relating to
the offence shall be transmitted in accordance with the procedures laid
down in Article 6 of the European Convention on Extradition of 13
December 1957. The requesting Member State shall be informed of the
prosecution initiated and of its outcome.
3. For the purposes of this Article, the term 'national' of a Member State
shall be construed in accordance with any declaration made by that
State under Article 6(1)(b) of the European Convention on Extradition
and with paragraph 1(c) of that Article.
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and, in instances when more than one State had jurisdiction over the
offense, in determining which State would prosecute."' Disputes
among member States arising from interpretation or application of
the Convention were to be submitted to the Court of Justice for
resolution. 5
434. Id. Convention Article 9 provides:
1. If any procedure in connection with an offence established in
accordance with the obligations arising out of Articles 2, 3 and 4
concerns at least two Member States, those States shall cooperate
effectively in the investigation, the prosecution and in carrying out the
punishment imposed by means, for example, of mutual legal assistance,
extradition, transfer of proceedings or enforcement of sentences passed
in another Member State.
2. Where more than one Member State has jurisdiction and has the
possibility of viable prosecution of an offence based on the same facts,
the Member States involved shall cooperate in deciding %%hich shall
prosecute the offender or offenders vith a view to centralizing the
prosecution in a single Member State where possible.
Id.
435. Id. at 18. Convention Article 12 provides:
1. Any dispute between Member States on the interpretation or
application of this Convention which it has proved impossible to resolve
bilaterally must in an initial stage be examined by the Council in
accordance with the procedure set out in Title VI of the Treaty on
European Union with a view to reaching a solution. If no solution has
been found within six months, the matter may be referred to the Court
of Justice of the European Communities by one of the parties to the
dispute.
2. Any dispute between one or more Member States and the Commission
of the European Communities concerning Article 1, with the exception
of point (c), or Articles 2, 3 and 4, insofar as it concerns a question of
Community law or the Communities' financial interests, or involves
members or officials of Community institutions or bodies set up in
accordance with the Treaties establishing the European Communities,
which it has proved impossible to settle through negotiation, may be
submitted to the Court of Justice by one of the parties to the dispute.
3. Any court in a Member State may ask the Court of Justice to give a
preliminary ruling on a matter concerning the interpretation of Articles
1 to 4 and 12 to 16 raised in a case pending before it and involhing
members or officials of Community institutions or bodies set up in
accordance with the Treaties establishing the European Communities,
acting in the exercise of their functions, if it considers that a decision on
that matter is necessary to enable it to give judgment.
4. The competence of the Court of Justice provided for in paragraph 3
shall be subject to its acceptance by the Member State concerned in a
declaration to that effect made at the time of the notification referred to
in Article 13(2) or at any subsequent time.
5. A Member State making a declaration under paragraph 4 may restrict
the possibility of asking the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling
to those of its courts against the decisions of which there is no judicial
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Furthermore, on October 6, 1997, the Council of Ministers
adopted a common position supporting the creation of international
instruments to make bribery of foreign officials and officials of
international organizations a crime." The common position
emphasized that it was in accordance with the program of action
against corruption that the Council of Europe adopted in November
1996 and the May 1997 OECD Recommendation on Bribery.437
3. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
The World Bank defined corruption as "the abuse of public
office for private gain."4 According to World Bank President James
D. Wolfensohn, "The international community simply must deal with
the cancer of corruption, because it is a major barrier to sustainable
and equitable development .... The World Bank Group stands
ready to do all we can to help our member countries and partners to
increase their efforts in the fight against corruption." '439
To that end, in August 1996, the Bank's Board of Executive
Directors revised the guidelines for loans and credits."' The
guidelines state that the bank's policy requires borrowers and
"bidders/suppliers/contractors" of contracts financed by the bank to
"observe the highest standard of ethics during the procurement and
execution of such contracts.""' In accordance with that policy, the
Bank will reject a proposal for financing if it determines that the
recommended bidder for the contract engaged in a corrupt ' or
remedy under national law.
6. The Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Community and its
Rules of procedure shall apply. In accordance with those Statutes, any
Member State, or the Commission, whether or not it has made a
declaration pursuant to paragraph 4, shall be entitled to submit
statements of case or written observations to the Court of Justice in
cases which arise under paragraph 3.
Id.
436. EU Bulletin EU1O-1997 (Jan. 13,1998).
437. Id.
438. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 240, at ch. 2.
439. Id. at Foreword.
440. See THE WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES FOR PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD
LOANS AND IDA CREDrrs (1996) (IBRD is the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, and IDA is the International Development
Association).
441. Id. at 7.
442. The Guidelines define "corrupt practice" as the "offering, giving, receiving,
or soliciting of anything of value to influence the action of a public official in the
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fraudulent practice 3 in competing for the contract. ' The Bank will
also cancel the portion of a loan allocated to a contract if the Bank
determines "corrupt or fraudulent practices were engaged in by
representatives of the borrower or of a beneficiary of the loan during
the procurement or the execution of that contract, unless the
borrower takes timely and appropriate remedial action satisfactory to
the Bank45
Furthermore, the Bank may bar a firm from receiving a Bank
financed contract, either indefinitely or for a fixed period, if the firm
engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices: Additionally, the Bank
may require that a contract provide the Bank with the right to inspect
and audit the accounts and records of suppliers and contractors.
E. Summary
Beginning contemporaneously with Congress' consideration of
procurement process or in contract execution." Id.
443. The Guidelines define "fraudulent practice" as:
A misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a procurement process or
the execution of a contract to the detriment of the borrower, and includes
collusive practices among bidders (prior to or after bid submission) designed
to establish bid prices at artificial, non-competitive levels and to deprive the
borrower of the benefits of free and open competition.
Id.
444. Id. Section 1.15(b) of the Guidelines provides that the Bank -will reject a
proposal for award if it determines that the bidder recommended for award has
engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices in competing for the contract in question
.... Id.
445. Id. at 7-8. Section 1.15(c) of the Guidelines provides that the Bank:
will cancel the portion of the loan allocated to a contract for goods or works
if it at any time determines that corrupt or fraudulent practices were
engaged in by representatives of the Borrower or of a beneficiary of the loan
during the procurement or the execution of that contract, without the
Borrower having taken timely and appropriate action satisfactory to the
Bank to remedy the situation ....
Id.
446. Id. at S. Section 1.15(d) of the Guidelines provides that the Bank, -%ill
declare a firm ineligible, either indefinitely or for a stated period of time, to b2
awarded a Bank-financed contract if it at any time determines that the firm had
engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices in competing for, or executing, a Bank-
financed contract." Id.
447. Id. Section 1.5(e) of the Guidelines provides that the Bank:
will have the right to require that, in a contract financed by a bank loan, a
provision be included requiring Suppliers and Contractors to permit the
Bank to inspect their accounts and records relating to the performance of
the contract and to have them audited by auditors appointed by the Bank.
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the FCPA and during the ensuing twenty-one years, the United States
has worked through international organizations to build an
international consensus for the prohibition of bribery in international
transactions. The United States has, by no means, acted alone in this
regard. Anti-bribery measures at the national and multinational level
have been advocated by Transparency International, the
International Chamber of Commerce and the 'World Trade
Organization, among others. As a result of these efforts, the United
Nations, the EU, the OAS and the OECD condemned the bribery of
foreign officials. These organizations called for the criminalization of
international bribery and elimination of the tax deductibility of
bribes.
Additionally, the OAS and OECD adopted multinational
conventions that, if ratified and implemented by their signatories, will
have far reaching effects in the apprehension, investigation and
prosecution of transnational corruption. These conventions not only
seek to assure uniform treatment of persons and entities engaging in
international bribery, but they also resolve difficult issues of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by establishing the basis of a State's
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction and by facilitating mutual
assistance in securing evidence and in instances of extradition.
Implementation of the conventions, however, will require
significant changes in the laws of countries that presently do not
regard the bribery of foreign officials as a crime. Indeed, the
continuing debate and disagreement among members of the OECD
Working Group concerning payments to foreign political parties and
candidates reveal that despite the growing consensus on foreign
bribery, there remain sharp cultural and political differences as to
what constitutes international corruption.
IV. Conclusion
In 1977, Congress concluded that the overseas "questionable
payments" U.S. corporations made in the early 1970s harmed the
strategic and diplomatic interests of the United States. It also found
that these interests would continue to be threatened unless Congress
asserted prescriptive jurisdiction extraterritorially to prohibit foreign
corrupt payments by U.S. entities and individuals. The resulting
FCPA was an aggressive, though not unique, exercise of Congress'
nationality-based and passive territorial and effects-based jurisdiction
to regulate the conduct of U.S. nationals overseas.
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Congress recognized that this exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction risked offending the sovereignty of other nations and the
concomitant harm to U.S. international relations. To accommodate
these concerns, Congress restricted the reach of the Act to those
persons and entities over which U.S. jurisdiction existed by virtue of
nationality or some other basis. In so doing, Congress eschewed the
problematic assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign
nationals (i.e., foreign officials and foreign corporations, including
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies) for offenses committed
outside the United States.
Enforcement of the FCPA is shared by the U.S. Department of
Justice and the SEC and has been consistently restrained as reflected
in the recent enforcement actions against Montedison, S.p.A. and
Triton Energy Corporation. However, because the United States is
virtually alone in prohibiting foreign bribery, U.S. companies are
subject to constraints in conducting international business to which
their foreign competitors are not subject. Thus, regardless of whether
the FCPA caused U.S. companies to lose business, the international
commerce playing field is not level.
For that reason, U.S. authorities, with Congress' endorsement,
pursued international initiatives to proscribe the corrupt practices of
those not subject to U.S. jurisdiction. These efforts, which began
contemporaneously with Congress' earliest consideration of the
FCPA, have enjoyed remarkable success. At the urging of the United
States, and with the support of organizations such as Transparency
International and the ICC, a consensus against international bribery
has developed in a multinational setting. Indeed, the United Nations.
the World Trade Organization and the European Union all publicly
condemned foreign bribery and proposed measures to combat
international corruption.
The conventions that the OAS and the OECD recently adopted
hold the greatest promise for multinational reform. Although their
approaches and provisions differ, both conventions mandate
uniformity among their respective signatories in the prohibition and
punishment of foreign bribery. Of equal significance is the fact that
both conventions establish and clarify the basis of jurisdiction over
the offenses prescribed therein and mandate mutual legal assistance
in investigation and prosecution of bribery, including extradition and
the elimination of bank secrecy as a barrier to assistance.
The conventions are powerful statements of principle. More
importantly, however, if the conventions are ratified and
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implemented, the U.S. government's twenty-year campaign against
international bribery largely will have been realized.
